CHAPTER - III
A DISCOURSE ON RADICAL - LIBERAL IDEOLOGY
(WEBER AND CRITICAL THEORIES)

(1) WEBER'S THEORY OF IDEOLOGY

Weber’s thematic discovery about the ideology of the modern west lies in the conceptual elaboration of the process of rationalization of human conduct, orientation and world view. His analysis of the history of idea involves a teleological-cum-evolutionary so far as he argues that the history of capitalism can been seen essentially in terms of growth, codification and diffusion of the universal process of rationalization and disenchantment of magical world. Raymond Aron rightly sees Weber’s work as “The paradigm of a sociology which is both historical and systematic” (1). Thus the theory of rationalization can be seen in historical, evolutionary and comparative perspectives. The fate of humanity will be measured by the extent to which a man conforms to or deviates from the ideal standard of vocational rationality. Reason of a man is inscribed in the new history of idea associated with the ‘idea of calling’ which emerged out of the womb of the Puritan inner-worldly asceticism. The rationalization thesis can be understood in terms of the following polemical questions:

(A) What does rationality mean?
(B) How did it emerge in the Western social order?
(C) What effects did it produce?

What does rationality mean?

Weber was primarily concerned with modern western society, in which, he saw it, behaviour had come to be dominated increasingly by goal-oriented rationality; whereas in earlier periods it tended to be motivated by tradition, affect or value-oriented rationality. His studies of non-western societies were primarily designed to highlight this distinctive western development. Karl Mannheim puts the matter well when he writes, “Max Weber’s whole work is in the last instance directed toward the question ‘which factors have brought about the rationalization of western civilization?’” (2). In modern society, Weber argued, whether in the sphere of politics or economics, in the realm of the law and even in interpersonal relationships, the efficient application of means to ends has become predominant and has replaced other springs of social action. Thus the above mentioned three polemical questions are complementary, however each requires a separate discussion for our understanding to the whole question of the dominant ideology of the western civilization.

Weber’s understanding of the history of mankind starts with the idea of ‘theoretical humanism’ which implies that the governing force of history is not ‘matter in motion’ or ‘mode of production’ as Marxists claim, but the meaningful social action of a concrete man. Weber, to be sure places the ‘history of idea’ at the centre of his analysis and he exposes the developmental character of normative idea through the empirical manifestation of social action. Unlike Marx’s characterization of social structure in terms of economic base and ideological superstructure in which

(2) Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction

the former has ontological primacy over the latter, Weber tries to establish a meaningful affinity between the ideological world and the material world in the space created by social order. Weber defined sociology as “a science concerning itself with the interpretative understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences” (3).

The behaviour to be studied by sociology is seen by Weber as social action that includes: “All human behaviour, when and in so far as the acting individual, attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be overt, purely inward, or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a situation of deliberately refraining from such intervention, or passively acquiescing in the situation. Action is social as by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals) it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course” (4).

Further for Weber, Sociology is “that science which aims at the interpretative understanding of social behaviour in order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course and its effects” (5).

Unwilling to commit himself either to a “materialistic” or an “idealist” interpretation of history, Weber’s ultimate unit of analysis remained the concrete person:

"Interpretative sociology considers the individual and his

action as the basic unit, as its 'atom' ——— The individual is ——— the upper limit and the sole carrier of meaningful conduct ———— such concepts as "State", "association", "feudalism" and the like, designate certain categories of human interaction. Hence it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to "understandable" that is without exception, to the actions of participating individual men"(6).

Thus on the basis of statement of Weber about the concepts of social action, interpretative sociology, human behaviour, and social interaction etc. quoted above we can make the following points:

(i) Action is social so far as an actor attaches subjective, intended and meaningful attributes to his conduct. However, the intended meaning of an actor may produce an unintended effect which could be seen at the level of social organization and institutions like State, bureaucracy, feudalism, capitalism etc.

(ii) Social action involves the realm of ideas, values, and representation given by cultural universe.

(iii) Realization of a goal or a set of goals by an actor is directed by the possible normative structure of existing organization of a given society. Actions are determined by goals, means, social conditions, and normative standard. The ideal of modern society is a rational action in a sense that there is a calculation of material interest and the ideal interests.

(iv) Social action may be either hidden or open or it may be cognitive or expressive. It is a locus of decision.

(v) Actor acts as a consequence of decision constructed out of his various

cognitive and material interests.

(vi) The diverse circumstances, events and forces of human history could be reduced, analytically speaking, to three contrasted ideal typical forms of historical action:

(a) Traditional action involves the elements of custom, habit, will, conformity and recognition of past. This action is guided by customary habits of thought, by reliance on the "Eternal Yesterday". The behaviour of members of an orthodox Jewish Congregation might serve as an example of such action.

(b) Emotive action involves the elements of affection, emotion, feeling spontaneity and the passion for present. Affective or emotional action is anchored in the state of the actor rather than the rational weighing of means and ends, as in the case of participants in the religious services of fundamentalist sect.

(c) Rational action involves the elements of cognition, intellect, reason and calculation. It has two types:

(i) Purposeful rationality in which both goal and means are rationally chosen, is exemplified by the engineer who builds a bridge by the most efficient technique of relating means to ends.

(ii) Value oriented rationality is characterized by striving for a substantive goal, which is in itself may not be rational - say, the attainment of salvation - but which is nonetheless pursued with rational means - for example, ascetic self-denial in the pursuit of holiness. Like the ideal type of action there means-for example ascetic self-denial in the pursuit of holiness. Like the ideal type of action. There can be an ideal type of authority, bureaucracy etc. An ideal type is an analytical construct that serves the investigator as a measuring rod to ascertain similarities as well
as deviations in concrete cases. It provides the basic method for comparative study. “An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into an unified analytical construct” (7). An ideal type is not meant to refer to moral ideals. The ideal type involves an accentuation of typical courses of conduct. An ideal type never corresponds to concrete reality but always moves at least one step away from it. It explains reality in abstract. For example, if we wish to study the religious roots of modern capitalism, it may be advisable to construct an ideal type of Protestant, on the distinct feature of sectarians as these emerged during the Reformation. In order to show the meaningful association between two or more than two variables Weber types of causality—historical and sociological. Historical causality determines the unique circumstances that have given rise to an event. Sociological causality assumes the establishment of a regular relationship between two phenomena, which need not take the term ‘A makes B inevitable’ but may take the form “A is more or less favourable to B”. The question for historical causality asks the question: what are the causes of the Bolshevik revolution? The search for sociological causality involves questioning the economic, the demographic or the specifically social causes of all revolutions or of particular ideal types of revolutions. The quest for historical causes was facilitated by what has been called mental experiments.

“The assessment of the historical significance of an historical fact will begin with the posing of the following question: In the event of the exclusion of the fact from the complex of factors which are taken into account as co-determination or in the event of its modification in a certain direction, could the course of events, in accordance with the general empirical rules, have taken a direction in any way different in any features which would be decisive for our interests” (8).

To determine sociological causality, as Weber argues, also requires operating within a probabilistic framework. This type of generalization attempts to establish, for example, that the emergence of capitalism required a certain type of personality largely snapped by the preachments of calvinist divines. The proof of the proposition comes, when either through mental experiment or through comparative study in other culture it is established that modern capitalism could probably not develop without such personalities; therefore calvinism must be considered a cause, though emphatically not the cause, of the rise of capitalism. It can be argued that contrary to his nominalist stress on the acting person as the unit of analysis, Weber advanced the theory of stratification, the theory of increase of rationality in the modern world, the theory of bureaucracy and the theory of capitalism in terms of or on the basis of structural principles. Thus Weber starts his analysis with the nominalist principle and ends his analysis with the structural principle. Weber’s concern with the meaning actors impute to relationship did not limit him to the study of types of social action. Rather, he used the typology of forms of social action to understand the drift of historical change. There

is a shift from traditional to rational action as an ‘elective affinity’ developed between the ideas of the Calvinist divines and the concern of certain bourgeois or petty-bourgeois strata in the Seventeenth century England and Scotland.

Weber showed that rational action within a system of rational-legal authority is at the heart of the modern rationalized economy, that is of the capitalist system. He says that the rationalization of economic action can only be realized when traditional notions about just prices or just wages are discarded and a positive ethical sanction is provided for acquisitive activities aimed at maximizing the self-interest of the actor. Such ethical sanction, Weber argued, was provided by the Protestant Ethic which broke the hold of traditionalism in the realm of economic behaviour even while it fostered a spirit of rigorous self-discipline, encouraging men to apply themselves rationally and methodically to the specific tasks they were “called” to perform within the occupational world.

