CHAPTER II

Democratic Development in Soviet Uzbekistan
The Soviet Uzbekistan, which came into existence after the national state delimitation of 1924, provides an ideal example of how Socialistic Democracy can flourish in a poor and underdeveloped region of Asia. On the eve of October Revolution, the socio-economic condition of Central Asia was in shambles. The working class existed only in rudimentary forms. Foreign intervention and secessionist movement instigated by the forces opposed to the consolidation of Soviet power were rampant. The future of Socialistic Movement in Central Asia to a large extent banked upon masses. It was in this context Soviet power under Lenin’s leadership embarked upon political development of Uzbekistan which he thought will provide an ideal example of Socialistic Democracy to other underdeveloped countries of the world.

The socio-economic conditions in Uzbekistan were diametrically opposed to that of European Russia. Democratic development in Uzbekistan was hindered by the traditional socio-economic structure in Uzbekistan. The Bolsheviks, therefore, carefully devised a strategy of building and indigenising the party apparatus in Uzbekistan through which only Socialistic Democracy can be developed.

Socio-Economic and Administrative Structure before the Revolution

Any study of socio-economic and administrative structure of Soviet Uzbekistan cannot be possible without studying the overall Central Asian region of which
Uzbekistan is a part. The 19th century Central Asian Empire consisted of three Khanates- Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva. At the beginning of the 19th Century, among the three Khanates, the most populous was the Khanate of Bukhara having a population of around three million; Kokand had around 1.5 million and Khiva only 0.5 million. A major portion of the population was settled in the oasis and river valleys especially of the Amu-Darya, Syr-Darya, Kashka-Darya and Surkhan-Darya and lived in big cities such as Tashkent, Bukhara, Kokand and Samarkand.¹

Although prosperous in earlier times, by the middle of the 19th Century the region was in a state of decay, isolated from the modern world, its population was static and economy depressed.² The Tsarist Empire of Russia after its defeat in the Crimean War diverted its interest towards Central Asia. The main objective of Tsarist Empire was to exploit the economic resources of the Central Asian region. Tsarist Russia annexed the Khanates of Kokand and reduced the size of the other two Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva which were later reduced as vassal states of Tsarist Empire. The annexed territories remained under the Governor-General of Turkestan.³ Despite Tsarist annexation, the social structure of Central Asian region didn’t witness much change. The Tsarist Empire supported the traditional rulers like the Khans and Emirs, with its troops and helped the despotic rulers of these feudal states to exploit the general masses.

³ Devendra Kaushik, op.cit, p. 54.
These three Khanates were economically backward feudal states with many strong remnants of the much older slave-owning society.4

The region although rich in natural resources had no large scale industries which can extract as well as utilise these resources. A few handicraft industries were there in Samarkand, Tashkent, Bukhara, and Kokand specialising in cotton and silk productions. The traders sold it in the countries of the East and also in the neighbouring Russian Empire. Socio-economic structure of the region was basically feudal in character. Taxation was heavy and was mostly realised in kind which had a negative effect on the development of capitalist relations. Feudal oppression and extraction by money lenders stalled the growth of handicrafts and agriculture. R. A. Pierce sums up the situations as follows, "Trade was poorly developed and slapped by heavy taxes. Caravans prey to the nomads. Almost constant warfare between Khanates placed a heavy burden on inhabitants, irrigation system could not be repaired or expanded and flocks were driven off".5 The Tsarist government did carry out some land reforms in Turkestan Empire. This paved the way for development of capitalist relations in the villages. Yet these reforms were inadequate and insufficient to liberate the masses from the yoke of feudal lords. Big landowners continued to exploit the peasant share-croppers. Both agriculture and cattle breeding in Turkmenistan and to a greater extent in Khiva and Bukhara were primitive. More than 65


percent of the total peasant households in Turkmenistan were *batraks* (landless peasant).\(^6\)

After the Russian conquest, Central Asia was converted into a potential raw material supplying base for the metropolitan industries situated in Russia. To meet the needs for Russian textile industries, the Tsarist-empire paid greater attention to the cultivation of cottons in Central Asia. The area under cotton cultivation grew from 13,200 hectares in 1886 to 5,97,200 hectares in 1914.\(^7\)

The introduction of cotton as the main cash crop did not change the feudal character of Central Asian economy. A new exploiter arrived in the scene when the metropolitan capital began to finance cotton cultivation through local firms. The credit advanced for the cotton cultivation to the poor peasants bore an extraordinary high interest rate charged by the cotton purchasers who acted as a sort of middle men between the cotton producers and industrialists. The increasing debt of the peasants forced them to sell their lands to the *bais* (local kulaks) in order to meet their debt obligations. In 1914, according to official figures, 25 percent of all peasant families in Ferghana region became landless as a result of sale or mortgage of lands.\(^8\)

In industrial field also some beginning was made towards the end of 19\(^{th}\) century. The military, strategic and the transportation of cotton compelled the

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\(^{7}\) Ibid.

