CHAPTER - I
The title of my Ph.D research topic is "The constitution of modern ideology: a discourse-analysis of the intellectuals of Delhi". My research interest deviates from the contemporary empiricist or positivist epistemological research tradition of a social sciences. The discourse method, which I will use in the interpretation of ideology of the intellectuals—be they conservative or radical—or Liberal or Marxist, or Western or Indians, has a close affinity with the epistemology, ontology and logic of structuralism. Serious research requires an effort to be the objective with respect of what is being studied, but it does not demand that researcher be "value free" or that those undertaking research be neutral in the sense of not caring about the subject matter under investigation. It does assume that the researcher can separate the self from what is being studied though it is probably impossible to eliminate all distortion or prejudice. Social scientists are not condemned to total, complete subjectivity and relativism just because they are human and the object of their study is social realm. The generally accepted model of research also includes a set of methodological principles and procedure considered essential to the production of defensible research. They certain to the research process itself (deduction versus induction; a concrete versus an abstract point of departure), the character of observation or intellectualization and interpretation, the meaning of data and concepts the explanatory forms, for expressing the rules that constitute theory (e.g; causal, dialectical, teleological etc) and the methodological requirements of theory (construction, testing and application).

The methodological assumptions of contemporary social
science require a certain empirical grounding in evidence with respects to theory construction. Research entails both deductive and inductive activities. It is inductive when it generalizes from observations. It is deductive when it examines the implications of specific theories applying the general principle to specific cases. A priori deduction which consist of postulating a formal set of relationships and examining their logical consequences is not acceptable if such activity is set apart from all the reference to testing by observation and comparison with evidence or if it is organized so that it automatically passes every possible test as a result of internal self-definition.

For any scientific research, the cardinal values of a working hypothesis are many:

(a) Formulation of a hypothesis gives definite point to the inquiry.
(b) It aids in establishing direction in which to proceed.
(c) It helps to delimit the field of inquiry by singling out the pertinent facts on which to concentrate and by determining which facts should be set aside, at least for the time being. The use of a hypothesis, thus, prevents a blind search and indiscriminate gathering of data which may later prove irrelevant to the problem under study. George Lundberg, experienced social researcher and theorist observes that "the only difference between gathering data without an hypothesis and gathering them with one is that in the later case we deliberately recognize the limitations of our sense and attempt to reduce their fallibility by limiting our field of investigation so as to permit a greater concentration of attention on the particular aspects which past experience leads us to believe are significant for our purpose."(1).

(1) George Landberg, Social Research (Longmans: Greene and Co; 1942), p.199
A researcher should not start out to prove the correctness of his hypothesis. He should test them and accept either negative or positive results in true scientific spirit of inquiry negative results can be just as important as positive ones.

Thus, contemporary social research assumes that absolute observation permits one to produce knowledge that goes beyond appearances, beyond the self-evident, to get at underlying causes. In the process of observation, one identifies and selects from the complexity of real world that which is interesting for the particular purposes of a study and omits that which is irrelevant. Interpretation is part of the set of procedures associated with research. In terms of the general model, it is not a process of creating a reality but rather one of discovery, valid only when constrained by reference to evidence. There may be any number of non-conflicting interpretations of what is being observed. But these should not be contradictory or inconsistent with each other. The meaning of data and their role in research are central to a generally accepted model of research. Data are defined here as descriptions, symbolic statements, about reality produced by observations and interpretation. Data constitute the most basic level of processed information resulting from the observation of the incoming flow of raw perceptions of the real world. Data are assumed to reflect reality and to be of use in understanding it, rather than constructed or invented in the sense of being arbitrary concepts or tools for identifying, organizing and setting the bounds of what is observed. It is preferable that concepts be defined in real terms rather than nominal terms and that they be linked to indicators that permit measured values to be assigned to the variables that represent them.

Explanatory forms and theories are also integral elements
of the generally accepted model. Explanatory forms refer to the patterns of relationships among data observed in the world around us. Theories are composed of rule like statements of regularities expressed in terms of these explanatory forms. Causality is an example. Theories consist of these types of generalizations that can be tested and guide inquiry. The policy making models adds to this definition of theory the requirement that explanatory forms be casual in character so that they can serve as the basis for intervention. The methodological dimensions of theory concern its construction testing and applications. A theory must he constructed with reference to observations and data, and it concepts must be defined in real terms. It should be tested against reality with reference to evidence. Evidence takes on a variety of forms. Application is central to justifying theory within the real terms of the policy making model. Specific assumptions underlie modern social science. Science refers to the whole process of doing research and producing knowledge systematically and rigorously. Based on observation, it seeks to organize and explain, directly or indirectly, the data that constitute the basic material of research. Its general method is to isolate elements and specify relationships. Its final goal is the synthesis of these elements and processes science is assumed to be generally utility for humankind. This notion is central to the policy-making model as well. None of this denies that science can be manipulated and distorted, that is, used for the ends of one group rather than those of another. But ultimately science is assumed to have a neutral core. It is not class determined politics should not be put above science in the sense of dictating, in advance, either methods or research result. Science should be independent of any particular political ideology. However one can say that "Science is essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical an archism.
is more humanitarium an more likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives" (2). This is shown both by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between ideas and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress is anything goes. For example, we may use hypothesis that contradicts well confirmed theories and or well-established experimental results. We may advance science by proceeding counter-inductively. Sociological theory comprises of six types of works:

(a) "Methodology ; (b) General Sociological Orientations ; (c) analysis of Sociological Concepts;
(d) Post factum sociological interpretations ; (e) Empirical generalization in sociology ; and
(f) Sociological Theory". (3)

Thus we can argue the empiricist epistemology of social sciences demand a strict testing and verification of hypothesis. The model for the proper way of performing the rituals of science is as familiar as it is clear. The investigator begins with a hunch or hypothesis, from this he draws various inferences and these, in turn, are subjected to empirical test which confirms or refutes the hypothesis. But this is a logical model, and so fails, of course, to describe much of what actually occurs in fruitful investigation. It presents a set of logical norms, not a description of the research experience. And, as logicians are well aware, in purifying the

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experience, the logical model may also distort it. Like other models, it abstracts from the temporal sequence of events. It exaggerates the creative role of explicit theory just as it minimizes the creative role of observations. For research is not merely logic tempered with observation. It has its psychological as well as its logical dimensions, although one would scarcely suspect this from the logically rigorous sequence in which research is reported. It is both the psychological and logical pressures of research upon social theory which we seek to trace. Thus there is central thesis that empirical research goes far beyond the passive role of verifying and testing theory: it does more confirm or refute hypothesis. "Research plays an active role: it performs at least four major functions which help the development of theory. It initiates, it reformulates, it deflects and it clarifies theory"\(^{(4)}\). As opposed to romantics empiricists are determinists in the sense that they hold this view that human freedom is to be limited by external and internal environmental and physiological constraints. Empiricist like Hume holds this view that all the phenomena and human intervention itself are logical, predictable and causal in character and, generally lawful rather than chaotic, haphazard, arbitrary and random. This epistemology of empiricism agrees with the logic of positivism which proceeds with this notion that a whole can be defined as more than a sum of its parts. in order to find objectivity, empiricists strive to apply the procedures of the natural sciences to the study of human behaviour and emphasize the importance of observations and observable experience. Concepts must be defined in the real terms and indicators and indices are sought out to set the limits and the use of the concepts. The research

\(^{(4)}\)Ibid., p.157
techniques which are employed by the empiricists include the social survey, structured interview, public opinion poll, quantitative contents analysis, sociometry, laboratory experiments, social distance rating scales, data analysis techniques such as casual modeling and analysis of variance, etc.

It was Hume who announced the philosophy of empiricism, though his position became ambivalent. The position of ambivalence stems from the logic of inconsistency between his misguided insistence on "tracking ideas to their origin" and his tendency to oversimplify the facts; However, he sought to establish a law-like or probable casual connections between matters of facts on the basis of methods of logical knowledge and proof. It is the domain of matter of facts in which objects, events, passions, actions and mental and physical states and process can be made to enter. The association of ideas may be analysed either by resemblance or by cause-effect system. Matters of facts are founded on the relation of cause and effects. We can never infer the existence of one object from another unless they are connected together. Therefore, one fact is the cause of another facts. Causes must precede their effects and there can be no interval of time between cause and effects. The behaviour of objects can not be treated individually, but is located in a spatio-temporal system and this may be taken to entail that the identification of any individual objects carries the presupposition that there are others to which it stands in some spatio-temporal relation in short, empiricists understands causality as the ground of the factual inference, and they speak of the unity of science.