Thus, for Weber, rationality is positively associated with homo-economics and homo-ethics and negatively distanced from traditionalism and spontaneous, random and zig-zag way of life. Rationalization is a process resulting from the interaction of ideal and material factors and proceeds in a mechanical and autonomous fashion without allowing for the possibility of opposing forces that could give yet another direction to the course of events. One can argue that for Weber rationalization process involves the following elements:

(i) Intellectualization of activity and conformity to the principle of reason. Through intellectual equipment we can maintain value-neutrality and position of empirical evaluation of truth and value.

(ii) Depersonalization of social relationships.
(iii) Radical and progressive disenchantment and vocationalization of human world.

(iv) Methodological individualism is the consequence of regular and continuous activity of an actor.

(v) Specialization of task through formal organization.

(vi) Codification and enlargement of normative control.

(vii) Secularization means "Christianity Without God". The norms which human beings follow are ethical commandments rather than fixed laws of God and nature.


(ix) All disciplines must come from the natural expression of personality system.

(x) Universalization, standardization and formalization of truth, knowledge, wisdom and virtue.

(xi) Scientific and impartial human conduct and attitude. It implies the development of universal citizenship and equality before law.

(xii) Theoretical affirmation of Freedom to make a conscious choice of inner cognitive capacity. The original freedom from constraint in religion to world bears the seeds of rationality.

(xiii) Human labour is ethical, meaningful and purposive. It must be accompanied by the ethical unification of action.

(xiv) Calculation of means and systematization of goals with a pragmatic outlook or alternatively it refers to the maximization of the effectivity of action in the pursuit of pre-determined goal.

(xv) Verification and confirmation of truth on the basis of matter-of-fact, not on the basis of psychological prejudice. The objective correlation
between forces and factors should be through the construction of ideal typical situation of reality.

(xvi) It is organically associated with the idea of “calling” which implies the fulfillment of the obligations imposed on individual by his position in the world. The idea of “calling” gives rise to “institutional individualism” guided by ethical norms and democratic egalitarianism. It determines fraternity and love from a world that is violent, brutal, egoistic and hedonistic.

(xvii) Self-discipline and sense of responsibility are important for maintaining coherence in public life and public office. Lack of objectivity and irresponsibility are the two deadly sins in the field of politics as a vocation.

One can say that it was ideal and material values that came into existence with the metaphorical closure of ideological conflict with charisma and its routinization. Rationality came as a major agency for the metonymic resolution of old values and forces which were grounded into the concepts of closed immobilism and irregular transmutation of things represented by the traditional action and charismatic action. Rationality displaces the hegemony of metaphysical version of reality in which a singular master centre— that is a singular, all encompassing and apriori God was supposed to unite all things and relations; it opens up the universe of various perspectives and values conceptualized in terms of various names such as liberalism, democracy, socialism, libertarianism, humanism etc.

Rationality has two dimensions: (a) formal and (b) substantive. Formal rationality refers to instrumentally rational perfection of the existing system, it is seen in terms of systematic universal
codification of rules, procedures and norms for the regulation and effectivity of life-situation, systematic relationship and organizational practice. It has a base in ideological, cognitive and normative evaluations. It is through the ideological yardstick of formal rationality by which means and procedures for the realization of desired goals are evaluated and calculated by an actor in a given culturally meaningful situation. Substantive rationality operates in the domain of human praxis. It is end-oriented activity and it is related to the consequences and outcomes of intended action. It refers to the actual and factual assessment of goal-realization and purposive performance achieved by an actor in terms of a particular value-standpoint.

(B) HOW DID RATIONALITY EMERGE IN THE WESTERN SOCIETY?

The question as to how rationality as a major ideological formulation occupied a space for its birth, is a matter of establishing theoretical polemics. Some might be convinced by this thesis that the rational explanation of man's relation to universe was the product of scientific revolution, initiated by Copernicus who radically displaced the old-established theoretical discourse of geo-centric time scale by his new paradigm of heliocentric time-scale. This displacement changed the sense and essence of old ideas, values and norms whose existence had provided a legitimate base for the successful regulation of man’s mystical relation to God, and which established the hegemony of Church in the domain of political life. Copernican Revolution made a major breakthrough in the field of astronomy by transforming to sun many astronomic functions previously attributed to the earth. Copernicus’s thesis conforms the idea
of positivism and utilitarianism.

Since Weber was hostile to positivism and utilitarianism, he locates the emergence of rationality in historico-religious process of disenchantment thesis, initiated by Protestant ascetic groups e.g. Calvinists, Baptists, Mennonities, Quakers, Reformed Pietists and Methodists. Weber observes that “the decisive historical difference between the predominantly oriental and Asiatic types of salvation religion and those found in the Occident is that the former usually culminate in contemplation and the latter in asceticism” (9). That is to point out that due to charismatic prophecy of various sets of the Protestant religion, rationality emerged in the form of ethically defined economic dimension which was not the case with the Indian religious groups because the Indian social structure was based on the existence of absence of concept of natural law and citizenship, the mysterious and secretive character of intellectuals, geographical isolation and the lack of national feeling, passive role of intellectual strata in society and above all, the existence of institutionalized inequality of caste system. On the other hand the intellectual leaders of Calvinism developed the concept of economic rationality. For example, Richard Baxter advocates that an earth man must, to be certain of his state of grace, do the works of him who sent him, as long as it is yet day. Not leisure and enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase the glory of God, according to the definite manifestations of his will” (10). Waste of time is, thus, the first and, in principle, the deadliest of sins. The span of

human life is infinitely short and precious to make of one’s own election. Loss of time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for health, six to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation. Work hard, in a calling, is a moral virtue. "He who will not work shall not eat" holds unconditionally for everyone. Unwillingness to work is symptomatic of the lack of grace. Baxter further holds that wealth does not exempt anyone from the unconditional commands. Even the wealthy shall not eat without working, for even though they do not need to labour to support their own needs, there is God’s commandment which they, like the poor must obey. Thus it is true that usefulness of a calling and its favour in the sight of God, is measured primarily in moral terms, and thus in terms of the importance of the goods produced in it for the community. But a further, and above all, in practice the most important, criterion is found in private profitableness for if that God, whose hand the Puritan sees in all the occurrences of life, shows one of his elect a chance of profit, he must do it with a purpose. We also find in Weber’s work that when the limitation of consumption is combined with this release of acquistive activity the inevitable practical result is obvious: accumullation of capital through ascetic compulsion to save.

Thus rationality in its forms of historical variant was born from the compulsion of an inherent logic which was situated in the irresistible drive towards demystification and secularization of religious ideas- a drive which was made by the revolutionary potential of charismatic prophecy. Uncharismatic belief of calvin revolutionizes men from within and shapes material and social conditions according to his revolutionary will. For the Puritan God is “in” the world and “His presence” exists in the purposive action of man. It is the salvational
commitment of a man that motivates him to carry out "God-ordained" rational orders. Man's qualified subjection to "God-order" is a part of his craving for realization of self and authentic existence in a world which is rational, meaningful and purposive. The anti-dualist world view of the Puritan doctrine created the philosophy of "now and here" by rejecting the old-philosophyof "then and there". This religious creed became the motivating force for secularization and rationalization of mind, soul and body.

Rationality as a religio-historical process emerges with the idea of world-affirmation of Puritanism which divorced the world-rejection thesis of early christianity: This new philosophy sealed of the contradiction between "here" and "there", between religious world and "material world", between political and hierocratic power and between "other-worldly" power and "this-worldly" power. There are, analytically speaking, two kinds of religion: (i) religion of salvation and (ii) religion of adaptation. The difference between the two religions are many. First, religion of adaptation demands conformity to behaviour on the basis of law and convention. Whereas religion of salvation highlights faith and conviction which reinforces conformity to belief. Second, the former accepts the world and this religion is about "elite" and this religion considers world in relation to kinship, politics, economics etc. The latter religion rejects the world and it is about "elect". Third, the religion of adaptation develops positive attitude to the world, gives pragmatic or practical orientations, emphasized sacred ritual and it considers world as valuable, meaningful and dutiful while the religion of salvation is hostile to world, tries to transcend the world, generates sacred faith and it treats world as a valuless, and meaningless except what religion gives it and it
develops both asceticism and mysticism. Fourth, religion of adaptation follows the ideal of “in the world”, and “in” and “of” the world; whereas the religion of salvation gives the thesis of “out” of the world and “in” but “off” the world. Fifth, the religion of adaptation creates the principle of community ethic in which one is supposed to follow his father and mother even if they are subject to conflicting values; but in the case of religion of salvation we surrender to universal ethic in which one can dislodge his parents for the sake of faith. Sixth, the religion of adaptation follows continuity in terms of repeated emphasis on sacred religion by priest. The religion of salvation is about “break-through” in terms of codification and reconstruction of message. The protect delivers sacred message on the behalf of invisible force that is God. The Puritanism is a salvational and vocational religion whereas the Hinduism is a religion of adaptation.