Tsarist state to build 3,377 km of railway line and 14 railway repair workshops and depots employing about 24,000 workers.\footnote{Ibid, p. 59.}

Railway construction in Central Asia began around 1880s. In 1888, Samarkand was linked by rail line with Krasnovodsk, in 1898 with Andijan and with Tashkent a year later. In 1906, Tashkent was also joined by a branch line with Orenburg. With the development of rail line, raw material processing industries also sprang up in Central Asia. Cotton ginning, soap, beer, brick manufacturing industries began to be established in Central Asia. By 1914, there were 818 primitive workshops and factories working in Turkestan. Out of these, 425 were located in the territory of modern day Uzbekistan and 296 in Trans-Caspian region of modern Turkmenistan.\footnote{Cited in Devendra Kaushik, op.cit, pp. 58-59.}

The literacy of the people was also quite low. In Uzbekistan, only 21 percent of the total population was literate, while that among the Turkmen was 0.5 percent, among Tajiks 0.5 percent, and among Kyrgyzs and Kara-Kalpaks 0.2 percent.\footnote{Cited in ibid, p. 61.}

The administration of Turkestan was under the charge of the War Ministry. The Governor-General appointed by the Tsar enjoyed enormous powers. In the administrative hierarchy, the Military Governor stood at the apex of the Oblast administration and all the powers were concentrated in his office. Military officers were heads of Uyezd and city administration. Besides, the above two levels, the Tsarist government also made use of the so called popularly elected
lower village administration. The post of Volost (lowest administration unit consisting of a few villages), administrations and village officials Starshins, Aksakals and Kazis were filled through election. Their appointments were confirmed by the Military Governor of the oblast.

The election of local officials was a farce as only persons of means could get elected. The interests of colonial administration and elected officials were identical i.e. to exploit the poor and weak. As Pierce writes, "most of the Uyezd commandants levied additional taxes on the natives, usually to a degree that not only covered normal expenses but enabled them to live in luxury".12

Development of Socialism in Central Asia

Under such an underdeveloped and poor socio-economic condition, the Socialist movement took its roots at the beginning of 20th century. At the beginning of the 20th century the movement faced numerous difficulties. Along with the Socialistic movement, two other movements were also going on simultaneously in Central Asia, the Quadimist and Jadidist movements. The Quadimists were defenders of the sanctified traditions and exercised exclusive control over the native economic, socio-cultural and educational institutions. These were used as an instrument to deter the penetration of modernising influence. The Quadimists went up against the alien, aggressive and arrogant culture of Russian intruders. The most important tool in the hand of Quadimist was the native educational

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12 R. A. Pierce, op.cit, p. 70.
system, financed and regulated by religious endowments drawing its strength from Wakf land.¹³

As opposed to the *Quadimist* Movement, the *Jadidist* believed that imperative of socio-economic change could be met through a puritanical revival of what they called “Golden Age of Early Islam”. Socialism appeared repulsive to them on account of its political and economic philosophy. Renowned *Jadid* intellectual Bek-Budi said, “it basically violated the spirit of Islam and ran counter to the law of Shariat”.¹⁴

Amidst this chaotic situation socialism appeared in Central Asia. The Socialist movement was spearheaded by the Russian workers as well as by those who had been banished from Russia on political ground and had sought refuge in Central Asia. By 1902, a small group had already started functioning among them. After the Second Congress of Russian Socialist Democratic Liberal Party [RSDLP] held in 1903, Social Democratic groups were formed in Tashkent, Samarkand, Kyzl-Arvat and Ashkabad by 1904. Among these groups, Samarkand group was prominent which came under the direct control of Bolsheviks as early as 1905.

To the Tashkent and Samarkand centre, members of the native workers and native intelligentsia like A. G. Rashid, V. T. Bakraje, M. V. Muratov, A. G.

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Khudash and A. R. Bakhirov were drawn.\textsuperscript{15} Towards the end of 1906, in the first Turkestan Conference of the RSDLP, it was decided to establish a union of Turkestan organisations of the RSDLP.\textsuperscript{16} This organisation became part of the RSDLP and participated in the party conferences while the Bolshevik faction within it worked independently.

