CHAPTER II
A DISCOURSE ON MARXIAN IDEOLOGY
(MARX AND MARXISTS)

The history of idea or sociology of knowledge says that no recorded human social formation can exist without ideology and intellectual. Reading human history means reading the different forms of connotative ideological formulation such as democracy, socialism, nationalism, secularism etc., in modern times; which as a process emerged along with the evolution of modern industrial social formation be it socialism or capitalism or a mixture of both systems. An ideology is a world view which people construct in order to explain and operate their conditions of existence. For example, in U.S.A. people have an unqualified faith in democracy whereas, in China, people strive to achieve the goal of socialist democracy. Here it is important to note that in different social formations may have different forms of ideological universe at a given point of time and the same social formation may have different forms of ideological construction over a period of time. Thus, the theory of ideology has a historical character and cultural context which get manifested in the observed behaviour and patterned relationship of social beings. For example, in the medieval Europe religion was the hegemonic ideology so far as the ideological, political and economic practices were concerned. In this society church was a source of both: (a) spiritual leadership and (b) temporal leadership. The temporal leader (king) was guided by the spiritual elite (priest). But after the dissolution of feudal social formation of European societies, nationalism, secularism and democracy become a guiding force of humanity because the new industrial order required a new form of world view which could sustain and reinforce the course of civilization united by the slogans of equality, liberty and fraternity of
French Revolution of 1789. The story goes with the America war of Independence of 1776. It was the Russian Revolution of 1917 which legitimized a different form of ideology— an ideology of dictatorship of proletariat. 

We shall say, to begin with, that ideology of society consists of,

(a) popularly accepted ideas about the structure, the internal processes (including the change taking place) and the world situation of the society,
(b) popularly accepted ideas about its history; (c) popular evaluation of accepted facts; and (d) popularly approved values and goals of society. This definition of ideology is not meant to suggest that "the" ideology of a society is perfectly definite, coherent and universally approved system of beliefs and values. In fact, as we have mentioned earlier every group in society or every nation at a particular historical bloc, has its own ideology. Thus the theory of modern ideology is fascinating but the history of modern ideology is puzzling because of the fact that we find the existence of three contradictory forms of ideological universe such as (a) fascism (b) socialism and (c) capitalism. These three forms of ideology generate three different forms of relationship between civil society and political society. In Nazism, the concept of race is so hegemonic that the political society determines the mode of thought and code of conduct of civil society. This happened in the case of Germany and Italy in the recent past. Hitler in Germany behaved like an autocratic ruler because his voice, in his prime, could enthrall a mass audience could express cajolery, irony, humour, indignation, wrath, it was sometimes shrill, sometimes vibrant-deep, and sometimes thunderous. Probably Hitler's eyes and his voice came to symbolize his message, which, in turn had a powerful emotional appeal on account of the social situation. Some may argue
that communalism in India, particularly Hindu communalism is the Indian form of fascism because it believes in the creation of ‘Hindu Rashtra’. Every ideology is institutionalized in the group for which it is an ideology. We can mention this view that fascism is the illegitimate child of democracy.

There is a close affinity between the political discourse of fascism and socialism of Stalin Variety because both of them believe in the theory of authoritarianism, cult of personality and monolithic bureaucracy and government. But there is a theory that there can not be a definition of anything without difference. The scientific socialism of U.S.S.R, unlike fascism of Hitler, was ‘committed to the ideology of “dictatorship of proletariat”’ at the level of political society and collectivization of means of production at the level of civil society. Socialism moves from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. Since Stalin’s socialism believed in force, coercion, threat etc, Jawaharlal Nehru believed in democratic socialism or what we can call socialism with human face as a major ideology of the nationalist movement which was radical because it was a war again British Imperialism. Thus, after independence in 1947, Indian state became a judicious mixture of democracy and socialism.

As opposed to Stalin’s socialism and Hitler’s Nazism as a form of fascism, in capitalist democracy there is a close association or pluralistic dialectics between civil society and political society. In this political and social formation we move from the political freedom to economic freedom. This tendency gets legitimacy from Max Weber’s essay on “Politics as a Vocation”. For all purposes the liberal democratic capitalism ensures three things: (a) right to life (b) right to property and (c) right to freedom. Liberal democracy believes in the evolutionary
transformation of society, polity and economy as it legitimizes the theory of “Possessive individualism” and considers social relations as a series of market relation.

The part third of the Indian constitution reflects this ideology so long as it has unqualified faith in the meritarian ideology. However, it has to be added that so long as Indian society is based upon what Dumont calls “the all encompassing principle of religious hierarchy”, it promotes the thesis of secularism, democratic socialism, federalism and social justice. The socialist character or compensatory ideology is one of the main pillars of part fourth of the Indian constitution.

After the fall of fascism of Hitler during the second world war, and the collapse of communism in recent times, capitalism and liberal democracy become the master concepts. The disintegration of the Soviet Union into state-nationalist republics, and the holocaust-like image that global T.V. stations beam to us from what was once the Yugoslavian federalism, appear at the first sight, to reaffirm the triumphant model of the nation-state. Likewise, in India nation is in the process of making and democracy is getting institutionalized day-by-day because there is a pressure from below so long as people have become conscious of their ethnic and social identities. Thus the ideologies of federalism, nationalism, participatory democracy, evolutionary socialism, social justice and national community constituted the major historical blocs of modern social formation- a formation, articulated by liberal democracy, free market and possessive individualism. These theoretical formulations are the epiphenomenon of the two great sociologists: (a) Karl Marx and (b) Max Weber, who were the children of modern industrial social formation.
KARL MARX'S THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

Marx's contribution to the theory of ideology provides a radical critique to the 18th century religion and feudalism of Europe. French materialism and German Philosophy of critical consciousness provoked an interest of the emergent bourgeoisie in its struggle against the feudal society. In his book entitled “German Ideology”, Marx was critical of Feuerbachian anthropology for whom the idealism of essence and empiricism of subject are one and the same. Also, Marx scored the conservative overtones of Hegel’s analysis of the Prussian state and showed it to be the necessary consequence of his idealist philosophy. According to Marx, Hegel’s chief error is that he regards contradiction in the phenomenon of, world as unity in its essence. Hegel divides the world into two spheres (a) the infinite world and (b) the finite world. The finite world is guided by the processes of self-contradiction and self-negation; therefore, it becomes transitory and temporary. On the other hand, the infinite world is a world of universal idea or spirit which gets manifested in the institutions of finite material world.