Rationalization could not be generated by other religions because they were dualistic and believed in the world-rejections thesis through different paths and techniques. Confusionism, Taoism and Islam develop the idea of “adjustment to the world; but their solution method is locked up in a closed dogma and they are not subject to the logic of universal validation and experimentation, and moreover, they are operated by the selected few. Hinduism and Budhism believe in the “flight from world” for acquiring salvation and liberation in a world which is there and distant. Hinduism devides the world into two parts (a) this world and other world, and considers this world as a world of suffering and the other world as a world of freedom from suffering. Weber points out that asceticism is of two types i.e. world-rejecting and inner-worldly. The attitude toward salvation, which is characterized by a methodical procedure
for achieving religious salvation may be termed as ‘ascetic’ concentration
upon the actual pursuit of salvation may entail a formal withdrawal from
the ‘world’: from social and psychological ties with the family, from the
possession of worldly goods and from political, economic, artistic and
erotic activities - in short, from all creatively interests. This is world-
rejecting asceticism which can be demonstrated by the concept of Sanyasi
in the Hinduism. On the other hand, the concentration of human behaviour
in activities leading to salvation may require participation within the world
on the basis of religious individual’s piety and his qualification as the
"elect" instrument of God. This is innerworldly asceticism which we find
in the Puritan religion. The person who lives as a worldly ascetic is a
rationalist, not only in the sense that he rationally systematizes his own
conduct, but also in his rejection of everythings that is ethically irrational,
aesthetic or dependent upon his own emotional reactions to the world and
its institutions"(11). Thus the religion of India puts emphasis on
contemplation, salvation by the grace of living saviours and transmigration
of soul, whereas the Puritan puts emphasis on rational, methodical human
action towards the realization of glorification of God on the earth.

Even catholicism believes that the salvation-acquisition
can be achieved by an individual by turning away from world. Only ancient
Judaism and Protestant ethics develop salvation religion by turning towards
the world. But it can be noted that Judaism is contemplative in orientation
and compels individual to accept ‘fate’ in the world; thus giving rise to
“static individualism”. Whereas the Protestant ethic believes in the
category of “world- mastery” through active action, thus creating the

ideological posture of “dynamic individualism” which is the core idea of rational action.

Thus, one can argue that a constellation of cultural circumstances and pressure to seek a new ideal and material interests were fundamentally responsible for the rationalization of human mode of thought and code of conduct. The demonstrative effects of this new idea, can be seen in the development of modern capitalism, science, law, politics and bureaucracy. These historical irreversible institutional clusters determine the men’s conditions of existence.

Unlike Nietzsche, who locates the origin of modern culture in irrational forces such as the violent competitions of the classical word, Weber locates the origin of modernity in religion in the irrational quest for salvation. He sought to study the historical evolution of modernity in the calvinistic ethic as the most rational standards and rational values. Weber’s compilation of a movement traditional to modern world is homologus to postulates of Tonnies, Durkheim and Marx who spoke of social dynamics in terms of a progressive march of historical societies from status to contract, from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity and from feudalism to capitalism respectively, though their analysis of the origin of societal progress is quite different and sometimes contradictory in their essential sense of the terms. Weber’s focus is on the Protestant sects as a collection of religious groups which provided the cultural motor for rationalization of worldview. According to Weber, the other religious group were guided by traditional forms of religiosity the pre-intellectualized forms of magic, whereas Protestantism highlights the religious impulse for legitimizing empirical, practical, this worldly action advocated by the intellectual class of priests. The greater the tension
between religious life and the real world; the more was the scope for intellectual class to systemize and rationalize the world for overcoming the potential threat of irrationality and conflict inherent in the old structure of polytheism. Rationalization means the unification of world view with the concrete images of reality.

(C) **WHAT EFFECTS DID IT PRODUCE?**

As an effect rationalization produced politics as a vocation. The conception of rationality was manifested into vocationalization of political discourse which means that reason of politics is par excellence, a reason that is distinct from divine force and cosmos. Reason of politics demands a solution to the following questions: what politics means and does and how its goal is achieved under the modern theory of state. To be sure, politics as a vocation demands two preconditions to be satisfied (i) to declare one’s own standpoint as openly as possible and (ii) to distinguish between scientific analysis and political premises because the former is “value-judgement-free” whereas the latter is "value-loaded". Political ethics are two: (i) ethics of conviction and (ii) ethics of responsibility. The first enables an actor to make the pursuit of certain values or ideals as an imperative duty no matter how great the chances of achievement or failure of ultimate value may be. The actor has to confirm the validity of those values which he holds to be absolute; the actor feels duty-bound to comply with them even in the most adverse circumstances even by sacrificing his life. The second is contrary to the first in a sense that it requires the constant understanding of the possible consequences of one’s own action, with a view to the optimal realization of whatever ideal values one has.
These ethics weber says, can be realized if a true politician feels "passionate devotion to a 'cause' to the God or demon who is overlord" (12). In conformity with Machiavellian tradition, Weber considers power as a chance of a man or a number of men "to realize their own will in communal action, even against the resistance of others" (13). Moreover, Weber argues that men do not only strive for power to enrich themselves. "Power, including power, may be, valued "for its own sake" very frequently the striving for power is also conditioned by the social 'honour' it entails" (14).

Weber considers force as an autonomous irreducible category of politics and defines state as a legitimate body of physical violence, or an area of the exercise of domination by means of force by a regime accepted or recognized as legitimate by those who are ruled. Here one can see an antinomy between the aggressive character of politics and the salvational quest of modern ethics. Weber's politician seems to appear like the Machiavellian prince who combines the qualities of fox and lion because the lion is defenseless against the traps and a fox is defenseless against wolves; and, therefore, one must be a fox in order to recognize traps and a lion to frighten off wolves. By politics, Weber, understands, leadership of a state. Politics is equal to state and state can not be defined otherwise except by the concept of force. Thus, politics is equal to force. It is at this point that Weber slips down in the philosophical terrain of the Machiavellian 'real polik' politics means striving to share power or striving

(12) Gerth and Mills (eds), 1946; op. cit, p. 115.  
to influence the distribution of power either among the state or among groups within a State. This kind of power politics is related to the genesis of industrial democracy with competitive leadership in leader democracy.

The ideas of leader democracy along with parliament, party etc. gives the idea of instrumental strive for power and prestige. Weber defends leader democracy as against leaderless democracy of professional politicians who act without a 'vocation'. However it can be argued that the professional politicians were responsible for the evolution of leader democracy and politics as a vocation. There are five types of professional politician: The first is educated clergy who assisted prince in consolidating power for the unification of nation-state. The second was humanistically educated literati who became the political adviser to prince. The third was court nobility. When the prince took power from nobility as an estate, he put this class under the political and diplomatic service. The fourth was gentry. The prince attracted this class in order to counter local administrators. The fifth was university-trained jurists who, on the basis of his knowledge of Roman law, brought about revolution in the political management.

Rationalization of politics means a movement from estate to the modern state system, from prince to leader, from professional politician to that of vocational politicians, from traditional or charismatic domination to legal and formal bureaucratic domination, from palace to that of parliament from people as subjects to people as masses, from partner to party, from political stagnation to political struggle for power, from mystagogue to demagogue and from local power to national power. The vocational politicians of leader democracy and industrial parliament must possess three qualities such as 'passion' a sense of responsibility
and a sense of proportion if they to achieve ultimate goal of power. When passion has devotion to a cause, there develops a sense of responsibility which can be discharged if a politician has a sense of proportion. The sense of proportion is a psychological quality of the politician, his ability to let the realities work upon him with inner concentration and calmness. It also asks politicians to keep themselves at distance from things and war. Though politics is made with the head its devotion requires passion. Here Weber unites reason with passion. Politicians of competitive democratic party must overcome "vanity" lack of objectivity because lack of objectivity is a sin for power-seeker. Irresponsibility is also a deadly crime because without responsibility politician enjoys power for power's sake and without a substantive purpose.

Now what relation exists between ethics and politics? Politics, as Weber says, has no ethics because "power is backed up by violence and violence is ethically neutral, that is it is neither right nor wrong even if it does not produce objective effects be it positive (Victory in war) or negative (loss in war). The ethics of politicians are two-conviction and responsibility - which are connective with acquisition of political power. The decisive means of politics is violence. Here there is a tension between means and ends. The ethic of ultimate end must go to pieces on the problem of the justification of means by ends.