The romantics view of social reality is grounded in a theory of knowledge which is close to voluntarism than determinism, because it regards free will to be more important than social factors in influencing action. It believes in the fact that people are goal-oriented and are capable
of defining their own reality in such a way as to create their social world with very few constraints. This human-centered philosophy puts great weight on the subject, the meaning of expressive idea and personal consciousness. This philosophy can be recognized by what Althusser calls the theory of "theoretical humanism". The romantic's epistemology emphasizes knowledge as indicating to the "expressive totality"; but of an anti-positivism and generally anti-empiricist character. This approach rejects the thesis of unity of sciences; because it sees human as special and apart from nature. The methodology of romanticism is interpretive and it claims that observation should be treated as an activity of creative construction by the human mind, a form of self-reflection. The romantics see theory as having priority over data; and mode of explanation consists of quantitative method and subjective tools. The research strategies, most compatible with their assumptions about inquiry, include: verstetien, symbolic, interactinism, ethnomethodology, Freudian psychology, semilogy, linguistics, phenomenology, sociology, and existentialism. The research techniques commonly associated with these research strategies include: participant observations, field work, case studies, life history, qualitative analysis, unstructured (open ended) questionnaires, and in depth interviews. For this philosophies self reflection, institution, empathy, insights, inspirations situational descriptions and perceptions constitute the ground for teleological explanation which puts emphasis on goal-oriented behaviour. One can say that the epistemology of "Philosophic Marxists" (5) like

Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas rely on the epistemology of romantics who reject direct causality as a form of explanation; but they retain dialectics and teleology which constitute the central themes of their method. By teleology they mean that the effect proceeds the cause and determines it. A preconceived state of affairs or a goal, acts as a cause of human activity, even though it would appear to an observer as an effect. The philosophies strongly criticize the materialist dialectician; because for materialist, dialectics is rigorously structured logic or a set of laws. Deductivistic dialialetic is simplistic and mechanical. The philosophic's own version of the dialectic is Hegelian in character, highly therotical and abstract in form and idealist in content. They see it as a universal explanatory form that includes a metaphysical, ontological understanding of the universe, a method of knowing, a means to transform society. The dialectic applies only to history and society, never to nature.

The philosophics understand dialectic as an alternative to direct causality as perceived by empiricists within dialectical explanation" every cause of an effect can be understood at the same time an effect of an effect". Instantaneous reciprocal influence is the rule. The effect of one element on another element is like an incorporation, a reflection and a manifestation of the dominant process in the other. The mechanisms of this developmental process are internal. The tension inherit in the polarity of opposites will disappear only after the revolution when opposites will be resolved and overcome. The dialectic is not an objective explanatory form but rather an expression of the subjective lawfulness of men.

When the philosophic do research, they generally select subjective, qualitative research strategies and techniques associated with them, which involve assumptions about inquiry, compatible with their
own views of epistemology, method and science. For example, they believe in action research which attributes a participatory role of those being studied. The philosophics reject quantitative research techniques because they believe that these tools of inquiry dehumanize people, presume a view of mankind as passive, exaggerate the predictability of human behaviour and underestimate the possibility of human intervention and purposeful action to change a situation.

The Philosophic Marxists argue that social surveys, small group methods, and sociometry are reductionists because they think that an understanding of the whole can be obtained by adding up the constituent parts. These research techniques as well as quantitative content analysis and laboratory experiments are criticized for neglecting the historical aspects of a topic which are important for an adequate understanding of the totality. They object to the assimilation of natural and social science, implied by the transfer of methods from the natural science to the social science. The unity of sciences is theorized by empiricists and positivists who try to established relationship between variable under considerations.

Philosophic Marxists argue that human behaviour cannot be quantified because it involves value and cognition. They also condemn the research tools of contemporary social science because their techniques assume objectivity as a goal. The argue that information obtained from interview and questionaires in the context of social survey cannot be objective. They say that this research techniques tap only superficial and miniformed opinion what Marxists call false consciousness. This is so, first, because those individuals included in a survey sample are interviewed in isolation, away from friends and in an artificial social
context, and therefore, they do not have a chance to grasp the real significance of any particular question. Second, the closed format of most survey questions makes it impossible for people to express what they really mean and feel because they can not answer in their own words and in the context they perceive to be relevant to the question. Further, empiricist assumes a distinction between the object and subject of research. In fact, in reality they can be fused together if we take the concept of totality.

One can say that public opinions and voting studies as examples of research techniques give only superficial appearance of reality without noting about the real essence of a reality which is hidden. Further, the contemporary research method is incompatible to dialectical explanation where everything is overlapping and interconnected. By rejecting the empiricist research strategies such as causal modeling and analysis of variance, we can choose research strategies that are qualitative and subjective methods of knowing the reality. For example, research strategies associated with hermeneutics, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology etc. are highly critical of empiricists and positivists, epistemology and research techniques. Many of these research strategies of anti-empiricists camp which were developed by non-Marxist sociologists who were themselves disillusioned with the positivism and empiricism, implicit in the generally accepted model of research; its reputed lack of a humanist focus; its acceptance of quantification and computer technology etc. The subjective and qualitative research techniques may be related to a Marxist point of view by studing metaphysical and aesthetic questions, cultural concerns, political and personal struggles, psychology and personality. Through hermeneutics we can understand and interpret
the cognitive products of human mind which characterize the social and cultural world. Based, for example, on personal insight and genesis of language and documents, we can assign communication to a position of central importance in the understanding of society-language terms out to be more than just a "system of symbols" for labelling the external world; and it becomes an expression of human mode of "being-in-the-world.

The research techniques of symbolic interactionism focus attention of the relationship between those studied, between the self and the subject studied, and between the self and fellow social scientists. It examines interaction sequence, searching for the process by which meaning is assigned and symbols are interpreted in a given situation. It emphasizes direct, first hand knowledge of the object of study. Ethnomethodology looks at everyday life experiences, at the particular character of what are considered to be routine occurrences that are generally taken for granted. Human behaviour in social situations and institutional context is explained as rule following activity. But each person interprets rule differently and according to context. The fixing of meaning is something actively done by participants in a particular social interaction. The ethnomethodology argues for the superiority of intuition as a methodology.

The specific qualitative research techniques which can imply, are participant observation, field work, oral biography, qualitative content analysis, unstructured(open ended) questionnaires and in depth interviews. Philosophic Marxists put emphasis on the intellectual and theoretical aspects of their mainly dialectical and interpretative methodology which aims to provide truth directly from the senses without the intermediary processes of empirically constrained observation,
concepts, data, theory and so on. Thus we can focus attention on individual consciousness on personal experience on situational description, on intentions and on motivations of various intellectuals who have analysed the ideological formation of the modern society.

As opposed to empiricists and romantic epistemological position rationalists believe in deductive metaphysico-scientific method and stress the power of apriori-reason, based upon innate ideas, to grasp the substantial truth about the world. However, there is an element of dualism between mind and matter in the works of Descartes, Spinoza and Cartesian. Leibritz tried to overcome the dualism or polarity by his ideas of "pre-established harmony" geometrical method and a universal calculus. He argues that demonstration of scientific truth cannot be achieved through self-evident axioms but through logical insights on the basis of the law of non-contradiction.

Modern rationalism provides the philosophical basis for a number of modern theories including French structuralism, post-structuralism and new social realism. The rationalist are neither determinist nor voluntarist and they have given an anti-empiricist epistemology. The rationalists methodology emphasizes reason, logical order and intellectual reflection as opposed to observation related to empirical referents. Rationalists evaluate theory not by comparing it with empirical reality. Their theories conceive of reality in terms of underlying rules, structures, process or system of signification, defined with the aid of analytical-abstraction rather than with concrete and empirical content rationalist like Spinoza rejects every thesis of origin, transcendence or an unknowable world, even disguised within the absolute interiority of the "Essence". For Spinoza, the idea of 'Truth' and the idea of 'Jurisdiction' of criterion
always go together because the function of the criterion is to identify the truth of what is true. Further, Spinoza goes on to say that what is true, identifies, not as a presence, but as a product which emerges in its own production.