Criticising Feuerbachian sensous materialism, Marx says that man is not an abstract being outside society and religion; hence for Marx, religion is the sign of oppressed culture. In capitalist society, proletariat is theoretically affirmed as free, fraternal and equal beings; but practically he is negated and denied. Thus, the main function of ideology is, first, to criticise the world and then to liberate the masses from the iron-law of exploitation of the capitalist society through class struggle. Hence, ideology is related to the theory of class struggle or what we might call “praxis”. The various explanations of Marx’s theory of
ideology can be summarized under three principles: (a) historical materialism explains the formation of ideas from material practice; (b) ideas of the ruling class are in the every epoch the ruling ideas and; (c) consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life.

It is true that in the 'German Ideology' some important concepts like relations of production are replaced by more ambiguous formulae such as "forms of intercourse". But the difference lies in the degree of precision and not in the fundamental meaning of these concepts. In this book Marx explains the concept of ideology by analysing material production. Certainly this text is polemical because it rejects Hegelian idealism of essence and Feuerbachian philosophical -materialism or empiricism of subjects; because Marx's scientific materialism heavily relies on the concepts of mode of production exploitation, surplus value and class-struggle etc. In the book "Communist Manifesto" Marx and Engels forcefully proclaim that the history of all hither to existing society is the history of class-struggle.(1)

This happen because Marx describes the exploitative condition of working class under capitalism in his mature writings as the fact;

"That social wealth confronts in more powerful portions as alien and dominant power. The emphasis comes to be placed, not on the state of being objectified, but on the state of being alienated, disposed, sold on the condition that the monstrous, objective power which social labour itself erected opposite itself as one of its moments belongs not to the worker but to the personified conditions of production i.e. to

(1) Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the communist party (Moscow: Progress Publishers;1977), p.35.
Alienation and exploitation are built in the very limited practice of capitalist system. Of course, alienation affects not only the working class but also the ruling class because the ideology which ruling class creates for the domination over working class, also enslaves the ruling class because ideology is universal, indispensable and necessary category for all men of the system which they create. According to Marx, both “the propertied and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this self-estrangement, it recognizes estrangement as its own power and has in it the semblance of a human existence”(3)

The entire theoretical problematics of Marx can be put under four master ideas, first, ideology appears as the conception of the active participants in economic relations. Second, the ideological conception are the reverse of the inner essential they invert and conceal the real relations. Third, although ideology is the reverse of and conceals, the essential relations, it is not an illusion without any social basis. As Marx comments while criticizing those, who think of mere illusions, “Hodgskin regards this as a pure subjective illusion. Which conceals the deceit and interests of exploiting classes. He does not see the way of looking at things arises out of it the actual relationship itself.”(4) Fourth, Marx’s formulation of ideology contains the possibility of a conception

(3) Karl Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family, (Moscow : Progress Publishers; 1975), p.43
(4) Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Vol - III (London: Lawrence & Wishart; 1972), p. 296
which corresponds to the inner relations.

Thus, Marx's theory of ideology does not consider ideology as a negative connotation, although it appears so when Marx criticizes religion and when he says that it is a soul of soul-less and a heart of heart-less people. In fact, Marx's theory of ideology is polemical because it exposes the exploitative character of bourgeois society whose institutions of private property and social division of labour create the problem of alienation of the proletariat from himself, products, nature and community. In sum, ideology is the modality of certain ideas within what Marx calls the "forms of social consciousness" which itself is sometimes rendered as the ideological superstructure.

According to Marx, ideology will disappear in the communist society because this society will eliminate the institutions of state, private property, classes and social division of labour. Communism, as the positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, is the real appropriation of the human essence by and for the man. According to Marx, communism is the complete return of man to himself as a social being. The communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism and as a fully developed humanism equals naturalism, it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man- the true resolution of the strike between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity and between individual and the species. In the communist society, the ideology will be replaced by ethics and morality which will create an organic and total social beings who will develop co-operation as their mode existence.

Thus, Marx's theory of knowledge about the concept of ideology
can be analysed under the following headings: (a) reality and praxis, (b) praxis and consciousness and (c) alienation and its forms.

(A) REALITY AND PRAXIS

An adequate comprehension of the presuppositions underlying Marx's perspective requires recognition of his early disenchantment with both Hegelian and Young-Hegelian idealism and the materialism of Feuerbach and political economists. Marx was quite aware of the tension, and apparently incompatibility, between these modes of thought: the former reducing reality to the historical realization of spirit; the latter reducing reason or spirit to the status of an epiphenomenal product of the existential, material word; the positivistic stance. This is exemplified in the theses on Feuerbach is that in which he argues that "the chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism- that of Feuerbach included - the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism- but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from thought-objects but he does not conceive' human activity itself as objective activity. Hence...... he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human allitude, he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary' or practical- critical activity". (5)

In fact Marx has rejected both: (a) the idealism of essence (Hegel) and (b) empiricism of subject (Feuerbach) Marx rejected an

individualistic nominalism that conceptualized phenomenon in relation to the individual and as amenable to change through the medium of a change of consciousness. Further, he also rejected the reduction of individual to pre-given social formation or to a material reality suigeneris. By criticizing both idealism (Hegel) and mechanical materialism (Feuerbach) Marx develops a third position. Perhaps the key to a comprehension of Marx’s perspective, of his dialectical approach at the level of basic presupposition is the central notion of praxis as reality for man. Reality, for man, is in this view neither the evolutionary unfolding of and participation in reason; nor is it the realm of matter-in-motion, perceived by the senses and reflected in thought. Furthermore, reality is not the interpenetration of timeless, a historical category inherent in mind, with empirical, physical reality although this idea approaches the idea of praxis. Rather, reality, in the human sense, for the human species is the active dialectical relationship between persons as social beings and physical nature: a relationship that is once mental and material, a unity of thought and action. Reality, interpreted as praxis, is an on-going historical process, a “humanizing of nature and a naturalizing of man” (6). Nature, as it develops through industry, is truly anthropological in nature. Marx makes point of praxis when he says that the ‘first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals . . . . Thus, the writing of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men . . . men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religions or anything else you like. They themselves began to distinguish themselves from

animals as soon as they begin of producing the means of their subsistence..... By producing their means of subsistence men indirectly producing their actual material life". (7)