In fact political grammar denounces the means as a point of valid-right; simply it is end oriented such as the case of revolutionary socialism created by Bolshevik Revolution End justifies means; this is the politics which weber accepts but be says that this idea can not bring "ultimate ends" and ethic of responsibility under one roof. In politics the ethical idea that "good comes from only good and from evil only evil
follows"; is not true. The true is also reverse. In the religious text of India we find the irrationality of means when Krishna says Arjun that “do what must be done” that is to say that war is objective necessity and it is sanctioned by dharma of the warrior caste. This is also true in the case of Kautalya Arthasastra. Even Protestantism legitimized the authoritarian state because it considers state as a divine institution and violence as a means. Thus all those who want to engage in politics as vocation have to realize ethical paradoxes: that politics means violence whereas ethics stand for love of humanity. In politics, the ethic means acquisition of power and here the ethic of ultimate end {drive for acquisition and an ethic of responsibility (possible realization of power)} are supplementary. The union of these two ethics constitute a genuine man - "a man who can have the calling for politics". Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards and it takes passion and perspective. Politics can achieve possible power unless man acts like a hero. Those people who are neither leader nor hero must leave all hopes of doing politics. Weber remarks that only he has the calling for politics who is sure that he shall not crumble for what he wants to offer: only he who in the face of all this can say “In spite of all” has the calling for politics.

Who are politicians in vocational sense in democracy? The first category will be lawyers as an independent status groups. Democratic politics operates through parties who are managed by interest groups. Lawyers advocate and win a cause even by logically weak “cause” and arguments. Since politics is conducted in public by means of the spoken or within words, lawyers can become politicians because they have capacity to become demagogue. The modern demagogues are, apart from lawyers, political publist and journalist who emerge in city. Journalist
gains more political influence from capitalist lord. Business men have no time to do politics. Civil servants have no demogogery capacity to do politics. However we can note that journalist and political publist can not maintain autonomy if they have to depend on capitalist for money and influence. In this sense party has elitist character in democracy. Parties are only true agency for the creation of leaders.

The constitutional state runs with the help of legal-rational authority. But there is a tacit hint that legal domination can not endure without elements of charismatically legitimized leadership. As a result, Weber categorized parliamentary democracy as a variant of charismatic legitimacy which is free from domination. In politics as vocation Weber says that a leader democracy with a machine is a combination of charismatically based leadership authority and bureaucratic techniques of domination. Weber, in German context, legitimizes leader democracy in charismatically qualified politicians with a sense of foresight instead of a leaderless democracy of professional politicians.

Vocationalization of politics means democratization and parliamentarization with multiple parties and competitive leadership. Weber's conception of exceptional leader of democracy entails the idea of charisma. The advantage of parliamentary democracy lies in the fact that the way, by which conflicts between philosophies and tendency is mediated, could be perfected. Weber introduced the idea of competition among those who are capable of leadership and have the "inner calling" to set objectives for the masses. Thus rationalization of politics establishes the ideas of rule of law, democracy, leadership and nation-state.

Democracy is a form of government whose function is to balance between various positions which are, in many situation,
contradictory. It has emerged along with capitalism. In democracy we have a system of formally free elections of leaders. Its ideological base comes from constitutions, popular sovereignty and positive rights. It first runs on the principle of individual self-determination which comes from the value of dignity of human being and then includes the idea that all relations are subject to domination and subjection. Theoretically it is asserted that individual’s choice are not influenced by external determination. But in practice we find that there is a tension between individual autonomy and domination. Thus ideally democracy would mean free and fair election of leaders institutional arrangement which guaranteed the resignation or the displacement of leaders by periodic election. But in reality it could only mean domination by freely elected leaders. For Weber, leaders who have calling to lead and rule, dominate by virtue of personal authority based on charismatic qualities, demagogic capabilities and personal responsibility. Weber defines parliamentary democracy as an anti-authoritarian variant of charismatic domination.

In leaderless democracy there is a production of unrestrained enforcement of the will of the masses vis-a-vis the state rulers together with the demand for the greatest possible minimization of the domination of man over man. In this democracy politics means routine-work with no room for creative political acts. This might create authoritarian or anarchistic order. There is also a possibility of dictatorial regime in leader democracy because here leaders use emotional type of devotion for effective propaganda measures. Even in this democracy continuous bureaucratization and routinization may damage individual creativity Weber’s views about the inescapable rationalization and bureaucratization of the world have obvious similarities to Marx’s notion
of alienation. Both man agree that modern methods of organization have tremendously increased the effectivness and efficiency of production and organization and have allowed an unprecedented domination of man over the world of nature. They also agree that the new world of rationalized efficiency has turned into a monster that threatens to dehumanize its creators.

According to Weber, there is all possibility of degnating mass democracy into a static society and political immobilism. In this situation Weber might recall charismatic leader as a source of creativity. This democratic leader with charismatic gift gives certain theoretical formula for creativity, freedom and openness. Rationalization of government and authority means an evaluation of charismatically based plebiscetarian 'leader democracy'. However, Weber also notes that rationalization has posed a dilemma in a form of social democracy versus political democracy.

Liberalization and democracy of pluralistic social structure is essential for permitting maximum free space where political parties, status groups and interest groups contest for ideal and material interests. Political mobility stops when there is an economic stagnation. Thus democratic state might intervene in economy and thereby breaks down structured inequality which is a thread to pluralistic competitive democracy. Here we find a contradiction between the principle of autonomy of civil society from state and principle of powerful interventionist state. However Weber stands for liberal state and democracy even though there is a domination of man over man. The idea democracy is one which is led by charismatically qualified politicians, in contrast to the out moded negative democracy which only demanded freedom from state for the disposal of internal and external relations in order to ensure the condition of a dynamic
policy in a society. The democratic leader gets legitimacy from masses and he, on the basis of scientific knowledge makes alternative political options (values) under the garb of social responsibility and accountability for maintaining coherence, order and happiness in society. This leadership politics is opposed to professional politics which operates without calling, without mission and long term vision, without responsibility. Professional politicians operate with egoism, hedonism and narrow outlook and personal objectives.

It could be said that Weber’s plea for a parliamentary democratic order was designed to serve the German national state. Weber’s Germany had a “highly developed industrial economy with a political structure dominated by the semifeudal values of Prussian conservatism”(15). Its political system was a “combination of a patriarchal type of authoritarianism with a highly developed, formal legalism”(16). Weber resented the continued political dominance of the Junkers and civil servant, not out of commitment to democratic values as such but because he feared that such continued dominance would be injurious to the German national mission. Further, we can advance the idea that Weber’s conception of a democratic man leader with the help of charismatic capacities can be traced to aristocratic individualism combined with Nietzschean idea of the value-setting personality, though he himself identifies fascism as leadership domination with machine regulated by norconic personality which was not content with comfortable compromises but always carried things to their extremes. There is a hint that in leadership state, the great

individuals, motivated by a strongest sense of personal responsibility, set new goals for mankind and prevent democracy from sinking into the mediocrity of a leadership of “herds of equal”. Sometimes, it appears that Weber is the miniature picture of Machiavelli. But this position can not be accepted if Weber’s personality is closely investigated.

Since Weber had an emotional preference for his mother and a suppressed negative attitude for his father’s 'technical mind', he took a decisive partnership against the authoritarian political order of Wilhelmism and its self-satisfied nationalism. However it is a fact that his unqualified support to the model of parliamentary institutions and democracy becomes a source of technical instrument of system. And Weber’s concept of reason terminates in “irrational charisma” and formal rationality of democracy gives rise to “material irrationality” operate on the head of politicians. Further, Weber’s leadership democracy does not represent the affirmation of ethical order or even the minimization of rule, but the opposite is true that is an increase in the power of nation state and selection of leaders who are charismatically gifted within a society hardened into bare-legality.

Thus, Weber radicalizes the political order by saying that rationalism in politics can be seen in terms of vocationalization of politics, in which few individuals are suited to join demands of rational responsibility and commitment to their adherence of various political values for the realization of goals. But no science of politics would come to the citizen’s aid and tell him what the right or the good thing was. He separates ethics and power and blind commitment to the instrument of power might lead to an irrationalism of blind choice and commitment in politics. One can not hide behind a stance of responsibility and evade value-choice. In
politics, the leader has to be tough to service and weak to go the wall. Politics, science and ethics are different because first of all, they belong to three orders of existence that is to say politics to power, science to truth and culture to life and, secondly, each sphere is guided by a plurality of beliefs, values and laws. Thus, the world is disenchanted and fragmented.

In brief, Weber’s political and ideological thought was both: German and Western, Weber’s ideological liberalism was committed to defend the plebiscitary leadership democracy, regulated by parliamentary system which has to decide three issues: (a) providing security for personal liberties and open government, (b) representation of a plurality of social forces and means for compromise and (c) selection and training of leadership. The exercise of the plebiscitarian leader’s will act as a source of the genuine social consensus.