It should be noted that from the year 1905-1906, the Socialist movement gained momentum following the large-scale participation of the local people. Apart from the participation of some leading individuals like Muratov and Rashid who were active in Samarkand and Tashkent region, the Turkestan Muslim Bolshevik workers from Baku Industrial Complex played a leading role in the early formative period of Socialist movement in Turkestan. The real growth of Socialist movement in Turkestan took place when a splinter group among the \textit{Jadidists} mainly comprising clerks, shop salesmen and teachers joined the Socialist movement. The splinter \textit{Jadidists} called them as Young Party. This group was located at Kokand and Old Tashkent. By 1912, it had fifty active members. The Young Party became instrumental in forming similar other parties like young Bukharans in Bukhara and young Khivian in Khiva. These small revolutionaries although small in number first joined Socialist Democratic


movement, later the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party and finally joined the Bolsheviks. In this process some leading literary figures of the time in Central Asia like Mukhimi Abdullah Saleh, Zaviki, Hamza Hakimzade and Sadruddin Aini, through their poetry and satirical works, made valuable contribution to the promotion of democratic and revolutionary ideas among the Muslims of Central Asia.\(^\text{17}\) Major policy differences were developed with them at the end. This group was led by T. Tyskulov and Tursun Khodzhaev.

The low level of technical and cultural development in Central Asia at the time of the Bolshevik revolution had led to a situation in which the minority political intelligentsia of nationalist and leftist orientation was called upon to assume the pioneering role of initiating socio-cultural and economic development. The new intelligentsia played an effective role in challenging the traditional order and values it represented. Apart from the intelligentsia, the Soviet government also provided institutional framework for the political participation of the people. The institutions available to the people to exercise their rights were: the workers and peasant Soviets and the Communist Party. Since the native proletariat was non-existent in Central Asia, the Soviets and peasant organisations became the main platform for political participation.

The Bolshevik strategy of indigenisation of the party apparatus was closely linked to its effort to encourage the natives to participate actively in politics. The basic Bolshevik strategies were the following:

a) Application of a uniform system of political socialisation. The creation of party cells of primary party organisations and organisation of peasants and organisation of youths in Young Communist League. These associations provided institutional framework to the indigenous population for political participation.

b) Using of certain party recruitment policies for the local population in order to isolate the feudal and orthodox religious political elites.

c) Imparting of political education to the workers, peasants, youth and women to prepare cadres for responsible political tasks and for the exercise of the leadership in the future.

The Soviet government through such steps proved instrumental in popularising the party among the masses which in turn increased mass participation in the political affairs. Soviet Uzbekistán which came into being after the national delimitation of 1924, adopted similar measures to increase mass participation. At the flag end of 1924, the representation of the Uzbeks in the party went up to the 42 percent.\(^\text{18}\)

Soviet Political Power and Democratic Development in Soviet Uzbekistan

The Soviet Uzbekistan which came into existence following the national territorial delimitation of 1924 provided an ideal base for analysing how socialist democracy developed in an underdeveloped region of Asian countries. It also proved wrong the notion of many political thinkers that socialistic democracy cannot be put into practice in Asian region because of their different socio-economic conditions. To have a clear-cut idea about the democratic development of Soviet Uzbekistan, it is imperative to study the socio-economic condition of Uzbekistan, which being a part of Central Asia was incorporated into Tsarist Empire.

Communist Party of Soviet Uzbekistan and Its Role in Socio-Economic and Political Development

In December 1924, Communist Party of Uzbekistan came into existence following the abolition of Communist Parties of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm. The First Congress of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SSR held in February 1925 can be termed as a milestone in the development of Communist movement in the Soviet Uzbekistan. In this Congress, the newly elected Soviet Uzbek Communist Party replaced the provisional organisational bureau. In order to achieve a classless society and to implement Soviet policies on various aspects of the society, the Soviet Communist Party required trained cadres to take policies to the masses. Therefore, the first task before Soviet...
Communist Party of Uzbekistan (S.C.P.U) was to inject socialist ideas into the minds of the native people in order to raise the level of their consciousness. In order to propagate further the principle of Socialism, native activities were encouraged. This led to formation of a society known as Koschi (plough men). The basic objective of the organisation was to raise the political consciousness among the peasants and landless workers. The Koschi became an important link between peasants and the party. The membership of the Koschi which was 99,837 prior to drawing of new national boundaries went up to 3,54,763 by the end of 1926. Koschi provided a new basis of political power to the communists and acted as a means for the recruitment of the peasants in the communist party. The Koschi also attracted women and young people. This acted as a means to propagate Socialist ideology among the masses. Not only in agricultural fields, but also in industrial field Uzbekistan made substantial progress after 1922. Between 1922 to 1928 there had appeared in Uzbekistan such industries as chemicals, leather, sewing and silk reeling. This period also witnessed massive expansion of power resources in Uzbekistan. Diesel, hydro-electric and thermo-electric plants were established in Tashkent, Kadyrinsk and Fergana.