In other words, before all else, one must acknowledge the fact of life itself, the needs of life, and the necessity of their fulfilment - a fact that is fundamental and transcends time. Further more, Marx is arguing that human life is different from that of other animals not simply because men think or have consciousness, but because the fulfilment of human needs is accomplished only by the active intervention of men themselves. The implication is that our comprehension of reality can not be divorced from our activity of transforming nature into means of subsistence. Reality is, therefore, reality-for-men, an interpenetration of nature and human activity. “The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) leads to new needs, and this production of new needs is (also) the first historical act” (8). Men are recognized as naturally and necessarily social in essence. Men actively produce their means of subsistence in relation to their historically developing needs, but this is a accomplished always on some social interdependent basis which is, given different forms through time. Marx, therefore implies that reality is not simply “there” for individuals nor inextricably bound up with individual activity, but that this activity must be comprehended in terms of its social character. Finally, to complete the whole of Praxis, Marx argues that “only now..... do we find that man also possesses”

(7) Marx, German Ideology (Moscow: Progress publishers; 1968) p 31 emphasis added
(8) Ibid., p. 40 emphasis added
'consciousness' but even so, not inherent, not 'Pure' consciousness.

From the start, the 'spirit' is afflicted with the curse of being “burdened with matter” which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of sound, in short language. "Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness, that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone is really exists for me as well; Language, like consciousness, only arises. From the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men" (9) Here, consciousness is viewed as but one interdependent element or moment in human being and becoming, in reality for man or in praxis. It is neither the prime nor leading presupposition in understanding human existence as for the idealists; nor it is but a 'reflection', of matter as for the positivists. Rather consciousness in interpreted as a functional element in the maintenance of life and in the development of potentialities; in the fulfilment of present needs and the creation of new possibilities. Further more, as but an element in praxis, consciousness is necessarily bound up with the human sociality that is a process of interaction between conscious, social beings actively fulfilling and thereby creating potentialities and physical nature or the environment necessary to this fulfilment.

Therefore, praxis constitutes a 'phenomenological' description of reality for man, presumed to be stripped of all ideological presuppositions. Praxis is the essential basis, the subsistence that underlies and is always present in, and in spite of, more superficial and historically contingent or relative concerns of individuals and groups.

In simplified terms, Marx says that individuals survive unlike other animals, species only by producing their means of subsistence...

(9) Ibid., p.42 emphasis added.
He presumes further that this production results in new possibilities and, therefore, in history, and that it is also a social process necessarily involving self-consciousness. Consciousness is interpreted as a functional moment in praxis that facilitates interaction and need fulfillment and as a necessity for the recognition of the potentialities that result. Here basically the individual is presented as an active, intentional and social being. No ontological distinction is made between individual and society. "By the social is meant the co-operation of several individuals, no matter what conditions, in what manner or to what end" (10) Praxis, therefore, entails the idea that individual action and thought are to be comprehended as social, but without an hypostatization of society; that is without conferring ontological status on the social dimension as an entity.

(B) **PRAXIS AND CONSCIOUSNESS**

This thesis is based on Marx's major statement that "it is not consciousness of men that determines their being, but, their social being determines their consciousness" (11). This is obvious to argue that human thought is tied to and can not be independent of the social dimension. Reality to which consciousness is tied is that of praxis, and praxis clearly includes rather more and other than the term "Social-existential base". Furthermore, the relationship between thought and praxis is not adequately comprehended in terms of organic ' totality' rather it has been ideologically misinterpreted by Russian orthodox Marxists like Plekhanov, Bukharin etc. For example, Plekhanov argues that "being

(10) Ibid., p.41 emphasis added.

determines consciousness”(12) and goes on to say that “material philosophy reduces law, morality and philosophy to one economic factor; and ideologies are merely multiform reflections in men’s mind of the single and invisible history”(13). This implies that ideological structure / consciousness has no system of even relative auto-regulation and what Althusser calls relative autonomy of superstructure.

In fact, like Plekhanov’s positivistic interpretation of Marx’s writings, Bhukharin also stresses this idea that “Ideas and ideologies rise over the economic base of society whose intricate internal structure is deeply rooted into material things like tools, institutions, forces of production and labour relations”(14).

Although Stalin gives the ontological dialectic of nature history and man, he forcefully maintains that "the materialist philosophy of Lenin forms an identity between revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice”(15). In brief, the thesis of economic determinism and dualism between being and consciousness have been rejected by the concepts of “Complex- organic expressive totality” (Lukacs) unevenly-structured complex whole, articulated in dominance, (Althusser), historical bloc of base and superstructure (Gramsci), dynamic totalization (Sartre), and unity of heterogenous parts (Della Volpe). In fact Marx believes in the theories of philosophy of man, conscious human praxis, identical subject-object.

(12) G. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Work Vol. II (Moscow: Progress publishers; 1977) pp 7-13

(13) G. Plekhanov; 1977, Ibid., p.250.


and dialectical relationship between praxis and consciousness. Against positivism, Marx believes in the theory of dialectical nominalism. Further, one can talk about hegemony and intellectual as a central tendency of Marx's philosophy or praxis which is tied with the thesis that social transformation depends upon objective factor and subjective factor. Objective factor indicates the growing gap between dynamic forces of production and static relation of production; and the subjective factor refers to conscious and intentional intervention of human agency through praxis. Thus praxis and consciousness are dialectically interrelated.