The structural Marxist like Althusser has been greatly influenced by Spinoza. Althusser rejects either an essentially idealist or an exclusively materialist view of the world and seek instead to reconcile the two by integrating what he considers to be the most interesting aspect of each. Other important structuralists who at the one time or another were considered to be Marxists, include Jacques Lacan, Maurice Godelier, Gorgan Therborn, Manuel Castells, Nicos Poulantzas, Michel Foucault and David Harvey. The structuralist's theory of knowledge falls between that of absolute correspondence or reflection and that of absolute mental construction. They bring together an imaginative combination of epistemological assumptions that includes both idealism and materialism. Althusser maintains that the ultimately "the superiority of one over another cannot be provided" (6) The structuralists see reality as a system of internal relations or structures which cannot be viewed at all—either directly or indirectly. These structures, which are continually fusing, dividing and recombining, constitute society or social formations. Reality is hidden beneath the surface, disguised appearances are deceptive. There is no possibility of linking observable evidence to these underlying structures. For some structuralists these problems are serious enough to

require that they reject a materialist theory of knowledge and opt for idealism. They argue that all we know about the world which is produced in thought alone. Reality is accessible only to the mind. Althusser suggests that the object of knowledge, the "object-in-thought" is absolutely distinct from the "real object", the external concrete thing-in-itself. Thoughts and reality are entirely separate realms. At the same time, we can argue that the structuralists view of the world is materialist, in that they argue that there is only one objective structural reality, though it may be in constant flux. They reject the subject (person) in history and emphasizes on structural factors.

The structuralists and especially Althusser, are committed to studying the totality or whole which they define as a structure. However, they reorient the dynamic of the totality in favour of the increased autonomy of parts, relative to the totality. Neither do they deny that all parts tell us something of interest about the totality. Each element in the totality (economic, political, theoretical and ideological) is influenced by the others, but each has own rhythm of historical development, its own contradictions or internal problems. The structuralists agree that the parts are a direct manifestation of the totality, but they do not see. The parts as necessarily reflecting the dominant theme present in the totality. "The parts can not be understood without considering the relations with one another and the contribution each makes to the continued existence of the totality" (7). In effect, the structuralist seeks to have it both ways. They emphasize the influence of the whole on the parts and the effects of the

(7) Althusser and Baliber, Reading capital (London: New Left Books; 1968), PP. 205-206
different parts on each other as well. The structuralist Marxists give a lower priority to the economic element of the whole than do the materialists. The structuralists reject the view that economic is merely the expression of the other parts. Rather they say that it determines which of the parts will be ultimately play a dominant role in the society at any particular point of time. But like the materialists, the structuralists grant that in the "last instance", the economic wins out over the other parts. Althusser, however, adds a warning to the effect that the "last instance" never arrives. The structuralists look for explanation in the dynamic interconnection of the parts and the whole rather than in the action of individual members of society. This rejection of the human "subject" as an object of valid research which prohibits social science inquiry from examining individual human beings as constituent elements of any whole.

The structuralist Marxists reject empiricism in all its forms. Essentially, their critique of crude empiricism is the same as the philosophics. Ignoring the distinction between crude and general empiricism, they refer to both as modern empiricism and discard them. Althusser outlines the idealist basis of classical empiricism and its metaphysical contents, and associates this forms of empiricism with philosophical subjectivism. He divorces his own form of structuralist Marxism from this type of empiricism as well because it attributes more importance to personal experience to "the conscious will of individuals, their action and their private undertakings"(8) than to structural reality. Althusser concludes that no inquiry can improve our understanding of society. If it is limited to what we sense, or what can study using the

empiricist procedures of contemporary social science. The research tools of empiricism emphasize quantifiable observation. The structuralists argue that the quantitative study of human behaviour, central to empiricism, is unacceptable because statistics can not go beyond appearances. For the structuralists reality is a series of structures that cannot be directly observed or studied with concrete research methods because structures are not parts of empirical reality. Theory, which refers to these structures, must be constructed by researchers only through the use of "scientific" reasoning as based upon logical and intellectual coherence.

In addition, an empiricist view conceives of knowledge as a "real part of the real object, the real structure of the real object" (9). Finally, the structuralists argue that empiricism is idealism. They say that because empiricism requires looking at the individuals, it encourages humanism and historicism which, in turn, implies an acceptance of idealism. Althusser contents that "idealism is the unacceptable consequence of all forms of empiricism" (10). Although Althusser and the structuralists are anti-empiricist, many of Althusser's students and followers, like Nicos Poulantzas, have produced interesting concrete and even empirical works. This is in part because Althusser himself has revised his position in his work recent work, admitting, for example, that it might be of some use to examine the object itself" (11). The structuralist Marxists are also hostile to positivism. "But they object very little to the assimilation of natural science with social sciences" (12). because

(9) Althusser and Balibar; 1968, op. cit., p. 38
(10) Althusser; 1965 op.cit, p.228
(11) Althusser; 1971 op. cit., PP 110-112
(12) Althusser; 1965 op. cit p.177
they believe that the two or similar and have a "dialectical unity". In short, the structuralists contend that Marxists cannot be positivists, but unlike the philosophics, they do not disagree with all of the elements of positivism like its distinction between ideology and science.

The deductivists who argue that social analysis must follow logically from what Marx, Engels and Lenin wrote, are Stalinist Marxists. Like deductivists, structuralists consider objectivity to be important and argue for the objectivity of their respective points of view. The deductivists do not, however, associate objectivity with rigorous research, nor do they require it to be based on observable experience. They maintain that dialectical materialism and "scientific socialism" provide an objective view of the world. In the most extreme form they contend that the laws governing society were discovered by Marx and Engels and Lenin need only be studied, understood and applied to guarantee objectivity. They assume that their point of view represents that of the working class which is an objective category in itself. The structuralists are also self-declared objectivists in the same sense as the deductivists. They oppose subjectivism, arguing that their Marxist structuralists method is scientific because it is based on the categories of mode of production, relations of productions, class-struggle, surplus value etc, not on 'humanism and economism'. However, the structuralists agree with the philosophics in that they also consider the subject and object of research not as "entities", but of relationships one to other. That is, they consider the subject and object to be linked; they see the subject as both structuring and being structured by the object. The structuralists argue that "if one distinguishes strictly between subject and object of research, one attributes too much importance to the particular roles of individuals,
thus once again violating the structuralists assumption that individuals are of no special significance." (13)

The structuralists take more seriously the need to go beyond appearances to underlying realities like the philosophics and deductivists, they feel that "reality is hidden and distorted as a result of the process of reification". (14) They argue that the underlying structural configurations that interest them and constitute the building blocks of the real world, can be studied only indirectly through their effects. Abstraction or systematic "theoretical labour" not observation, is required to uncover their dynamics. Among the structuralists, Althusser is notable for even further complicating the problems of discovering hidden reality. First, he claims that observation is useless since knowledge is theoretical, involving the "reproduction of the concrete by ways of thought". Then he asserts that even those who abandon observations and employ theoretical analysis to go beyond surface appearances will inevitably fall. "It is not the 'interior' that is important but the 'concept of interior' for knowledge of the 'inner aspect' always remains hidden, enclosed in an empiricism and an empirical state of mind". (15) For Althusser, 'there is a paradoxical identity of non-vision and vision within vision itself'. (16) The structuralists agree with the philosophics, arguing that exterior data are subject to 'interpretation' in a sense that a number of different even contradictory Interpretations of reality are defensible. But they maintain

(13) Althusser ; 1965 Ibid., p.25
(14) Althusser and Balibar ; 1968, p. cit p.313
(15) Althusser and Balibar ; 1968., Ibid., PP 190-1
(16) Althusser and Balibar ; 1968, Ibid, p.21
that their own interpretation in terms of "structures" is the only one that is objective and valid. Interpretation, as they view it, has no link to observable experience and is not constrained by reality. The structuralists' concepts are exclusively nominal in character intended, they say, to be "both universal and a historical". The concepts of over-determinism, displacement, condensation, contradiction and structure-in-dominance are central to Althusser's theories. He says that such concepts can not be "Categories of the social world" because knowledge of a real object is not reached by immediate contact but by the "production of the concepts of that object (in the sense of object of knowledge) as the absolute condition of its theoritical possibility". (17) As a result, the meaning of his concepts is contained completely in their formal definitions. They are separate from the real world without links to indicators.