(2) CRITICAL THEORIES ON IDEOLOGY

The core members of the Frankfurt school are Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Jur Gen Habermas who have critically examined the materialist dialectic of Marx and instrumental rationality of Max Weber. They use the term critical theory in place of the term historical materialism through which they give a radical philosophical critique of modern science (positivistic epistemology), positive philosophy (materialist dialectics) and totalitarian politics (be it fascism of Hitler or dictatorship of proletariat of Stalin) In order to combat the rise of fascism as a dominant socio-political force in Germany and Stalin’s repressive socialism in U.S.S.R which led to the defeat of working class movement on the world-wide scale and damaged the dialectical consciousness of man, critical theorists try to restore the emancipatory
philosophy of man. They also criticise the instrumental rationality of which resulted in the emergence of two phenomena (a) Jewish persecution and (b) genesis of world war. It is in this background that we will deal with the theories of ideology given by critical theorists. They believe that positive or materialist philosophy creates a dualism between fact and value, between nature and man, between science and ethics and between nature and history. This type of theoretical methodology has been given by Engels, Lenin, Plekhnov, Stalin and Althusser. Horkheimer and Adorno express their deep-rooted pessimism when they write that "we are wholly convinced ....... that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought, nevertheless, mankind, instead of entering a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism; thus critical theory aims at the redemption of the hope of past". (17).

Critical theory tries to discover the various levels of historical repression and resistance of the modern industrial society by accepting the optimistic vision of Hegelian philosophy of history, hermeneutic- epistomology and psycho-analytical method. It seriously believes that the fundamental opposition between human reason and unreasonable empirical world, between fact and value, between public and private, between theory and practice, between scientists and citizens and between nature and society can be overcome within a rational society by two thing (i) historically-induced revolutionary reason and the rational-purposive human labour and revolutionary praxis. This school holds this ideal that theory is an expression of class- world view by insisting that

theoretical discourse can not be reduced to its social conditions of production. It believes that there is no absolute subject of knowledge; and that subject and object do not yet to coincide in the process of thinking about society, although that process is, in fact society’s self-knowledge. The critical attitude of social theory is implicitly built upon the Marxian conceptual apparatus such as class exploitation, surplus value, economic production and alienation. For critical theorists Karl Marx’s critique of political economy was paradigmatic, as an analysis of liberal capitalism that was critical in the sense that he analysed the system of production from the standpoint of the objective possibilities of change inherent in its basic structure and present in latent form in pre-revolutionary conditions. They reject positivism and empiricism because they present reality in terms of dimensional surface observation of facts. They argue that there is a need to underline the form of intentional meaning structure beneath the empirical manifestation of reality in terms of historical strategy of liberation of human beings.

In opposition to determinate scientific laws, critical theorists highlight the role of human consciousness and human project in order to change reality; and consider theory as a self-reflection of the unfolding character of historical truths. As a whole, they constitute a group of left-Hegelian whose main business is to highlight the dialectics of consciousness and the philosophy of the “here” and “now” as a political tool for the emancipation of man from the repressive world in which freedom and humanism have been cancelled by the modern industrial scientific complex. Realization of Hegel’s philosophy based upon a presumed contradiction between revolutionary dialectical method and the conservative system, has been the major problem of left-Hegelian’s
theoretical construction. Thus for them “it is through political revolution that Hegel’s identity of Real and Rational can be realized” (18). Marcuse and Habermas definitely advocate the Hegelian philosophy of dialectic and history within the orbit of Marxism. Perry Anderson has rightly pointed out that the entire "Marcusian philosophy has been influenced by objective idealism of Hegel" (19) which aspires for progressive deconstruction of finite world through the liberal-radical idea of political resolution or politics of “Great Refuse”. In his book “Reason and Revolution”. Marcuse highlights the principle of negative reason and negative dialectic; which corresponds to Hegel’s principle of negation of negation, by which political can be generated. Habermas is also guided by Hegelian objective idealist epistemology because his major focus is not on Marx’s concepts of the forces of production and relations of production, but on the concept of labour and interaction for constituting a philosophy of the self constitution of the history of Human species. Labour (which is equivalent to Marx’s concept of economic base) of species is related to Weberian- Parsonian purposive action; and interaction (which is equivalent to Marx’s concept of ideological superstructure) is tied to the domain of symbolic communicative discourse of labouring human beings. Habermasian political manifesto is basically concerned with the problems of distorted political communication which can be solved by the enlightened efforts of critical public and critical reason which take place within the domain


Like Benjamin, Adorno explains social reality in terms of its internal multiplicity and difference or a constellation and configuration of elements drawn from the world of experience but arranged through their structure by the mind’s power of seeing resembles between things. The concept of whole as a true structure is false; and total contradiction is nothing but the manifested untruth of total identification. However what we find in the work of Adorno is that ultimately, the concept of “whole” is based on this assumption that everything depends upon everything else even though the whole is internally contradictory. It is consciousness that possesses photographs of objectivity and it is knowledge that conceives objects as it conveys them. Material consciousness sees the objectivity of reality without any prior image, and that historical materialism must ensure the spirits liberation from the primacy of material needs in their state of fulfilment.

Adorno argues that it is false to make an opposition of object and subject, of matter and idea and of concrete and abstract, and then to give primacy to one over other in order to constitute a homogenous language of philosophy. The true philosophy negates the dualism between body and mind, between matter and idea, because the phenomenology of facts of consciousness does not allow their separate definition and existence. For Adorno, “materialism is no longer a counterposition of idealism, rather it is a critique of idealism in its entirely and of the reality for which it opts by distorting it” (20). He agrees with Horkheimer’s

theorem that critical theory seeks not to make materialism acceptable, but to use it to make men theoretically conscious of what it is that distinguishes materialism from traditional theory of science. Critical theory is never regulated by pre-fabricated politico-social interest constellation; instead it has to struggle against false objectivity and false subjectivity of existing matter of facts. While explaining being-thought relationship, Adorno, like Lukacs, accepts “an ontological primacy of being over thought” (21) though he rejects Lukascian notion of identity of subject-object and primacy of practice in which theory is dissolved and loses its autonomy. Adorno is anti-totalitarian and anti-system in a sense that he is opposed to all ideas that serve to perpetuate a particular form of domination and reduce the human subjects to reified form. Negative dialectic is anti-science because it identifies rationality with measurability; reduces everything to quantities and excludes qualititative differences from the scope of knowledge. He also makes this point that “thought is not image of reality, rather it aims at the thing itself” (22). and it is due to the reason that if thought is related to image, then it will deny the spontaneity of subject and a movement of the objective dialectics of productive force and conditions. Materialism has to declare a war against image-theory that conceals the objective movement of reality within its distorted forms. Having rejected the principle of reduction of difference to identity, Adorno points out that the concepts enter into a constellation. The constellation illuminates the specific side of the concept, the side to which a classifying procedure is either a matter of indifference or a burden. Language itself

(21) Ibid., p. 200.
(22) Ibid., p. 205.
proceeds in such a manner when it becomes a form of representation. It provides objectivity to concept by the relation into which it puts the concepts centered about a thing. Without establishing an affinity between concepts and reality, it is not impossible to know truth. Location of truth is a matter of consciousness which, in turn, knows as much as about its otherness as it resembles that otherness. In fact, Adorno accepts the concept of totality not in the sense of the absolute subject-object, but rather because commodity fetishism produces a totality reducing the qualitative diversity of the real to a single homogenous dimension of abstract social labour. This is a point where we can argue that even Adorno’s conception of totality entails the principle of ultimate identity of elements; and as a consequence of it, history becomes a homogenous unity of continuity and discontinuity of social consciousness.

In brief, the main thrust of critical theorists is to give an ideological reaction against the modern positive science, repressive ideology, authoritarian political grammar and materialist epistemology which have decomposed a man into numerous contradictory atomized entities; and increased the process of forced social integration through the domination of man over nature which ultimately turns as a domination of man over man. In the absence of the objective possibility of structural transformation of industrial domination, the institutional philosophers of Frankfurt school attempt to uphold the notions of critical reason and the transcendental norms of rationality as a major apparatus to realize the popular ideology of global revolution in the form of political consciousness and political violence. Progressive realization of historical reason is a pre-condition for the constitution of human freedom and happiness in a rational society in which reason will obey its self-constituted protocol,
inner law and voice. In order to give a comprehensive understanding of the rationalist epistemology of the critical theorists, Marcuse and Habermas can be selected as the chief representatives of Frankfurt school who speak the language of German idealism and psycho-analytic method within the kingdom of Marx’s historical materialism.