Material reality, for Marx, is that of living individuals whose life is praxis- an active social and conscious relation with physical nature. Consciousness does not determine this life, but neither can this life be reduced to prior existential factors known in themselves. Consciousness is but a part, on aspect of the whole of praxis: This life, this social being "determines" consciousness; that is, it is the context, the whole, in terms of which consciousness makes sense as a process and product. However, equally, the whole depends on the part as Marx points out that "nature constructs no machine ...... They are products of human industry, natural materials transformed into instruments......They are instruments of the human brain created by human hand. They are the materialized power of knowledge". (16)

If reality for man or praxis, is the relationship of men in acts of need satisfaction, with nature as the object of such satisfaction, then, clearly human cognition must be understood as intimately to bound up with need and therefore with praxis and the forms it is given. Marx argues

that while human consciousness does not create objects, it does establish "thinghood ...... an abstract thing, a thing created by abstraction and not a real thing ...... (which) is totally lacking in independence, in being, vis-a-vis self-consciousness. It is a mere construct established by self-consciousness". (17) This establishment of "thinghood", this act of knowing, functions within praxis, within reality-for-man, in relation to needs, and implies that objects are always objects-for-man; this is sensuous objects as well as objects of sense. Therefore any materialist discussion of nature taken abstractly and rigidly separated from man is nothing for man.

Thus, if man is defined as ultimately a being of praxis, as an active, intentional, conscious and social being, then a specific form and content of consciousness and a specific form of co-operation or social form, are co-emergents from or "products" of praxis in relation to a specific level of need. And, just as Marx makes no ontological distinction between persons and society, so the unity of praxis demands that no distinction should be made between process and products of consciousness and the process and product of social interaction of co-operation. Infact, the positivistic interpretation of Marx is wrong if we take an interaction between praxis and consciousness; positivistic interpretation of Marx will miss to take into account the central concept of alienation in terms of which the social analysis of ideas acquires its character and meaning.

(17) Marx; 1964, op.cit., p. 206
(C) ALIENATION AND ITS FORMS

As Marx maintains throughout his work, it is precisely the goal of his conceptual and empirical analysis, including the analysis of ideas in relation to social form, to comprehend the contradiction between alienation and praxis, and to explain it as a prologue to its transcendence. The clearest and most detailed development of this problematic on a conceptual level, is presented in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844. Her Marx outlines the four different, yet interrelated, aspects of alienation which parallel the aspect of praxis already discussed. First and centrally, men become alienated from the process of production itself, a process Marx also calls the alienation of men themselves, from their species-nature as producers of the means of subsistence. “This is the relationship of the worker to his own activity as something alien and not belonging to him— as an activity which is directed against himself, independent of him and not belonging to him” (18). To be alienated from the process of production or from one’s self is to be in a situation where in “labour is external to the worker, i.e. it does not belong to his essential being; .......... in his work ,therefore,he does not affirm himself but denies himself. He is at home when he is not working and when he is working he is not at home, his labour is, therefore, not voluntary, but coerced; it is a forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need ; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it” (19).

In other words, in terms of the idea of praxis it is man’s fundamental nature to work: that is, to produce means of subsistence and

(18) Marx; 1964, op.cit., p. 126.
(19) Marx; Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House; 1961), p.72, emphasis added.
to be self-developing. Thus, one is alienated from one’s basic nature in so far as one works, not to fulfil this nature, but simply to obtain the means to the fulfilment of other needs—the essential need or end becomes but a means to survival. Such a condition most clearly holds in capitalist society wherein the majority of men do not control but sell their labour power to others—others who control and direct the process of production. A second aspect of the problematic involves the estrangement of the specific products or objectifications which result from the productive process. And it is an aspect of alienation quite inseparable from the first, for “the product is...... but the summary of the activity of production. In the estrangement of the object is a merely summarized the estrangement, the alienation in the activity of labour itself” (20). In Praxis, objectification or objective and forms produced are understood as a fulfilment of needs on the one hand and on the other as making possible the appearance and realization of new needs; They are but contingent means in this dual sense. Further, more they are expressions of man, expression of his essential powers. However, in a condition of alienation, the relationship is apparently the reverse: the alienation of the worker in his products means not only that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him” (21). In other words, to be alienated in this sense is to be “subject to”, instead of being a subject in control of the object produced by one’s labour. What a man produces in praxis is his “capital” is that what he creates to fulfil his needs and which he “re-invents”, as it were, in his own development. In alienated production,

(20) Ibid., p.72.
(21) Ibid., p.70.
the product no longer belongs to the worker, it is no longer an expression of himself or in his control. It should be noted that the "objects" referred to are not simply material objects or what we normally think of as commodities produced by men. In fact, reality in praxis is always reality-for-man, it is significant that Marx includes, in this aspect of alienation, man's very comprehension of natural objects; this alienation, "Is at the same time (an alienation of) the relationship to the sensuous external world to natural objects............" (22).

This becomes clearer in relation to a third, interdependent aspect of alienation, the alienation of man's very species being or self-conscious being, which is also an essential aspect of praxis. Within praxis, consciousness is a functional moment in need fulfilment, in interaction and is essential to the awareness of potentialities or new needs. However, with alienation this relation appears to be reversed: "Conscious which man has from his species, is transformed......so that species-life becomes only a means for him. Thus alienated labour turns the species-life of man, and also nature as his mental species-property, into an alien being and into a means for his individual existence" (23).

What Marx argues in this context that ideas become reified; they are no longer understood as expressing contingent and fluid meanings within praxis and instead are reduced to reflections of the existing form of praxis. Thought ceases to be concerned with the possible or with development and instead is rendered 'but a means of existence'.

Finally, whereas the reality of praxis involves the essential sociality of man, alienation involves the apparent destruction of the social

(22) Marx; 1964, op.cit, pp. 125-6.
(23) Marx; 1964, op.cit, p. 129.
character of human life: "every self-alienation of man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation which he postulates between men and himself and nature. Thus religious self-alienation is necessarily exemplified in the relation between laity and priest .......