So far as the causality is concerned, structuralists are opposed to the Hegelian expressive causality which is ideological. The structuralists argue against direct causality as an explanatory form. First, their anti- empiricism leads them to object to direct causality because it requires quantifiable evidence. Second, direct causality focuses on the importance of the parts than the whole. The structuralists criticize this because it would require them to look at individual subjects and their actions at events and at the concrete historical origins of phenomena". (18) They believe that a focus on these aspects of concrete reality is incompatible with their own commitment to understanding the world and change (what they call rupture) in terms of structure and higher level structural process.

(17) Althusser and Balibar; 1968 Ibid., p. 184
(18)Althusser and Balibar; 1968, Ibid., p. 164
They complain that direct causality leaves no room for understanding the depersonalized structural forces that work almost unconsciously, certainly without volition but that wield their influence just the same at the structural level.

The structuralists are not opposed to causality in an absolute sense, but it never requires cogent centrality in their analysis. Certain aspects of their epistemological views are consistent with causality: acceptance of structural determinism, emphasis on the interaction of the totality and parts, agreement with certain aspects of positivism and claims of objectivity for their own research. Now, the questions are: (a) What is structural causality? (b) How do the structuralists define it? The answer to these questions are: structural causality is multi-dimensional, a form of complex causality, a system of intricate causal chains of mediations and reciprocal effects rather than direct unidimensional cause-effect relations. This does not preclude a form of internal self-determination of structures where in one sub-structure may be temporarily predominant at a particular moment. Reality is a system of internal relations which is in the process in the being structured through the operations of its own transformation rules. Research has to be directed to discovering the transformation rules whereby society is consistently being restructured rather than to finding causes.

Although the structuralists do not reject causality itself, their view of it departs from that of contemporary social science. They use causal language, speaking of 'necessary conditions' admittedly in rather imprecise terms. These Marxists attempt to examine how structures (which are invisible) arise and in turn give rise to change. They maintain that structural causality is objective and scientific. But the problem with
this structural causality is that it is not open to being tested against reality. In addition; structural causality does not specify what exactly determines, or causes a specific phenomenon, indeed, it would be impossible to do so because" a structure exists in its effect and in not interely present in any of them. Although the structuralists point to the rate and timing of development of specific structures, they avoid direct causal statements. Precise prediction is also impossible because structures are constantly "combining, dissolving, and recombining". Everything is intimately linked to everything else at the level of structures. Feedback occurs immediately. A cause is "imminent in, not exterior to its effects." This precludes being very specific about causal links at any level or in terms of any unit of analysis. The structuralists view of causality is so general and amorphous that it is not likely to produce theoretical statements that can be used to predict and provide a basis for intervention. In effect, structural causality redefines causality transforming it into a form of inquiry, certainly not without interest but useful only for post hoc rationalization.

So far as the use of dialectics by the structural Marxists is concerned, we can maintain this position that they deny the utility of the kind of direct, individual level, causal explanatory forms that are essential to modern social science. They propose an alternative form-structural causality. What, then, is the role of dialectical explanation for the structuralists? There is considerable variation within the group. Some of the structuralists argue that dialectical laws constitute a useful explanatory form. People like David Harvey content that neither direct causal explanation nor dialectical explanation, aiming at general global laws

(19) Althusser and Balibar ; 1968 ; Ibid., PP. 188-9.
governing society, can substitute for structural causality. Another group of structuralists, represented by Meunier and Seung, retains dialectical explanation. They define it in terms of structuralist configurations rather than as conformations between individuals or specific concrete institutions. Some of the structuralists demonstrate considerable intellectual ability in reconciling dialectical laws to structuralist concepts. Thus, the transformation of quantity into quality is related to what they call "rupture"; the identity of opposites is linked to primary and secondary contradiction; and the principle of negation is interpreted in terms of the process of over-determination. Althusser's concept of over-determination has also been understood as a form of dialectical structure which assumes all at once, relative autonomy and reciprocal determination, relative dependence and relative independence. However, we can argue that dialectical laws are neither essential to structuralist Marxists nor incompatible with it. But no matter how well these Marxists harmonize structural causality and dialectics, they still do not satisfy the methodological requirements of contemporary scientific inquiry. Their use of the dialectic remains vague, resting on "theoretical work" rather than an concrete research to identify structures. Specific predictions are not considered important.

Theory, produced through abstractions, also of primary importance to the structuralists because, as Althusser contends, it transforms ideology into knowledge. As he argues that "theory is itself a form of practice or activity in which the real world is appropriated by thought" (20). By this he means that reality is simply seized or taken over by the mind. This conception has important consequence for theory

construction. Theoretical practice, like any other practice, is defined as the process of transformation of a determinate given raw material into a determinate product undertaken by human labour, using determinate means of production" (21). Althusser means that theory, arrived at through intellectual abstraction is, like any other activity, a form of work once removed from reality. It involves transforming a specific object into something more sophisticated in character, with the help of the tools available to do such labour at any particular point in time. "What distinguishes theoretical practice from other practices is that it takes place entirely in the realm of thought" (22). Theories, as defined by Althusser, generate their own explanations and predictions out of their own intellectual procedures, without reference to reality. According to Althussers, in the structuralists view of theory construction, there is no role for data, real concepts with indicators, observation of the world, or general investigation in general.

Althusser and the structuralists reject contemporary social science norms regarding the testing of theory. This view follows logically from their understanding of theory construction as "Theoretical Practice" as an intellectual process. They deny the need to test against evidence. Althusser rejects actual empirical engagement with reality. As structuralists see it, data are products of the theory in which they are constructed. Because each individual has his or her reading of reality, there is no basis in external evidence for judging any particular theory's adequacy. Althusser argues that to argue such testing is merely pragmatism which he rejects.

(21) Althusser, 1965; op. cit., p 166
(22) Althusser and Balibar; 1968, op. cit., p. 42
No true science, he observes, ever depends on such outside verification". \(^{(23)}\)

Althusser is specially hostile to history as a source of evidence for testing theory. His objections refer to the underlying assumptions of history itself which he says imply a view of time as read on a calendar, as continuous. He argues that time is complex and non-linear. Structures have different and independent time sequences and do not co-exist in the same time frame. He objects to the empiricism implicit within a historical perspective, constituted of a succession of events. He maintains that little can be learned from history about what is going on at the moment. He attributes "primacy to the present over the past". \(^{(24)}\) As an alternative to the testing of theory, Althusser suggests, that it should be evaluated on the basis of its internal characteristics of scientific problematic. By problematic, Althusser means questions posed and answers sought. Theory depends on the internal articulation and development of its discourse, not upon the pseudo-innocence of an appeal to experience or experiment. Althusser reasons that theory produces a special object (knowledge) which has its own internal criteria of validity. There are, he continues, "definite protocols with which to validate the quality of its product [Theory], i.e. the criteria of the scientificity of the products of scientific practice". \(^{(25)}\) While vague on the specifics, Althusser seems to argue that theory should be evaluated by strictly logical, intellectual procedures. The adequacy of a theory rests entirely with the

\(^{(23)}\) Althusser and Balibar, 1968; Ibid., p.59 and also see Althusser, 1965, op. cit., p. 173

\(^{(24)}\) Althusser and Balibar; 1968; Ibid., PP. 61-63 and p. 125.

beauty the theoretical structure, the systematization of its concepts, its analytical rigor, its internal consistency and its logic. None of these criteria is without importance. But the question remains. Are they sufficient? Can a theory be of value in and of itself, independently of concrete reality? Without testing the adequacy of a theory by comparison with reality, there is little possibility correcting mistakes internal to the theoretical structures. Theory tested only with respect to internal criteria cannot produce knowledge useful for policy making because it is designed to be of use, not in changing reality, but only in describing it abstractly.