Marcusian dialectical epistemology involves a double reduction of science and philosophy of rationalism, particularly, a negative philosophy whose main target is to annihilate the unreasonable material world embedded into technological and scientific rationality. Marcuse explains the modern industrial society as a repressive order which progressively, first, keeps society, nature, mind and soul in the stage of permanent mobilization, and, then it produces a historical contradiction between the human essence and the external constraint. Technology is the source of reification; and irrationality of rationality is the source of mystification of always-already mystified world. The world is characterized by repression, domination- subjugation relationship, alienation, rationality and a triple conflict- man vs. nature, man vs. society and history vs. nature. In a tension-ridden society, “repression has become so effective that for the repressed it assumes the form of freedom (illusion), the abolition of such freedom appears as a totalitarian act” (23). It can be pointed out that for the latter Marcuse, the categories of libidinal rationality and sexual revolution are more important than historical reason and political reason which were his early obsession. In the texts "one Dimensional Man" and "Reason and Revolution" Marcuse formulates a

historico-dialectical epistemology in which positive thought/positive philosophy is contrasted with negative thought/philosophy. “Positive thought corresponds to the principle of intellect i.e. to the principle of non-contradiction as a material principle of common sense and science, in turn, justifies the existence of factual and material reality; whereas the “negative thought” is twisted with the principle of contradiction which aims at the negation of common sense world and finite material reality. The existential structure of material world has left us with no choice, but to change it through revolutionary philosophy of praxis so that we can restore the original identity of subject and object, essence and existence, naturalism and human and ideal and real.

In the process of resolving contradictory existential condition of human beings, Marcuse sketches a composite structure of hyper-radical philosophical medicine emerging from his Heiddegarian-Marxism (1920-1933) to Freudian Marxism (1945 onwards) via Hegelian-Marxism (1933 to 1944). Having dissatisfied with communist party dictatorship, Stalin’s wit of personality, materialist orthodoxy etc; Marcuse made a heroic attempt to regulate the emancipatory power of human reason and defended the democratic and liberal socialism. During his early period Marcuse gave a Heiddegarian solution to human problems by claiming that the main function of a theory is to make a search for the fundamental structures of human existence, society and history. In his book “Ontology” (1931), Marcuse tries to bring Hegel, Marx and Heidegger under the same platform by saying that the need of philosophy emerges from existential necessity for the construction of subject; but philosophy as he extends, has to transform with the collaboration of revolutionary praxis. But as we move from Marcuse’s ‘Ontology’ to his 'Reason and Revolution' (1941),
what we find is that he becomes mainly an exponent of the Hegelian-Marxian revolutionary dialectics. Here he highlights the law of negation of negation as a basic key to understand the movement of concrete-historical society. Marcuse attacks positivism and crude materialism, and formulates the structure of historical dialectic which encompasses all realms of human and social existence in which the contradiction between essence and existence is expressed and resolved. For Marcuse, dialectic is a category of negation in terms of human practice, whose basic modality is the truly creative and transformative negation of material objects and socio-material conditions of life. Dialectical negation is rooted into human labour, praxis and goal.

Marcuse expounds the theory of historical truth as a ‘think tank’ which guides human reason and human practice in such a direction so that they could become able to realize the unactualized potentialities of human beings. The vitality of a theory of critical dialectic/ reason can not be damaged by the oppressive reality, manufactured by positive-science because it is a "thinker in a time of need". In conformity with historical epistemology Marcuse in his book “One Dimensional Man” writes:

“When historical content enters into the dialectical concept and determines methodologically its development and function, dialectical thought attains the concreteness which links the structure of thought to that of reality. Logical truth becomes historical truth. The ontological tension between essence and appearance, between “is” and “ought” becomes historical tension, and “the inner subjectivity” of the objective world is understood as the work of the historical subject-man in his struggle with nature and society. Reason becomes historical Reason. It contradicts the established order of men and thing on behalf of existing forces that
reveal the irrational character of this order" (24).

Here, we clearly see that for Marcuse dialectic operates within the structure of concrete historical-totality whose contradiction between essence and existence is resolved by a concrete historical man loaded with the task of getting the goal of rational society realized by negating the capitalist society which creates alienation and exploitation. It is man who constructs social reality; and history is a continuous movement of creative subjects. The serious limitation of Marcusian thesis of creative individual praxis is that it relegates the theories of mode of production and organized class struggle to the background of Marxian theory construction. Its message is that the revolutionary subject with pre-dominantly emancipatory interests has to launch an eternal war against the integrative power of the one-dimensional society. Marxism is neither a body of empirical propositions nor a dogmatic method but a theory of the universal individual who tries to annihilate the unreasonable material world until it comes into a conformity with the universal reason.

Marcuse also criticizes the repressive social order of U.S.S.R, more particularly Stalin’s U.S.S.R. Though the Soviet social structure was characterized by collective ownership of means of production, its monolithic repressive statecraft has not as yet dissolved the tension between idea and reality, between intellectual and material culture, and between theory and practice. The whole concept of peace, freedom and rationality are defined in terms of behaviour/formal science with a pragmatic instrumental intent to legitimize the irrationality of

political domination. Autonomy, reason and individuality can only be realized at the level of cognition, not at the level of reality. Thus thought and reality have become two distinct entities; man and nature have become hostile to each other and theory and practice move in opposite direction.

In order to protect his iron monolithic political regime Stalin arbitrarily converted Marxism into Scienticism in which everything is supposed to follow the pre-fixed mathematic laws and regulations. Subjectivity has no place in theory, and the law of negation of negation has no use under Stalin’s materialist philosophy. Everything is based on apriori formal logic which cannot be contradicted by the human subjective disposition. It assumes a theory of universal material outlook with rigid rules and regulations - which converts the critical revolutionary dialectical thought into a mere ideological-philosophical system. This type of codification of Marxism by Stalin was based on the Engels’s overemphasis on the dialectic of nature as the general laws of the material world and his underemphasis on dialectic of history (i.e. interaction between man and nature); and it is this raw material which inspired Stalin to divide Marxism into two disciplines of "dialectical materialism and historical materialism, the latter being the extension and application of the former to the study of society and its history"(25). Marcuse does not legitimize the thesis of naturalistic realism, propounded by Engels and Lenin, in which nature and history comply with same universal scientific system; and this philosophy was quickly manipulated by Stalinism which minimized the transition from necessity to freedom and assimilated freedom to necessiated

in ideology as in reality.

Marcuse dismisses the “single vision” of mechanical materialism and in the same moment, recognizes the hitherto unrecognized Hegelian dialectic as a tutor of Marxian dialectic. A new mode of apprehension is evolved by Marcuse when he transmits the revolutionary potential of Hegelian dialectic to the Marxian theory of social contradiction in order to understand history, society and human existence. The historical dialectic deals with the philosophy of human life in a concrete manner; it does not posit a subject-object dualism and it understands the movement of historical existence of society in terms of the principle of constant negativity. The transformation of class society into classless society involves the praxis of conscious revolutionary class. The maturation of contradictions between essence and existence is an expression of historical objectivity; and the effective intervention of human agency to transform reality is a moment of historical subjectivity; and these two things, taken together, form the essence of dialectical method. Dialectical method, which operates within social totality, is not a private property of Hegel but a common aspiration for both Hegel and Marx for whom truth can be discovered by adhering to the norm of negation of negation. In his book, 'Reason and Revolution' Marcuse provides a theoretical foundation of critical theory whose origin lies in the philosophy of nineteenth century. The basic premise of critical theory, in opposition to positivism, is that it is negative in character in a sense that it denounces conformist mode of thought and challenges an established authority of facts. However, he makes a point of difference between Hegel and Marx by saying that former has applied dialectic in “rational totality” whereas the latter has connected dialectic to the historical totality, as Marcuse boldly points out that “the
totality that Marxian dialectic gets to is the totality of class society, and the negativity that underlines its contradictions and shapes its very content is the negativity of class relations" (26).

Hegel's method is revolutionary because it provokes a critical employment of reason; but the system, in which dialectic operates, is conservative because it makes a compromise with the prevailing conditions of life. Hegel confuses thought and reality; he makes an identity of thought and its object and thus he becomes the prisoner of existing socio-political interest of society. Marx invented Hegel in a sense that he links dialectical process to historical process of class-divided society and remained committed to resolution of contradiction of the capitalist society through revolutionary union of theory and practice. Marxian dialectic is historical in a sense that it deals with particular stage of the historical process; whereas for Hegel dialectical method generalizes the dialectical movement into a movement of being, as such and getting merely abstract and speculative expression of the movement of being. For Hegel, resolution of contradiction leads to the realization of free subject and the restoration of human essence; whereas for Marx the negation of contradiction in class-divided society means the liberation of the historically specific proletariat.