(24) This aspect of alienation is expressed in the a-social or a cooperative, class/exploitation relationships between men within the system of capitalism. It involves an emphasis on relations of competition and domination rather than on co-operation; and it involves a division of labour in which men tend to identify each other in terms of what they have and what they do; that is, relationships in which men become objects and means for one other, rather than a completion of each other's social nature. Together, these interdependent aspects of alienation directly parallel and are, in a particular sense, the opposite of the reality presumed by Marx; the reality of praxis as man's essential and dynamic nature. To repeat: the description of what an alienated existence entails is a description of the problematic of human social existence that Marx is concerned to understand and transcend. In general, it may be argued that his studies amount to: (a) an attempt to expose the alienated character of especially the capitalist system- a description of the discrepancy between existing forms of life and praxis; and (b) an attempt to account for the historical emergence of such a situation but, precisely as a part in, and preview to its international negation. But, by taking from Althusser one can argue that if consciousness in particular can be totally reified or negated at the fundamental level of praxis, then the essential, if partial role it has in the dynamics of praxis, in rendering sub-and superstructure contradictory, disappears Marx would thereby have contradicted the presuppositions of his work, as many critics

(24) Marx; 1964, op.cit., p. 130.
claim he does, and it would have to agree that his “youthful” solution to the man/society duality is superfluous to, and inconsistent with, his “mature” and apparently mechanistic doctrine. Specifically, his own concern to produce a recognition of alienation (and thereby of the need to rebel) through analysis, and his various attempts to organize opposition to capitalism, would have to be viewed as superfluous to the mechanistically conceived, inevitable clash of forces and relations of production.

(2) Engels’s contribution to the theory of ideology

Engels believes in the ontological natural dialectics which maintains this position that the dialectic of nature is a referential point for the operation of dialectics of history, man and consciousness. Engels’ sketches the essential nature of dialectical laws of development of natural order on the basis of two things: (i) things and thoughts present themselves in interconnection; and (ii) there is a dynamic and moving character of thing because the matter is in motion and motion itself is a contradiction is precisely what motion is” (25). Engels rejects the Hegelian teleological dialectic of Idea which considers reality as a temporal manifestation of the unfolding character of the universal spirit. In the scientific dialectic, matter and motion are interlinked; they do not require separate explanation of history, consciousness and human action. Equilibrium of society means the predomination of forces of attraction over the forces of repulsion. Engels also points out that “equilibrium is inseparable from motion and all equilibrium is relative and temporary” (26). He is so preoccupied with the materialist philosophy that even life is defined as the mode of existence

of protein bodies, the essential elements of which consist in continual metabolic interchange with the natural environment outside them; and which ceases with the cessation of this metabolism, bringing out the decomposition of the protein.

In conformity with Engels, Lenin also rejects the metaphysical definition of matter as constellation of ideas and sensations that runs through from Berkeley's writing to the Machians and then he off-repeatedly says that "there is nothing in the world but matter in motion and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time."(27) The concept of matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given in our sensations. To divorce motion from matter is equivalent to divorcing thought from objective reality. There is no absolute idea because idea, sensation consciousness and praxis change with the changing character of objective material condition of existence of society.

In his critique to Duhrings, Engels says that his philosophy is an ideology because it deduces reality from the concept. For Engels, ideology entails a conscious thinker but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces must be unknown to this thinker otherwise, they would not exist. But this conception of ideology of Engels changed from the times of The German Ideology. In his latter work as we have already mentioned, Engels related ideology to material reality and also says that ideology and political superstructure has a relative autonomy. That is to say that superstructure could react on the base as secondary causes and thus have a real effect upon history. He conceives an interaction among various superstructural elements and between them and base, taking place

(27) Lenin, Materialism and Empirio Criticism (Moscow: Progress Publishers; 1977) p. 158
on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself. Engels tries to reconcile the determinant role of the economy with a relatively independent causal efficacy of the superstructure.

Engels frequently referred to the ideological superstructure; the 'ideological spheres' and the 'ideological domain' with sufficient generality to make it at least possible to believe that they cover the totality of forms of consciousness, be it political or religious or philosophical. These ideological form play an important role in history of humanity. Both Marx and Engels support a critical concept of ideology and that during their life time this meaning was neither challenged nor changed by their followers.

(3) Plekhanov’s and Lenin’s contributions to the theory of ideology

For Plekhanov there can not be a revolutionary practice without revolutionary theory. The same has been mentioned by Lenin. Plekhanov did think that nothing would stop the working class from becoming aware of its interest and creating its own intelligentia. Furthermore, in contrast to Kautsky, he did not seem to hesitate in subsuming science under ideology. "Ideology is associated with class struggle"(28). So far as Lenin is concerned, we can argue that he concentrates upon the distinction between the spontaneous consciousness of the working class and the real socio-democratic class consciousness. The organized mass movement requires a party, an ideology and a leader. From the very beginning, Lenin’s understanding of ideology was consistently positive and revolutionary. Lenin distinguished, at a general level, “material and social relations from

‘the ideological social relations’. The former take shape without passing through man’s consciousness and generate recurrence and regularity in the social phenomena, thus making scientific analysis possible. The latter are those relations that, before taking shape, pass through man’s consciousness and they merely constitute a superstructure on the former.” (29). In fact, Lenin clearly identifies the totality of forms of consciousness with ideology and speaks freely of the “ideological leaders of the proletariat” (30).

The practical operation of ideology is seen in Lenin’s text “what is to be done?”. Here Lenin depicts a highly polarised political struggle which determines that the only choice is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology. "There is no middle course because mankind has not created a third ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonism there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology.” (31). Developing an idea of fusion between science and ideology, Lenin says that socialism will be the product of the development of ideas among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. Lenin does not believes in the spontaneous development of the working class movement because it leads to its becoming subordinated to the bourgeois ideology. Some may argue that Lenin conceives the working class as a passive subject being moved towards socialism by a non-historical spirit because he believes in the


leadership of socialist intelligentia organized into a party. It is interesting to note that in Lenin’s conception socialist consciousness is explained in terms of a fusion of three different concepts: ideology, class consciousness and science. The socialist class consciousness is the authentic class consciousness of the proletariat which is opposed to spontaneous trade union consciousness of bourgeois ideology. The contents of socialist ideology are supplied by science, and express the genuine class consciousness of proletariat. Thus ideology is a fusion of class consciousness of proletariat, revolutionary leadership of socialist intelligentia and a revolutionary party.

(4) Lukacs’s contribution to the theory of ideology.