The structuralists claim that their own research is scientific and objective, indeed they frequently criticize the philosophic Marxists as relativist and unscientific. The structuralists claim that their definition of science is based on rigorous, objective and theoretical form of inquiry. They say that it consists of an original system of concepts that are both neither relative nor subjective. They argue that their research is scientific, in the sense that is opposed to speculation or sentimentalism. Structuralists see it as open-ended, the opposite of ideology which is dogmatic and closed. They note that, whereas all sciences has its origin in ideology, Marx showed the way to break with this view and create an objective science apart from ideology (26). We can reduce Althusser's conception of science into three points. First, the structuralists say that because their science is structuralist in character, it must be anti-empiricist and anti-humanist. For Althusser, this means that science cannot involve individual human beings employing research techniques, studying, experimenting or observing reality, drawing conclusions and formulating theories. What

(26) Althusser and Balibar, 1968; Ibid., p. 314
he calls "the subjective role" (any function reserved for the individual practitioner in the research process) is absent from the inquiry. Second, structuralist science searches for a structural reality that is "more true and authentic than appearances". Althusser states that "this science designates a concrete reality which however cannot be seen or touched" (27). "The object of such scientific knowledge and the real object are entirely different things" (28). Third, the structuralist's science is above evidence and need not be tested. It has no object outside its activity. It is turned in upon itself and its own practice. Its only point of reference is its own norms and its own internal criterion.

The structuralist's view of the relationship of science to politics is partly in accord with the requirements of the generally accepted model, and partly in contradiction with it. Consistent with their formal understanding of science as objective and opposite of ideology, the structuralists argue that science and politics are separate. Althusser does not purpose that they should be fused. He retains a view of natural science as independent of Marxism. Althusser does, however, attempt to replace non-Marxist social science with Marxism. He first argues that there is no science but several, mathematics and physics are sciences. Second, he contends that Marxism is also a science. "Like mathematics and physics it has its own object and procedures". (29) It has "the theoretical practice of a science". (30) Althusser does not formally argue that all sciences are

(27) Althusser, 1971; op. cit., p. 125
(28) Althusser and Balibar, 1968, op.cit, p. 312.
(29) Althusser and Balibar, 1968, Ibid. p. 153
(30) Althusser and Balibar, 1968, Ibid; p. 32
subservant to politics. He need not do so because for him the political view of Marxism is, by definition an "objective" science. This position militates against the structuralists producing defensible research at least in the social sciences. Further, Althusser and the structuralists deny any legitimacy to a class-based science, but grant that the proletariat has a clear view of some topics. They reject the theory of two sciences as it is generally formulated within Marxism. For Althusser, "science is not an expression of proletarian consciousness or a summary of knowledge gained by the proletariat, from the class struggle" (31) rather an objective theoretical structure. But "Althusser does imply that social sciences are pertinent to the bourgeoisie and what he calls the Marxist science of history, relevant to the proletariat" (32). He hints at a class-based science when he proposes that valid knowledge of class exploitation repression and domination in politics and economics will be recognized only by the proletariat. But he never defends a class-relative science.

The Althusserian structuralists reject both contemporary social enquiry and the philosophics qualitative approach to research. The Althusserian structuralists make assumption about epistemology, method and science which encourage about a shift away from search for causes of social phenomena (which focus on events and individuals) and a move toward, on the one hand, macro-level structures that are not directly or immediately visible and, on the other hand, a textual mode of analysis on an abstract level. Neither of these is accessible with the research tools of contemporary social science. The structuralists say that policy

(32) Althusser, 1971; op.cit., p.7
making is not important and the normative is irrelevant. The Althusserian structuralists, therefore, have little choice but to define research as abstract intellectual theorizing and to choose research techniques appropriate to this view. In certain forms discourse analysis and semiotics (the study of signs) are research strategies acceptable to them.

Thus, discourse analysis is research strategy by which the structuralists do research. Discourse analysis is a modified version of substantially more abstract character of what is commonly known as content analysis. Its assumptions, however, are congruent with the Althusserian structuralist premises about inquiry. It is used to examine symbols rather than events or ideas. It draws attention to the absurdities, the discontinuities, and the errors in a communication, to what is left unsaid, to what is hidden or omitted in a text rather than to what is made explicit. The slips and silences of the written word are assumed to express an unconscious reality. The works of Michael Foucault are an excellent example. Seeking to go beyond the conscious level, discourse analysis assumes that what is absent from a communication is more significant than what is obvious in it because the missing elements provide clues to the hidden structural reality lying beneath the surface. Discourse analysis, understood and employed by Althusser's successors substitute the study of language as a universal symbolic system for a broader study of social reality, taking on an anti-empirical, highly theoretical expression, concentrating on the form and the structure of what is communicated, but neglecting the agency and the content of a statement. When defined in this manner, it risks treating social reality itself as a discursive order, rather than as a reality external to discourse but to which the discourse refers. Thus, Althusserian structuralists agree with the underlying
assumptions about inquiry implicit in discourse analysis. They are enthusiastic about its epistemological premises because, for example it orients inquiry toward the whole without neglecting the parts. A communication is viewed in its social, political, and economic context, as "a process without a subject" which means no attention is paid to specific individuals. It is compatible with the structuralist's methodological assumptions because, for example, it emphasizes abstraction, it views research as a process without any link to empirical observable reality, and it seeks to attribute meaning in a situation where the constraint of evidence is consciously ignored. It does not search for historical explanation (temporal antecedents) or causal explanation. It is consistent with the structuralist view of science as exclusively a form of intellectual reflection. The Althusserian abstract form of discourse analysis makes assumptions about reality which are inconsistent with the generally accepted model. Research such as discourse analysis substitutes "a text for reality", "the invisible for the concrete", and at the same time eliminates subjects (human beings) as agent of change. Some structuralists like Nicos Poulantzas, Maurice Godelier, Erik Olin Wright etc. implicitly concede something that is completely unacceptable to Althusser, namely, that observable experience offers clues to what is going on at the structural level. Thus this method has, at least some agreements with the norms of contemporary social sciences.

**DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

The methods of discourse analysis has developed in poetics (literary scholarship), stylistics, rhetoric or content analysis (e.g. in mass communication research) beside the fact discourse analysis emerged as a model research strategy in the disciplines of linguistics, psychology, social
psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, law etc during 1960s and 1970s in the west. These shares interest for various phenomena of language use, texts, conversational interaction or communicative events which, taken together, come under the discipline of discourse analysis. As a result of it, the boundaries between the many disciplines have become blurred through the attention to a common objective research-discourse (or texts, conversation, messages etc.). Increasing multidisciplinary integration has led to the emergence of new interdisciplinary of discourse analysis as an independent field in the humanities and social sciences.

With a qualified position one can say that discourse analysis is both an old and a new discipline. Its origin can be traced back to the study of language, public speech, and literature more than 2000 years ago. One major historical source is undoubtedly classical rhetoric, the art of good speaking etc. Whereas the grammatica, the historical antecedent of linguistics, was concerned with the normative rules of correct language use, its sister discipline of rhetorica dealt with the precepts for the planning, organization, specific operations, and the performance of public speech in political and legal settings. Its crucial concern, therefore, was persuasive effectiveness. In this sense, classical rhetoric both anticipates contemporary stylistics and structural analysis of discourse and contains intuitive cognitive and social-psychological notions about memory organization and attitude change in communicative contexts. After some important revivals in the middle ages and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, rhetoric lost much of its importance in the curricula of schools and in academic research. The emergence of historical and comparative linguistics at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the birth of structural analysis of language at
the beginning of the twentieth century, replaced rhetoric as the primary disciplines of humanities. Yet, parallel to this decline of rhetoric as an independent academic discipline, new developments in several fields of the humanities and the social sciences took place that would eventually lead to the emergence of discourse analysis. First, the Young Russian revolution witnessed emergence of new ideas in anthropology, poetics and linguistics, an interdisciplinary development known under the label of "Russian Formalism". Apart from research by literacy scholars and linguists and related new experiments in the theory and practice of art and film, one of the (later) most influential books of that time appeared to be "Morphology of the Folktale" by Vladimir Popp published in 1928 (first English translation appeared in 1958). Major structural principals of early linguistics (phonology, morphology) were here paralleled with the first structural analysis of discourse, namely, the Russian folktale in terms of a set of fixed thematic functions in which variable contents of different tales could be interested.