As a Marxist-theorist, Marcuse considers the class-consciousness of proletariat as a constitutive factor in the objective realization of human liberation. But Marcusian faces a serious dilemma when it, first, recognizes the dissolution of the proletariat as a class and,

then, it provokes a pessimism by recognizing the internal process of instinctual repression which hampered liberation. The theoretical show of the dignified part of Marxism begins at a time when Marcuse announces that the concept of dialectic, as a necessary expression of class-divided society attempts to resolve all contradictions on the basis of a judicious combination of a totality of objective conditions as well as intellectual culture and self-conscious and recognized working class. But his working class makes a leap from factory to university campus and his philosophy of economic freedom is converted to a sexual liberation. After all, it is a revolution and revolution is a matter of negative reason of self-realizing and self-determining subject. “The subject as a mode of existence possesses the quality of reason (for Hegel, it is mind or spirit) by virtue of which it is able to transcend nature and society and to gain the comprehending knowledge which constitutes its real subjectivity” (27). Freedom is inscribed in critical reason, which as an objective historical force, distinguishes between existence and essence of entity and becomes a motor for the construction and reconstruction of history. The essence of an entity refers to a stage of full realization and optimization of its inner potentiality, and provides standards which can be used to criticize deficiency of actual world of operation. Objective reality has to be realized by the substance (freedom) of subject. If there is an antagonism between subjective world of cognition and objective world of material life, then freedom of reason makes a call for revolution by condemning existing reality as a bad form of reality, a realm of limitation and bondage “True existence begins only when the immediate state is recognized as negative,

(27) Ibid., p.9.
when beings strive to overloose their deficiencies and develop their potentialities”.

Negativity is inherent in all finite things. It forces the historical subject to denounce the material existence of social order. In brief, dialectics explain the movement of reality and the movement of reality takes place because it contains the seed of its self-destruction, since “all forms of being are permeated by an essential negativity, and that this negativity determines their content and movement” (28). Marcusian dialectic is associated with the philosophy of life, analysis of labour, theory of proletariat consciousness and the construction of socialist revolution. His dialectic is always negative in a sense that it conceives reality as a historical process of development in which change takes place through overcoming contradiction and through negation of material world. Negative philosophy is antithetical to positive philosophy which does not see contradiction in reality and justifies material world and common-sense knowledge. The main function of social theory is to explain the truth of changing concrete historical conditions and to generate revolutionary practice for creating a free-rational society. Theory is a guardian, thinker and master in a sense that it determines the course of political practice. Marcuse restricts the function of dialectical thought to only class-divided society in which there is a tension between essence and existence and consciousness is determined by social and material existence. But “in the socialist society, dialectical-historical materialism is self-negated because here reason will be determined by itself” (29) and

(28) Ibid., p.27.
(29) Ibid., p.319.
freedom equalizes the relation between consciousness and social existence. Thus the whole theoretical postulates of Marcuse move around the concept of dynamic historical totality, negative philosophy, negative reality, unity of theory and practice, philosophy of objective man, and creative role of consciousness. His philosophical movement from Hegel to Marx is nothing but a passage from philosophy to social theory in which all the philosophical categories are at the same time social and economic categories. Marcuse sees a continuity in the economic and social theory of Marx, since “even his early writings express the negation of philosophy”(30). Marcuse develops a theory of revolution by combining Hegel’s concept of reason with Marx’s analysis of alienated labour.

As a radical humanist, Marcuse tries to preserve the scientific character of historical materialism from the delirium of idealism; he swiftly jumps from Hegelian philosophical circle to that of Marxian prison gate. From the gate of historical materialism, he thinks of/aspires for scientific socialism leading to stage of communism which will connect naturalism to humanism in such a manner that contradiction between essence and existence, between self-confirmation and objectification, between freedom and necessity between individual and species will be resolved. He bases his revolutionary political agenda on Marx’s “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts” in which a theory of total alienation has been explained in terms of private property and division of labour of capitalist order. Alienation can be removed only by revolutionary practice of working class. In this book Marx builds up the theory of historical materialism as a revolutionary critique of bourgeois political economy. In

(30) Ibid., p.258.
doing so Marx has borrowed the notions of essence, labour, objectified labour etc. from Hegel and applied them to concrete socio-economic condition so as to produce a scientific anthropologic problematic “which becomes the science the necessary conditions for the communist revolution and this revolution itself signifies- quite apart from economic upheaval- a revolution in the whole history of man and the definition of his being”(31).

For Marx man stands for a set of social and practical relationships; man is a total being; but under the capitalist order, based on the concepts of profit, surplus, wage, social division of labour, competition and above all private property man has become an alienated entity and “his sensuousness is essential practical objectification, and because it is practical it is essentially a social objectification”(32).

By developing a critical confrontation with the categories of Hegelian philosophy and classical English political economists, like Smith and Ricardo, Marx explained capitalism through the concept of alienation; and this theory has been basic concern for Marx’s historical materialism which originates from “Manuscript of 1844” and penetrates throughout his latter successive writings. The continuity of Marx’s intellectual culture, as Marcuse says, is established through an interconnection of philosophy, political economy and revolutionary practice. The science of revolutionary historical materialism demands not only an economic transformation of capitalist society but also a revolution of the whole history of human species. The present history is a history of total


(32) Ibid., p.21.
human alienation and devaluation of human reality. Alienation is not only an economic fact, but also a social fact consisting of denegation of life; loss of human value and loss of human sensitivity. The target of Marx's critique of political economy is to show how private property and social division of labour produce alienated labour under the historically constructed capitalist mode of production. Alienation can be abolished if capitalism is overthrown by revolutionary practice. Revolution is the product of the contradiction between one's essential human needs and the creative powers and historical conditions of capitalist exploitative relations of production. Contradiction involves opposition between the need to be human and the objective expression of alienated labour or a labour, associated with the tendencies of objectification, being-a-burden, and constraint and forced activity which are the features of wage-labour under capitalism on the basis of Marx's "capital III", Marcuse divides human activity into two domains: (i) a realm of freedom which contains possibilities for the creation of an authentic self and (ii) a realm of necessity in which labour appears as a bondage in the domain of material production.

Marcuse has developed a historico-anthropological problematic in which historical materialism makes a unity of man and nature, an identity of humanism and naturalism and a union of history and man. This mode of representation of historical materialism is diametrically opposed to both: idealism and vulgar materialism. Marcuse does not reduce Marx's scientific anthropology only to economic factor but explains it with the category of many-sided beings with a wealth of needs and powers that are at once individual, social and historical -many-sided human being. But when we closely look at Marcusian ambitious plan for the reconstruction of Marxism, we find that he has invited various idealist
philosophers like Hegel, Dilthey, Heiddegar, Freud etc. to make a secret treaty with Marx for the achievement of human liberation. The overall picture of Marcusian Marxism is like this: alienation is equal to the objectified labour (Hegelian touch) emerging from the privatized economic production (Marxian Caste) which can be overcome by negative philosophy of dialectic (Hegel-Marx alliance) along with the politics of Refuse (Marcusian self-reflection) through a critical self-constituting subject Heideggarian influence, possessing human sensuousnes (Fvorbachian problematic’s influence on Marx) we can fully agree with Kolakowski's observation that “Marcuse’s thought is a curious mixture of feudal contempt of technology the exact science and democratic value plus a nebulous revolutionism devoid of positive content”\(^{(33)}\). His closest association with the idealist philosophers has surrendered Marxism either to historical pessimism or defeat or to self-love or self-romance. The major consequence of this type of interpretations of Marxism is that the science of historical materialism has become a helpless governor of reality because it has lost its universal vision, direction and goal. This applies not only to the Marcusian philosophical discourse but also to the Habermasian intellectual production technology.

Habermas constructs the design of revolutionary humanism by mediating his amity with Marx via Hegel, Weber, Parsons, Frued etc. Having shown his commitment to the emancipatory philosophy of Marxism, Habermas tries to reconstruct the empire of historical materialism in the contemporary advanced capitalism by borrowing the

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concepts of labour-interaction from Hegel, rationality from Weber, dynamic equilibrium of system from Parsons, ego-identity and science of unconscious from Freud and symbolically mediated institutional setting and grammatical theory from Chomsky and others. His critical theory, associated with emancipatory knowledge-constitutive-interest, gives a critique of positivism and materialism in which things and persons are seen in terms of mathematical rules and regulations and scientific knowledge is used for the maintenance of political domination. The major element of positivism and materialism is that they produce and reproduce an opposition between truth and power, between fact and value, between man and nature and between determinism and voluntarism. As against materialism and positivism, critical theory tries to discover the governing laws of self-constituting history of human species by making a dialectical relationship between subject and object between being and consciousness, between nature and man and between social labour and human interaction.