In contrast to the one-sided formal objectivistic and naturalistic dialectic of Engels, Lukacs’s historical dialectic pleads for a dialectical union of natural science and social science and, moreover establishes the “dialectic interaction between subject and object in the historical social process” (32). The unity between theory and practice can be achieved by saying that “it is not enough that thought should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive toward thought” (33). Hegel’s maturing philosophy eliminated the concept of positivity and retained the thesis of “dialectical relation of the praxis of man in society to the object he has created” (34). According to Lukacs, the traditional Marxist like Plekhanov has given us a mechanistic and fatalistic over extension of economic necessity by counterposing social being and social consciousness; whereas Marx has never done it.

He has simply, in reaction to idealism, asserted "the ontological priority of social being over consciousness"\(^{(35)}\). Social being is equal to the concept of totality which includes both economic factor and non-economic factor.

Society is an organic and expressive totality in which consciousness is a part which can be explained in terms of totality. A summary review of Lukacs essays reveals that he uses the term ideology or ideological to in order to explain both the bourgeois ideology and the proletarian ideology without implying a necessary negative connotation. In conformity with Lenin who made distinction between a bourgeois trade union ideology, which is the spontaneous consciousness of the working class; and a proletarian scientific ideology which is developed by intellectuals, Lukacs makes a distinction between the psychological class consciousness and imputed class consciousness of the proletariat. But there is a difference between Lenin and Lukacs. The main difference between Lenin's couplet spontaneity- Science and Lukacs's couplet Empirical Consciousness ascribed Class Consciousness is that whereas the former allowed for the autonomy of science, the latter collapses science into consciousness. Lukacs gives four theses: (i) dialectics of history is important for grasping the current of history, (ii) proletariat is at the centre of history, (iii) and proletariat is the subject and object of history and (iv) object is the objectification of subject.

For him Marxism is the ideological expression of the proletariat in its effort to liberate itself from the dehumanized capitalist world. Proletarian class conscious is the major agency of social transformation.

But he explains that the fate of socialist revolution depends upon the maturity of proletarian consciousness just as the bourgeoisie ideology and petty bourgeoisie ideology deconstructed the feudal-cum-aristocratic social transformation, the proletarian ideology will bring social transformation in capitalist society. One can say, there are three weakness in the Lukacsian theory of ideology (i) Lukacsian ideology explains only the dominant ideology and it excludes the existence of other form of ideologies,\(^{(36)}\). (ii) bourgeois ideological domination appears without an institutional apparatus to sustain it and (iii)Lukascian conception of ideology can not explain the ideological condition of the spontaneous working class consciousness.

One can argue that the ideology which is the source of transformation in one historical era, becomes a source of resistance at another historical era. This happens due to a change in the form and content of class interest and class-position. Further there is a hint in Luckascian theory of ideology that it is a distorted veil, that hangs over the eyes of men as illusion. This is more true in the case of bourgeois ideology. Bourgeois class consciousness is false not because it is ideological but because the bourgeois class position is structurally limited. Authentic ideology is a socialist, proletarian materialist ideology which humanizes and naturalizes the men. The supposed mediation between the science of man and the science of nature gives us this instruction that there are two ontological positions for the construction of sociability of human beings (i) there is a humanization of man through labour as ‘necessity in reality’ and the essential sphere of economy is realized through human mediations,

and (ii) the continuity of human society is assured by the objectification of needs, abilities and activities. In brief, we can argue that the proletarian thought gradually transforms itself into a practical theory that overturns the real world and that in the communist society, the source of knowledge will be spiritual, artistic and moral elements.

(5) Gamsci’s contribution to the theory of ideology

The genesis of the Gramscian historicist epistemological discourse announces its most sustained polemical dialogue with Engel’s dialectics of nature. Bukharin’s sociologism and Croce’s idealist philosophy of praxis. According to Gramsci, Marxism is a revolutionary philosophy of praxis associated with practico-historical role of the ideology and intellectuals. He establishes an organic unity between base and superstructure, although in several situations he assigns primacy to superstructure over base.

He immediately realizes that it is ideo structures of ideology, culture, ethics, law and politics through which the capitalist society produces and reproduces its material condition of existence. And it is the moving unity of economic structure (content) and ideological structure that helps us in our understanding of the emergent objective contradictions of the capitalist social formation which can be translated into a revolutionary situation with the help of revolutionary philosophy of praxis whose articulation can be realized by injecting a critical-political concrete social activity and consciousness among the masses. Proletariat’s struggle against capitalism much conceive this idea that the economic struggle cannot be separated from political struggle, nor either of them can be
separated from the ideological struggle"\(^{(37)}\).

Machiavelli schooled Gramsci in such a manner that he came to realize that the acquisition of legitimacy and the mechanism of political stability of bourgeois rule are made through the dual guises of force / deal and fraud / consent. Gramsci identifies the Machiavellian Prince- no matter whether a historical myth or a reality- with the modern revolutionary political party which provides a ‘first cell’ for the concrete expression of workers hegemony and collective will whose functions will be to damage the balancing force of the capitalist order. He makes this point that “the Modern Prince must and can not but the preacher and organiser of intellectual and moral reforms, which means creating the basis for a later development of the national popular collective will forwards the realization of a higher and total form of modern civilization”\(^{(38)}\).

Gramsci identifies society in terms of historical bloc in which there is “reciprocity between structure and superstructure which is nothing other than the real dialectical process”\(^{(39)}\). That is to say that structure and superstructure reflect the condition of existence of each other in the historical development of society. By launching a theoretical war against the pre-established materialist and naturalist causality, Gramsci forms this ideal that the historical science of consciousness is constructed on the basis of four inter-related and mutually reducible concepts of history,


economics, philosophy and politics. However, it is important to note that Gramsci is mainly a superstructural theorist. For him civil society and political society are the two main organs of superstructure. Civil Society produces hegemony whereas the political society produces coercion and violence. The distinction between civil society and political society is made with reference to law. Civil society is guided by personal law whereas the political society is guided by public law. The constituent elements of civil society are religion, philosophy, morality, ethics, culture and education; whereas the main organs of political society are state, military organisation and bureaucracy.