Indeed, part of the inspiration of (initially French) structuralisms in the 1960s came through the translation of Popp's book and other work of the Russian formalists. Levi strauss's structural analysis of culture and especially his analysis of myths, in part inspired by Popp and further development of structural linguistics in Europe, was one of the sources for renewal in anthropology, poetics and other branches of the humanities and the social sciences. These early interdisciplinary development of the middle 1960s were often captured under the new lebel of "Semitotics" to which is associated the names of Barthes, German etc. and many other engaged in the structural analysis of narrative and other discourse forms or cultural practices. Dhymes' book(ed)"Language
in culture and society"; which appeared in 1964, was also a major contribution to the discourse analysis. Although notions such as "discourse" or "text" do not yet dominate the contribution to that voluminous book, there is attention to forms of "speech", "communication" and to specific topics such as "forms of address" which would later develop into the discourse analytical orientation of so-called ethnography of speaking in anthropology. In Europe, more than in the United States, the original plea by Z.S.Harris' book entitled "Discourse Analysis" which appeared in 1952, was responsible for a new generative-transformational approach to the grammar of discourse. After that French structural Marxists contributed much to the development of discourse analysis. Michael Foucault contributed much more than any other person in the discourse analysis of various practice, such as cultural practice, ideological practice and political practice.

From this brief historical review of the origin of modern discourse analysis, we may draw several conclusions. First, the early interest in systematic discourse analysis was essentially a descriptive and structuralist enterprise, mainly at the boundaries of linguistic and anthropology, Second, this interest primarily involved indigenous or popular discourse genres, such as folktales, myths and stories as well as some ritual interaction forms. Third, the functional analysis of sentence and discourse structure as well as the first attempt toward text linguistics often took place independently of or against the increasingly prevailing paradigms of generative-transformational grammars. Both the formal sophistication and the inherent limitations of this approach to language would decisively influence the development of discourse analysis and other studies along with the emergence of structuration thesis of Anthony
Giddens. However, we will try our best to analyse the discourse analysis presented by sociologists and historians, particularly by Goffman, Foucault and contemporary French discourse analysts.

(A) E. GOFFMAN: SELF PRESENTATION AND DISCOURSE PROCESS

While the conventional analysts provide a discourse model nearly devoid of reference to the social-self, Goffman's works like "Frame Analysis" (1974) and later work on conversational structure can be seen as vehicles for further development of his early work on "The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life" (1959). In fact, Goffman's emphasis of his work on the analysis of discourse processes in sociology. The major strengths of Goffman's approach are two fold. First, he has directed attention to the importance of units or boundaries of discourse. Second, Goffman has attempted to link the communicative abilities of to frame and transform ongoing discourse to a range of impression management strategies and rituals that he claims a central part of modern American culture. Goffman has addressed the question of units at the level of individual 'acts' or 'moves' and speech events of "face engagement". Regarding the latter, Goffman began by introducing the notion of "territories of self". Territories of self are important because social interaction depends on individuals' giving up some of the boundaries and barriers that ordinarily separate them" (33). What is of most interest for discourse analysis is how the protection and use of, as well as encroachment upon, territories of self affect movement towards the

intiation or avoidance of discourse analysis. Take, for example, Goffman's discussion of personal space in public settings like waiting room, buses, and others. In these setting the intruding into or giving up of personal space due to crowding is seldom questioned, but the return of space when crowding is alleviated is a more delicate matter. Thus, as a crowded elevator empties, passengers "acquire a measure of uneasiness, caught between two opposing inclination to obtain maximum distance from others and to inhibit avoidance behaviour that might give offense" (34).

One can argue, in addition, that it is at these points that a need for a talk is heightend, even if for no longer than a single exchange. In short, realignments of territories of self can get conversation started making (or serving as boundaries) stretches of discourse.

Once territories of self are relinquished, episodes or stretches of discourse can occur. Throughout his work, Goffman referred to episodes as "encounters", "focused activites", and "face engagements". Face engagements are defined as comprising "all those instances of two or more participants in a simple focus of cognitive and visual attention what is sensed as mutual activity entailing preferential communication rights" (35). What is important for discourse analysis is not simply Goffman's definition but also his recognition of the requirements and constraints for the production of face engagement. Goffman adds to what he calls the "system constraints" developed by the conversational analysts and

(34)E.Goffman, 1971, Ibid., p.38
others who make Goffman's "system constraints" equal to "turn taking procedures"(sacks), "back channeling device"(Ducan), and "conversational maxims"(Grice). Constraints are equated with ritual constraints these are constraints. That govern "how each individuals ought to handle himself with respect to each of the others, so that he does not discredit his own tacit claims to good character or the tacit claims to the others, that they are persons of social worth whose various forms of territoriality are to be respected"(36).

According to Goffman, ritual constraints give rise to suppositive and remedial interchanges. Supportive interchanges often serve bracketing functions within and around face engagements. The most interesting of these are access rituals that are crucial for the initiation and termination of face engagements and that seem to be acquired early in life and hence moves have universal features. While supportive interchanges serve initiation, expressive and termination functions, remedial interchanges are more directly tied to impression management. "The function of remedial work is to change the meaning that otherwise might be given to an act, transforming what could be seen as offense into what be seen acceptable"(37). Remedial interchanges keep interaction running smoothly at points where an individual's behaviour may potentially violate ritual constraints. Supportive and remedial interchanges are important for discourse analysis because they are often intricately related and interwoven with other discourse functions. Thus, as Goffman

(36) E.Goffman, Replies and Response,(in Language in Society, 5; 1976,), p.266
(37) E.Goffman, 1971, op. cit, p.109
suggests, individual may be motivated to use these devices to preserve face but the end up preserving orderly communication as well.

Regarding units of analysis within face engagements, Goffman discusses and rejects such units as the 'sentence utterance, conversational turn' and Sack's notion of the "adjective pair". What is offered instead is a three-part series of moves making up an interactional unit. Moves are defined (loosely, according to Goffman) as "any full stretch of talk or of its substitutes which has a distinctive unitary bearing on some set or other of the circumstances in which participants find themselves" (38). The basic interactional unit is composed of three moves:—

(a) mentionable event, (b) mention and (c) comment on mention, with the first "moves" quite likely do not to involve speech at all. Goffman argues that the first "moves" is overlooked in conversational analysis because of a reliance on audiotapes that can not capture the precipitating phase of the interactional unit.

Although he focuses on units, Goffman does not mean to imply that discourse is simply a matter of changing together a series of basic interactional moves. In fact, Goffman argues that responses (i.e, comment on mention and any additional comments) must have reference. Therefore, it is the cognitive activity of referencing (i.e, a sequence of response moves with each in the series carving out its own reference), rather than dialogic couplets and their meaning which out to be the basic mode of talk. What we have in the end is a dynamic view of context in which conversation becomes a sustained strip or tract of referencing, each referencing tending to bear, but often deviously, some retrospectively

(38) E.Goffman, 1976,op.cit, p.272
perceivable connection to the immediately prior one. A second strength of Goffman's emphasis on self-presentation is his demonstration that the density, complexity, and fragility of social interaction is a reflection of the individual ability to frame and transform ongoing social activity. Borrowing from Bateson, Goffman defines frames as "the principals of organization which govern social events and the actor's subjective involvement in them"(39).

In this book "Frame Analysis", Goffman presents a virtual legion of examples of framings including types of keyings, fabrication, frame breaks, misframing, and frame disputes. However, in the last two chapters of this book, Goffman once again returns to a discussion of self and impression management. For Goffman, "self (then) is not an entity half concealed behind events, but a changeable formula for managing one self during them" (40).