By criticizing the attempt to unite science and politics for the creation of domination-subjugation relationship in society, Habermas establishes the emancipatory power of historico-hermeneutic epistemology whose knowledge-constitutive-interest is to show the objective possibility and fundamental condition for the possible reproduction and self-construction of human species. Habermas presents this view that "constitutive-knowledge interest cannot be considered entirely by thinking of "reason as an organ of adaptations or knowledge as an instrument of adaptation to a changing environment; rather it is derived both from nature (biologically evolved cognitive capacities) and
from the cultural break with nature" (34). On the basis of diversity of interest-constellation Habermas talks of two sciences: (i) empirical-analytical natural science and (ii) historical-hermeneutic science. The first category of science serves the guiding interest of domination of man over man; it facilitates instrumental operation of things and persons, and produces distorted communication and objective reality. But the guiding interest of the latter category of science is to arrive at an 'unconstraint consensus' through the notion of free and critical dimension of inter subjectivity; it also establishes critical consciousness on the basis of man-nature-society interaction through labour teleology. The emancipatory power of critical hermeneutic knowledge involves the autonomy, responsibility, freedom, choice and goal-fixation of historical subjects in the process of production and reproduction of determinate social order. The historico-hermeneutic science does not divorce theory from value; it mediates relationship between social objectivity and natural objectivity and it produces knowledge in relation to the history of human race. It also understands an identity of ego and social group. It can be noted that, unlike Marcuse, Habermas is not hostile to science and he will not demand a total annihilation of scientific knowledge. He simply says that the scientific knowledge has become a major source of distorted political communication and manipulation of power, which can be disclosed and checked by the inter subjective communicative discourse of historical-hermeneutic action so long as it attempts to free us from the internalized pressure of absolute legitimations. The recognition of distorted communication leads Habermas

to develop a theory of communicative competence which he relates, under the influence of psycho-analysis, to the emancipatory effect of critical theory.

The consistent effort of Habermas's critical theory is to point out that the instrumental conception of knowledge is morally indifferent; it does irrational evaluation of reality divorced from social context and considers people as an object to be exploited and manipulated so as to produce the phenomenon of reification. On the other hand, critical philosophy of social science explains the totality of reality through meaningful thought, action goal and consciousness which are context-dependent. It generates human communication and free discussion about existing power system and fights against the depoliticization of life.

Under historical materialism there is a union of theoretical interest and practical praxis, as Habermas claims that "theory is involved in two interrelated processes-investigation of the constitutive historical complex of the constellation of self-interest on the one hand and historical interaction of action in which it becomes theory in action-oriented social praxis and political praxis" (35), on the other hand, for changing the existing social order. For Habermas the mediation of theory and parxis and especially the institution of their unity does not takes place on the level of cognition, but rather in language, work and interaction, for the subject is always-already socialized i.e. constituted by praxis and thus there is no provision for neutral subject. The implication of this argument is that reality is experienced within an accepted symbolic mediation between

theory and praxis.

Habermas says that "Marx's dialectical logic fails to highlight the normative basis of social theory with practical intent"(36). Critical theory is antithetical to scientific-rigidity and transcendental philosophy because it rests on inter subjectively determined and historically specified human communicative intentionality, consciousness and praxis as is the case with class. Knowledge is not only derived from forces of production but also from moral learning and insight, practical knowledge, communicative action and consensual regulation of action conflict"(37). Thus the total volume of knowledge is produced on the basis of self-sustained interaction between forces of production and relations of production.

For Habermas relations of production are associated with moral representation, identity formation and legal structure embodied in institutional system which, in turn, becomes instrumental for the creation of new productive forces. Social system maintains its integrative power so long as there is continuity between the developmental patterns of forces of production and relation of production and between ego-developmental and the developmental logic of society. The gradualist developmental model of society is determined by its own rationalized-institutional core which plays the dual role of linking the various developmental levels of society into a whole and of circumscribing a range of variation within which objective social change can occur. The institutional cores of primitive

(36) Ibid., p.16
society, feudal society and capitalist society are age-sex criteria class domination in the form of political hegemony and relation of wage labour and capital respectively. It is the institutional core itself that explains both social integration and social crises. Thus Habermas is a theorist who equalizes the logical competence of productive action and praxis oriented communication. However, as a Marxist, he makes it clear that "the developmental logic of social evolution is materialist in a sense that it makes its reference to crisis-producing system problems in the domain of production and reproduction and remains historically oriented, because it has to underline the causes and conditions of societal evolution both in the fields of normative/interactional order and economic order". (38) Here, Habermas rejects the reductionist short circuiting models of base-superstructure and material determinism of Plekhnov and accepts the notion of social totality in which there is mediation between economic force and ideological force, so long as the developmental logic of historical materialism is grounded into the normative structure.

For Habermas Marx's historical materialism is a comprehensive theory of evolution of human species and their associated structural patterns in which capitalism appears as one of its stages. Social evolution is conceived as a bidimensional learning process (cognitive/technical and moral/practical); the stage of which can be described structurally and ordered in a developmental logic. Here emphasis is laid down on the institutionalized embodiment of structure of rationality which makes learning possible at each level for socialized individuality. Habermas conceptualizes the reconstruction of historical materialism in terms of

(38) Ibid., p.133
socially-organized labour and the self-constituting history of species. "Social labour, as a form of reproduction of human life, is grounded into materialist epistemology which does not assign primacy of the spirit over nature, idea over interest, but defines man as the ensemble of social relationships" (39).

The concept of labour teleology is opposed to crude materialism in which matter determines idea on the one hand and to idealism in which spirit determines the movement of material world on the other. In brief, it refuses to accept the theories of mechanistic materialism and methodological individualism. Against idealism, Habermas relates the developmental model of human species to the concept of mode of production consists of two things: (i) a specific productive force and (ii) specific social intercourse. The productive power of society consists of labour power of producers, technically useful knowledge and organizational structure; and the relation of production are those mechanism and institutional orders that determine ways in which labour power is combined with the available means of production. Relations of production also determine the mechanism by which interest group (classes) are created out of unequal distribution of economic wealth. The stability and instability of social order can be explained through correspondence and non-correspondence between productive forces and productive relations.

Historical materialism explains this fact that with the developmental character of productive forces over a long historical period, the nature of social intercourse, first matures and then, becomes a complex

(39) Ibid., p.133
order. One of the crucial points, Habermas makes, is that it is only in the capitalist mode of production where base is identified with economy that determines other systems. Class, in the true sense of the term, is found only in the capitalist market economy. The reason behind this is that "integrative forces of other social formations like primitive social formation, feudal social formation and post-industrial social formation are based on the non-economic criteria such as system of kinship structure, political domination and educational and scientific order respectively" (40). Thus historical materialism defines society as a moving unity of productive power and normative power; it explains that the structural patterns of the different stages of development can be ordered in a developmental logic that is, in a hierarchical sequence of increasing complexity and encompassing forms of rationality.

Habermas' version of historical materialism operates under the positive influences of Hegelian notion of labour teleology, Parsonian notion of system analysis and Weberian notion of meaningful intentional action. His dialectic of history is associated with the notion of labour-interaction model. The developmental model of society is guided by evolutionary method along with the theory of functional compatibility or functional incompatibility of parts. In his historical materialism, labour covers all rational instrumental action which, in turn, can be identified with Marx's concept of productive forces. Marx's notions of relations of production is replaced by Habermasian theory with a new term designating the institutional framework of society that is equivalent to the notion of symbolically mediated interaction.

(40) Ibid., p.144
Habermas joins the camp of functionalists when he sees development of society in terms of structural differentiation and functional specialization of socially-regulated economic order within which cultural, ideological and political orders create and sustain their respective conditions of existence. For Habermas, conflict zone of society is not class-antagonism but masking and unmasking of the difference between rationalization in the instrumental sphere and emancipation in the institutional framework. As a consequence of it, he only gives a simple radical ideological critique of society and thereby pleads for political movement in order to raise the critical political consciousness of the people. Habermas says that the relation of history to social and political theory can be conceived at the levels of interpretation, practical orientation and philosophical foundation. In fact, he is pre-occupied with third so long as he reduces science and politics to philosophical discourse, too timid about the second, and to single mindedly about the first. Under the impact of idealist philosophers, Habermas has presented the dialectic of enlightened will and self-conscious potential and “the idea of cybernetically self-regualted-organization of society as the highest expression of the technocratic consciousness”(41). Habermas also discusses the insufficiency of dialectical logic when he recognizes its histoical specificity to a form of life that produces distorted communication”(42). However he plans to formulate the possiblity for negation of dialectic of

distorted communication by the critical consciousness, undistorted language, communication and creative praxis. Thus Habermasian theoretical tone presents a radicalized version of Hegelian-Freudian Marxism. Marcuse belongs to same Marxian theoretical construction.

In brief, the critical epistemological construction of Marcuse and Habermas involves seven projects: (i) rejection of dialectic of nature and the materialist epistemology and acceptance of dialectics of history and thought; (ii) the construction of society in which social order and economic order are organically related to each other; (iii) formulation to the categories of labour-teleology, creative praxis, historical rationality, philosophy of concrete labouring man and man-nature-society interaction model; (iv) codification of the ideology of liberal-radical political revolution in opposition to the concept of dictatorship of proletariat, central to the thought of Lenin; (v) conceptualization of the law of negation as a central theme of revolutionary dialectical method of Hegel and Marx; (vi) explanation of societal contradiction between essence and existence; and (vii) consideration of modern science and technology as a basic source of domination, repression and alienation which can be overcome by the revolutionary human praxis and the critical consciousness of enlightened people.