Gramsci believes in the dialectic of history which means that the role of creative ideas, ideology consciousness etc. in the development of society. He says that unorganised, spontaneous ideas do not constitute a coherent hegemonic ideology. In fact this kind of reality is an arbitrary individual speculation. The organic, coherent and hegemonic ideology is created by intellectuals. This is reflected in law, art, economics, and in the manifestations of individual and collective life. Further, ideology has to do with action or praxis because it organizes masses and makes them travel in a political terrain. It is in ideology that social classes become aware of their positions and their historical role; it is in and by ideology that a class can exercise hegemony over other classes.

Gramsci’s concept of ideology is connected with the master concept of hegemony by which a social class, in a given situation, takes consent from the masses for the regulation of state and government. Since the bourgeois order is more based on hegemony than force, the working class intellectuals have to create a counter-hegemonic ideology. That is to say that it has to struggle first in the field of ethics and morality, then in
the field of politics and economics. Hegemony means a moral and intellectual leadership.

If we compare Lukacs with Gramsci on the theory of ideology, we find three differences: (a) whereas in Lukacs the analysis of ideology remains at an undifferentiated level of high intellectual complexity, Gramsci considers ideology at different level. He distinguishes four level of ideology namely philosophy, religions, commonsense and folklore. In a sense ideology has also a relation to popular mass culture. (b) Lukacs talks about class consciousness, but he does not fully explain how it is that it comes to be formed and who are the agents in its development. Gramsci, on the other hand, strongly underlines the role of intellectuals in the formation of class consciousness. Gramsci, talks about the two kinds of intellectuals: (i) traditional and (ii) organic, which are the creation of two different and hostile classes. Traditional intellectuals are related to classes which have no essential role in a particular society whereas organic intellectuals are the creation of mass movement, and they make masses conscious of their existence, organic, and make them struggling organs; (c) whereas Lukacs pays scant attentions to the material institutions, Gramsci gives weightage to organizations, party and institutions which are the sources of the production and diffusion of ideologies. The main institutional apparatuses for the production and reproduction of ideologies are press, educational institution, media etc. Gramsci says that it is through the counter-hegemony by which proletariat gains leadership over all forces opposed to capitalism; and wield them into a homogeneous politico-economic historical bloc without internal contradictions. Thus the philosophy of praxis is created by intellectuals. The philosophy of praxis is a proletarian ideology which can be lived as a faith and as good sense.
The production, distribution and diffusion of ideology is made by organic intellectuals through organizations and institutions for the realization of a humane society and polity. Similar position has been made by Althusser who considers Gramsci as his mentor at least in the domain of ideology and hegemony.

(6) Althusser’s contribution to the theory of ideology

Althusser, a French structuralist, gives a positive version of ideology. He distinguishes between the theory of ideology in general and the theory of particular ideologies. The object of the theory of ideology in general is “an omni-historical reality, in a sense in which that structure and functioning are immutable, present in the same form throughout what we call history” (40).

Ideology is a mechanism through which people explain their conditions of existence at both levels: (1) imaginary and (2) real, and thereby secure cohesion among themselves and between them and their conditions of existence. It is a cement that holds society together. The ideology of particular ideology focus on the specificity of different social formations and their history. For example, the feudal mode of production was based on the two ideological institutions; (i) church and (ii) school whereas the capitalist mode of production is based upon different ideological tools such as nationalism, democracy, secularism etc.

Ideology interpellates individuals and constitutes them as subjects who accept their subordinated role within the system of production relations. Ideology makes individuals as a trained, obedient

and efficient labour force for the maintenance of system of production and reproduction of social relations. Initially Althusser made a contradictory relation between ideology and science, considering ideology as false reality and science as a true reality. But this was his positivist deviation. Later on, particularly in his text, ‘Essays in self criticism’ he holds this opinion that ideology defends science because it is a philosophy of science and it is a material reality. However he made a distinction between the bourgeois idealist ideology and the proletarian materialist ideology which is a revolutionary thought. Here, he has been influenced by Lenin. When he says that proletarian materialist ideology interpellates subject as militant subjects. It is not the subject that produces ideas, but it is rather ideology that produces the subjects. As Coward and Ellis put it, ideology is “a practice of representation, a practice to produce a specific certain subjects as their supports” (41).

According to Althusser, the ideas or representations etc. which seem to make up ideology do not have an ideal or spiritual existence but a material existence. Ideology operates through concrete material apparatuses such as educational institution, legal institutions, etc. The materiality of ideology can not be understood in terms of paving stone, rather in terms of languages and rituals which have bearing on human behaviours. Ideology is not a distorted consciousness, rather is true because it represents men’s and women’s lived relations to their conditions of existence. Further it is an objective reality because it is not related to the intentionality of individual. For Marx the subject was produced by/in its own material practice. In capital he affirms that men, by “acting on the

external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature” (42). The determinations of consciousness by material practice has been transposed into the determination of the subject by ideology.

Althusser gives an anti-historicist and anti-humanist interpretation of ideology because it has no relationship with a subject. It is one of the practices of mode of production which is a scientific concept. The other three practices are economic practice, political practice and scientific practice. Marx replaced his notions of subject, alienations and consciousness by his concepts of social formation, class-struggle and surplus value in his book ‘The German Ideology’ which was written in 1845. Althusser explains this development in the thought practice of Marx by his master concept of epistemological break. Instead of saying that man makes history he says that masses make history and they are the motor of history. It is further observed that masses make history not as they please, but according to the circumstances given to them. Thus “the subjects of history are given societies and the true subjects of practices of social formation are the relations of production. Men are never anything more than the bearers/supports/effects of these relations” (43). According to structuralist epistemology of Althusser, mature Marx rejected the idealism of essence and the empiricism subject because they do not contain a concrete scientific history. In other words, man has no history, he has been defined in terms of mode of production. Feuerbachian man is not the origin, cause or goal of any history. Thus Marx avoids the problem of reductionism or expressive casualty from his scientific theory of mode of production which has two complemementry principles: (1) Relative autonomy of superstructural practicess and (2) the determination of society (42) K.Marcx, Capital Vol I (London, Lawrence and Wishart; 1974), p. 173. (43) L. Althusser, Reading capital (London: New Left Books; 1970), p. 180.
in the last instance by economic practices.