Goffman implies that at some point in human development individuals recognize the importance of self-staging, their abilities to stage appropriate selves, and the multiple threats to and vulnerabilities to self-presentations. The process of self-staging can take on a life of its own, and the individual's sense of a unique self, if it ever existed, soon dissipates into a myriad of performances.

What is most important for discourse analysis is not Goffman's conclusions about the nature of self but rather his recognition of the communicative abilities that underlie self-presentation and the effect

(40) E.Goffman, 1974; Ibid., p.573.
of self staging on discourse process. While other discourse theorists have systematically studied the importance of social context, background knowledge, and past interactional theory in discourse. Goffman emphasizes the individual's tendency and ability to use discourse for the staging, and maintenance of self. Take for example, Goffman's discussion of dramatization in everyday talk. The individual, says Goffman, spends most of his conversational time, "providing evidence for the fairness or unfairness of his current situation and other grounds for sympathy, approval and so on, while his listeners are primarily obliged to show audience appreciation." For Goffman, an individual engaging in ordinary talk can function as a principal, strategists animator, and figure who seldom seeks a simple answer to a question or a compliance with request but rather most often desires "an appreciation of a show put on".

Furthermore even while the individual's performance are underway, he can "frame himself from view" because self-displays informal talk, are properly to be attributed to a figure animated, not the animator. The complexity and looseness of everyday talk does not stop here, however, because overlaid on the quickly changing frames of a speaker's talk may be another mode of frame change, this set introduced by the bearer- if something only for himself.

While the emphasis on self-presentation is the source of the major strengths of Goffman's work for discourse analysis, it is also the root of several limitations of his approach. A frequently heard criticism of Goffman's work is that it is restricted to American culture and possibly even to the American middle class. Although Goffman often owns up to this criticism, the issue is seldom pursued in any detail. It would seem that the communicative abilities that underlie Goffman's notions of framing
keyings, and fabrications are part of human competence and are, therefore, universal. Could it be that these abilities appear across cultures but are manifested in different ways given variations in social structural demands?

In sum, the cultural limits of Goffman's work are real but so are the opportunities for comparative research. A second problem in Goffman's work involves the interrelationship between his assumptions about the cognitive processing and communicative abilities of discourse participants. Goffman has always relied heavily on the generation of new concepts that are supported by examples of data from unsystematic observation, the media or literature. One problem with this method is that in Goffman's case, it has became almost an art from in which all possible types or properties of each concept are pursued to their logical limits even when it appears they may have little to do with what transpires in social reality.

Goffman is personally aware of this problem. He acknowledges at the start of "Frame Analysis" that his analysis is "too bookish, too general, too removed from field work to have a good chance of being anything more than another mentalistic adumbration" (41). But the problem runs deeper than this. Goffman makes major assumptions about what people do in discourse while seldom studying actual discourse. The logic of his analysis seems to be that if cognitive processing of linguistic, non-verbal, paralinguistic, ecological and social cues can be carried out to arrive at social meaning of hypothetical events in periods of reflective and analytic thought, then individuals can and do use the same processes in actual discourse. Such an assumption may be unwarranted. Surely, discourse is more demanding than isolated.

(41) E. Goffman, 1974; Ibid., p. 13
Reflection in terms of the information processing, memory and communicative skills required the direct analysis of ongoing discourse processes is necessary to support many of Goffman's claims regarding the nature of self and the effects of self-presentation on discourse structure. It may be that we are much self-conscious in reflection than in social interaction. The above criticism is not meant to imply that "impression management", "role-distancing" and other types of self-staging do not occur in discourse, but rather that they are matters of empirical investigation. Careful analysis of these processes in audio-video recordings of actual discourse that proceed by extensive ethnography are crucial for bulk determining the validity of Goffman's claims about impression management and for isolating how self presentations are accomplished in actual discourse events.

**B) MICHAEL FOUCALUT: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS**

The French work is the richest development of discourse analysis as historical inquiry. The work entitled "The Archaeology of Knowledge" produced by Michael Foucault is significant in the conceptualization of discourse analysis. According to Foucault as Dominique Lecourt writes, "discursive formation is structured hierarchically" (42) and this hierarchy regularly imposed on every subject. Foucault believed in decentered whole and argues that each practice of social formation-be it economic or political or ideological has its own peculiar discontinuity and pattern. The conventional historians; as Foucault argues, believed in linear succession of events, models of economic growth, quantitative analysis of market movement, accounts

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(42) Dominique Lecourt, Marxism and Epistemology (trans by Ben Brewster), (London; NLB: 1975) p.203
of demographic adjustment and there by came to the conclusion of spread of continuity through linear succession of homogeneous time scale which was connected with the Hegelian "expressive totality". Against Hegelian expressive causality, Foucault holds this opinion that "beneath the great continuities of thought, beneath the solid, homogeneous manifestation of single mind or of a collective mentality, beneath the stubborn development of science striving to exist and to reach completion at the very outset, beneath the persistence of particular genre, form, discipline or theoretical activity, one is now trying to detect the incidence of interruption" (43). History in classical form believed in theses of dispersed events, divisions, accident, initiative, discoveries etc. Classical historians considered discontinuity as a stigma of temporal dislocation. However, we can say that the notion of discontinuity is a paradoxical one because it is both an instrument and an object of research. The birth of man was an invention of the recent times. Thus, discourse/practice must strive to see the social structure as complex, uneven, decentred and continuous activity. Discourse includes practices of philosophy, religion, science, politics, fiction etc. In discourse, absence of the category in the text is as important as the presence of the category. "The manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say and this "no-said" is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said" (44). Thus, one is led to the project of a pure description of discursive events as the horizon for the search or unities that form within

(43) Michael Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge (Translated by A.M. Sheridon Smith), (London; Routledge : 1972), p.4
(44) Michael Foucault, 1972; Ibid., p.25
The analysis of thought is always allegorical in relation to the discourse that it employs. Discourse makes a relation of relations between the statements or a group of statements about which the author of the text may not be aware. Discourse is thus, a codified and normative system of statement. If we have to make discourse, about delinquency, we may refer it to a whole series of events/objects such as homocides, crimes, sexual offences, certain form of theft etc.

Discourse is not a slender surface of contact or confrontations between reality and a language, and the intrication of a lexicon and the experience "of course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than the use of these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language and to speech. It is this more that we must reveal and describe" (45). Discourse is closely related to the concept, language, and strategies of power. Discipline, as a strategy of discourse of power, involves three things: "(a) political investment of body; (b) a new micro physics of power and (c) a political anatomy of details" (46).

The couplet discourse practice presumes as a condition for reality. Foucault can study the ways in which discourse is not innocent, but shaped by practices-without privileging any form of practice, such as class struggle. Of course, Foucault's discourse is connected with politics and he does not give any ontological primacy to it by ignoring economic practice ideological practice etc. In "Discipline and Punish", Foucault is

(45) Michael Foucault, 1972; Ibid., P.49.