Althusser's theory of the law of uneven, law of development of contradiction is based upon Mao's writings. Mao talks about the distinction between principal and secondary contradictions and between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. According to Mao, a principal contradiction is that "whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of other contradictions. Secondary contradictions are, therefore, those which are determined and influenced by the contradiction"(44). For example, economic relations in a given situation constitute the principal contradiction whereas political relation, legal relation constitute, in that situation, a secondary contradiction. As for the distinction, antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions one can say that the former is defined in terms of opposition between two hostile classes such as bourgeois and proletariat. It is open and direct and it leads to class-struggle which is a source of revolution. Non-antagonistic contradictions may operate either through the combination of various forces or strata of bourgeois class or through the combinations of various forces or strata under the proletariat class.

Thus, the charter of modern ideology which emerged in the western, empirical, rational and scientific discourses, is based upon the key notions of democracy, socialism, individualism, hedonism, scientific humanism, rational code of conduct and mode of thought, domination of man over man and nature, market system, meritarian principle and consumer culture. Modernity, as a process of societal and cultural

differentiation and pluralization, includes the general capitalization of social life, industrialization and atomization of art and democratization of thought. But it has been noted that the operationalization of these notions has been ambivalent and painful. As a result of it, there has emerged a dualism between 'is' and 'ought to be' (Kant), between the 'Ideal' and 'Real' (Hegel), between essence and existence (Marx), between normative rationality and substantive rationality (Weber) and between the thought-concrete and real-concrete (Althusser). We might assume that due to the progressive distortion of modern ideology there has emerged a paranoid temper of mind that makes one repulsive to the current of anger, cruelty and hedonism, the strategies of triumph and humiliation of domination and subjection which are prevalent in the relations of social productions, of culture and value.

In sum, the genesis and function of ideology can be seen from three distinct epistemological positions:

(1) The German rationalist-cum-idealist tradition. It is based upon the following thesis:

(A) Human history is the progressive movement of Idea (Hegel) the universality of reason (Weber) and the Transcendental subject (Hussel).

(B) Freedom is the function of reason and reason is inscribed in the history of human consciousness; and

(C) The world is meaningful, real and rational.

(2) The British empiricist and positivist tradition. It is based on the following principles:

(A) Identity of scientific and ideological world view;

(B) Ideology stems from concrete factual and empirical reality;
(C) It is derived from common sense, knowledge and perception.

(3) The French socialist tradition. It is based on following ideological principles:

(A) Ideology has a positive content. It is not a false consciousness; rather it is a medium by which people explain their conditions of existence at various levels (i) ethical, (ii) cultural (iii) educational (iv) political and (v) economic.

(B) It is real, universal and indispensable for all social formations.

(C) It is a representation of culture, ideas, myths, rituals, practices, related to the material conditions of existence; it is grounded into the materiality of social institutions and its main function is the production and reproduction of relations of production.

(D) It is creative and revolutionary because it is related to the theory of class struggle.

Thus, the theory of Marxian ideology as a collective representation and consciousness belong to the domain of superstructure. The main ideas running through the Marxist theory of ideology are:

(a) Ideology as a distorted reality and false consciousness for the depressed masses;
(b) Ideology as an instrument of the ruling class for the justification of the system of inequality;
(c) Ideology as a totality of images, symbols and values;
(d) Ideology as a system of regulative mechanism of the capitalist class;
(e) Ideology as a material force; and
(f) Ideology as a cementing force in the form of the concepts of democracy, nationalism, socialism, freedom, humanism, fair justice and equality which are the sources of capitalist state. Marxist theory of ideology is related to
the concept of praxis because it believes in the invasion of the unfolding spirit of Hegelian and contemplative discourse of Feuerbachian philosophy into the periorization of modes of production. In other words, we can argue that idealism of essence and empiricism of subject of Hegelian and Feuerbachian philosophies respectively, was inverted by Marx into material practice of sensuous human activity of concrete real men or what Marx calls the definite individuals who are productively active, in a definite way, enter into definite social and political relations. Further in the eyes of Marx, men make their history, but do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under the circumstances chosen by themselves; but under the circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.

The scientific terrain of economic determinism involves this proposition that the forces of production and relations of production constitute “essential sphere” or “core structure” or “terrain of necessity” that determines and regulates the superstructural elements of ideology, mentality law, consciousness, culture etc. which jointly form the terrain of peripheral domain. Lenin’s epistemology as a reflection of material reality, existing outside of consciousness is subordinated to materialist ontology which refuses to recognize the hybrid project for the reconciliation between materialism and idealism.

It was maintained by neo-Marxist or Western Marxists that the history of society could not be paralleled to the determinate laws of physics; and to think materialism exclusively as an analysis of matter and its motion, is to run the risk of omitting ideas and consciousness as causal forces in history. That is why the neo-Marxist consider ideology in a positive term and put stress on the thesis of dialectics of history, negation of negation.
as a central law of dialectic, consciousness and ideology as a constitute element of society, reciprocal relationship or mediation between base and superstructure, creative role of human praxis and agency in the transformation of society and the primacy of concrete economic structure over the structure of consciousness in the last intance. To say that being determines consciousness means at least in larger part: the character of the leading ideas of a society is explained by their propensity, in virtue of that character, to sustain the economic role called for by productive forces. Althusser gives the theories of overdetermination and contradiction, structural casuality of mode of production, proletarian revolutionary philosophy and conceptualization of society in terms of a pre-given-unevenly-structured-complex whole articulated in dominance etc. Althusser’s view of ideology is related to the institutional apparatuses of state and it is concrete and critical. Further, it is related to the concept of interpelation by which a subject (subject with small S) is subjected to subject (subject with capital S) for the production and reproduction of a conformist, trained, obedient and disciplined labour force education is the major ideological state apparatus in capitalism. However, he also argues that even socialist society maintains its equilibrium on the basis of fusion of ideological moment and institutional moment. In fact, the modern state is a net-product of coercion and hegemony. Thus Marxian ideology is materialist, revolutionary, creative, omni-present and indispensable for all social formations.