able to locate his object, technologies of power, only by an investigation that puts aside the rationality or agency of individual. In the "History of Sexuality". Foucault goes a step further, defining his object as discourse practices through which the individual is constituted as the subject of truth. In this case the rational individual is seen not as a proposition to be defended (or refuted) but as the consequence of socio-historical process; not as the intentional goal and underlying basis of history, but as its illusory results. In "Discipline and Punish" and "History of Sexuality" Foucault divides the history of crime and sex into two main periods with the eighteenth century, serving as one of the dividing lines. In the earlier periods knowledge and power about crime focussed on the body of the transgressor. After this period punishment shifted its attention from the body of an individual to the mind of an individual and the methods of control; which have been articulated as the effects of the technology of the power; constitute new types of subordianted groups. The elaboration of institutionalized discourses and powers is endless. In short, Foucault would like to argue that he will abandon any attempt to see discourse as a phenomenon of expression-the verbal translation of a previously established synthesis; instead, he will look for a field of regularity for various positions of subjectivity. Thus, conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but on the contrary, a "totality" in which the despersion of the subject and his discountinuity with himself may be determined. In totality, discourse is a materiality of various practices which follow the principle of "ruptures" on the development. Here materiality of any practice means ritualization of that practice. Discourse also becomes a powerful material force when it is related to the structural science of language.
All of Foucault's work can be seen as an elaborate justification of the importance of the study of discourse in history. He sees discursive forms as both cause and effect, active and passive, responsive to transhistorical factors, yet molding institution and roles. For this reason, Marxists feel that Foucault simply juxtaposes discourse practice and other practices; he explains nothing. Marxists stipulate a tight relation of effect and cause between discourse and politics. For marxists discursive formations are the material production of the process of winning adhesion to an ideology; and discursive system has an extralinguistics as well as intralinguistic source. The Marxist task for discourse analysis is the revelation of an internal economy of an ideology; it is a project of umaskning, and Marx's "Eighteenth Brumare" is the exposition of the relation of discourse, ideology and power. But the Foucaultians attack Marxists analysis as an oversimplification. They claim that the Marxists approach is as question, begging as the standard history of ideas approach. The historian of ideas can only find the presence or absence of his chosen themes; while the Marxist can only describe ideological manipulation and exploitation through discourse since he has no vocabulary to describe well-motivated discursive analysis. Thus Marxists are primarily preoccupied with mode of production; whereas Foucault is concerned with mode of information. There, however, are mutual agreements between them on the polemical analysis of capitalist system, its ideology and state. In fact, Foucault is a philosopher who founds his theory of history on discontinuity. Foucault's position involves neither the dismissal between natural and human science, nor does it assert the radical autonomy of human from physical technology. " The standard of truth/falsity is a necessary internal component of a history of
science" (47). At this point Foucault follows the epistemological position of L. Althusser.

**CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: THREE MODELS**

**(I) HISTORY AS NARRATIVE:**

In the lengthy and often illuminating contemporary discussion of history as discourse, three major hypotheses have dominated. Barthe claimed that history is a narrative discourse. He proposed descriptive tactics that include the formulation of lists of substantives (existents) and actions (occurrences) dominant in each text as well as the analysis of modes of discursive self-definition of the historian. For example, the suppression of the authorial "I" in standard modern histories as a claim to objectivity by asserting impersonality. Anglo-American analytic philosophy has also made a case for discursive structure as an essential, non-trivial aspect of the historical project and also focussed on the logic of narration. Mink quotes Gallie as indicating that story is the form of history: "a historical narrative does not demonstrate the necessity of events but makes them intelligible by unfolding the story which connects their significance" (48). For Mink, finding a historical truth is grasping in a single act or cumulative series of acts - a relation that can only be experienced. For Gallie, to produce or "follow a story" (49), or for

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(48) L. Mink, *History and Fiction as Mode of Comprehension* (New Literary History; 1, 1970), p. 245

(49) W. B. Gallie, *Philosophy and Historical Understanding* (New York; Schocken: 1964), pp. 12-13
Mink "to have followed a story", describe the central historical act of investigation and of exchange of investigative results within the historical community. What is most significant is that both the Anglo-American analytic philosophers and French hermeneuticists are making strong claim about narrative as a complex construct of serious investigation.

(II) HISTORY AS RHETORICAL STYLE:

H.V. White in his book "Metahistory"(1973) also focusses on discursive styles as cognitive styles but claims that his analysis of history as rhetoric is more inclusive, narrative or emplotment, being only one of rhetoric. His tropological analysis reveals one of the four master rhetorical trope-metaphor, metanymy, synecdoche, irony- as hegemonous in the historical text. These structures constitute an exhaustive list of fundamental mental structures, very like the preperceptive sets of Gestalt psychology, that generate primitive strategies of connection and disjunction and thus create both discursive form and thematic content.

(III) HISTORY AS ARGUMENT

The thesis that "history is argument" may be simply an extrapolation from the Collingwood's postulate that history is an informal logic of question and answer that attempts to reveal the logic of question and answer that motivates that motives all historical action. The hypothesis is also consistent with the initiatives in the historiography of science by Kuhn, and Feyeraband. These two authors in their respective books "The Essential Tension" (1977) and "Against Method" (1978), are concerned with how a paradigm or theory achieves dominance in science, and all "uses" characterizations of scientific discourse to explain success. Kuhn
describes an essentially authoritarian model of disciplinary exchange, where it is the abandonment of critical discourse which marks the transition to science. Feyeraband insists that the truly generative theoretical stance is philosophical anarchism, which is enabled by freely structured argumentative practice.

Thus, we will use the following techniques to reveal the hidden ideological formations in the texts of western intellectuals in chapter two (Marx and Marxists) and in chapter three (Weber and critical theorists). At the same time, we will also examine the works of Indians intellectuals in chapter four entitled "A discourse on nationalism: Bipan Chandra" and in the chapter five entitled "A discourse on democracy: Rajni Kothari".

(1) HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PRACTICE: AN AGENDA OF ANALYTIC PROJECTS

It should be reassuring to the historians that the discourse analysis of historical texts is essentially a historical project, since it describes specific acts of exchange of information, reinforcement or consolidation of hypothesis and argumentative changes of goals and premises of research as well as the place of historical discursive structures in the wider domain of moral-political discourse. Further, the analysis should serve the social scientists engaged in self-critique as both diagnostic tool and source of therapeutic suggestion. Its description of the conventions and rules that constrain the historical account may be used to discriminate between successful and unsuccessful inquiry: A priority of this project, of course, is the development of an agenda of analytic task.
(2) INTRATEXT ANALYSIS: FUNCTION AND DYSFUNCTION WITHIN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TEXT

(i) THE ISSUE OF NARRATIVE FORM: One can say that since narrative form is the essential mark of historical inquiry, the contemporary social scientific strategy that rejects narrative, destroys history. One can see the narrative that merely commemorative, disallowing serious investigative moments, and subjective, not permitting the establishment of a critical distance on the part of the investigator. Yet pertinent question concerning discourse can be raised: Can statistical description achieve "thick" description of a cultural practice? Does the attenuation of narrative form enhance or detract from argumentative structure?

(ii) THE PROBLEM OF THE FOOTNOTE: THE NATURE OF UPPER AND LOWER TEXT RELATIONS:

The problematic relation between the upper text on the page, the argument or narrative and the lower text or footnotes, is a strategic one: A historian may relegate opponent's argument to the notes; he may qualify this own argument with exceptions and limitations, he may supplement the upper text with parallel or even subversive arguments.

(iii) QUANTIFICATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:

The quantification initiative in modern historical research would seem to offer a clear instance of a strategy not so much of diminution of narrative as of argumentation of argument. Quantification technique may serve to disguise the criteria and hypotheses that guide research. One can point to disjunctive effect: As one equation supports
or opposes one hypothesis, a series of equations produces either linking arguments or disjoined generalizations. Furher, since dependence on counting is often expressed as a dependence on charts, graphs, tables and maps, quantitative history raises the issues of the integration of discursive and semiotic descriptions—the relation of figure to narrative or argumentative matrix. We must remember that any critical discontinuities must be woven into the narrative web.

(3) INTERTEXT ANALYSIS : THE RELATION OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHIC TEXT TO DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

(i) THE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT AS USE OF TEXT

The employment by the historian of metadiscursive texts, the sources that purport to resolve historical language issues, poses a separate problem of privileges. Lexicology—the theory of the inquiry into lexical usage, enquires the analysis of dictionary texts as discursive practice between the historian and his source.

(ii) THE HISTORICAL TEXT AND HISTORICAL DISCIPLINE : DISCURSIVE STRUCTURES OF DIFFUSION AND EXCHANGE

The analysis of the discursive practice of historians is a mode of investigating the roles and institutions of history as discipline. Foucault has selected as key practices in the development of modern discipline, the confection of the role of an author with its obligations and privileges, the creation of the pivotal genre of commentary, and the development of the scholarly journal as a mode of exchange.

Thus, obviously, the discourse analysis that attempts to describe the rules of innovative historical discourse; has prescriptive as well as descriptive claims; the ability to describe argument is the ability to discriminate between good and bad argument. Discourse analysis can
be seen as one of a range of formal options that turns simple injunction into a formal technique, a mode of achieving equity; it replaces piety with a protocol. The main thrust of discourse analysis is anti-anachronistic, the elimination of "our" habits of usage by means of precise accounts of "their" actual practice.