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Increasing agricultural activity and development of industries led to increase in consciousness of the people and some changes were made at the social level. This in turn provided impetus to the people to participate actively in the activity of the Communist Party.

**TABLE- I**

**Social Composition of the Uzbek Party (1924-45)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Membership</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Service/White-collar workers</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>13927</td>
<td>4899</td>
<td>5977</td>
<td>3230</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>36093</td>
<td>17980</td>
<td>9017</td>
<td>7786</td>
<td>1310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>33834</td>
<td>13348</td>
<td>14605</td>
<td>5881</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>63847</td>
<td>18507</td>
<td>20967</td>
<td>24372</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>82505</td>
<td>20691</td>
<td>26159</td>
<td>35655</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From the above table, it can be noted that the total membership of the party in 1924 was 13,972, which rose to 36,093 in 1929. The membership of the party doubled during this period. The participation of workers and peasants also increased.
After the adoption of Five Year Plans, the industrialisation process got a boost in Uzbekistan. In November 1927, the Third Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan discussed the main problems concerning First Five Year Plan. A sizeable amount was spent on industrial development of Uzbek SSR. The allocation for the industrial development in the First Plan was 288.4 million roubles which constituted 26 percent of the total capital investment under the plan in the republic. In the Second Five Year Plan, 2.2 billion roubles (2.2 times the size of the First Plan) were invested in the economy of the Uzbek SSR. Of the total investment under the plan, 46 percent were allocated for industrial development as against 26 percent in the First plan. Not only in the industrial and agricultural field, but also efforts were made to improve women’s status so as to provide recruits for the labour force and develop their cause.

Hence development in socio-economic sphere provided a stimulus to the people to participate actively in the political affairs. But, the increasing trend in the party membership reversed after the ‘purge’ carried out in the party from 1934 to 1937.

The Great Purge and Political Development in Soviet Uzbekistan

The Communist Party of Uzbekistan which made rapid stride after 1924, somewhat faced set-back after the “Great Purge”. The Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) declared a purge with the object of cleansing the party ranks from the socially alienated and ostracised class

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21 Devendra Kaushik, op.cit, p. 112.
elements. The purge began in May 1934, The President of the Council of Ministers of Uzbek SSR Fauzullah Khodjaev in his speech of 5 September 1934, on the tenth anniversary of National State Delimitation in Central Asia remarked that, in the Second Five-Year Plan, the Communist Party and all the toilers of Uzbekistan are faced with a grim struggle against agents of Kulaks and have to wage a struggle against Kulak ideology.\textsuperscript{23} In 1935, the total membership of Party declined to 33,834, a decline of more than two times as compared to 1933. The impact of the purges was more severe in urban areas than in the rural areas. As a result, the representation of workers in the Party declined from 50.48 percent in 1933 to 39.45 percent in 1938.\textsuperscript{24}

Following the decisions of 17th Congress of the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the sixth Congress of Communist Party of Uzbekistan suggested the reorganisation of party cells and primary party organisations in Uzbekistan, which were recognised on the basis of territorial and production principles.

The “Great Purge” affected the leadership. Stalin who assumed charge of supreme authority in Soviet Union after Lenin in 1938, undertook the purges with the objective of cleaning the political system and to establish and popularise his own notion of effective Socialist Democracy. He ordered the killing of Fauzullah Khodjaev, Chairman of the Uzbekistan’s Council of People’s Commissars. Akmal Ikramov, First Secretary of Uzbekistan was sentenced to death after being dubbed as “enemy of the people” in a famous

\textsuperscript{23} OIKUP, 1974, op.cit, p. 353, cited in M. S. Sansanwal, op.cit, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
show trial which resulted in their execution along with Bukharin, Yagoda and other “Right-Trotskyites”.  

The key local figures in the post-purge leadership were Usman Yusupov who in September 1937 succeeded Ikramov as First Secretary of the Party, Abdurzhabar Abdul Rakhmanov who in 1938 became Chairman of the Sovnarkom and Mukhamed-zhan Yuldashev who came to head of Tashkent Party. These leaders represented new Soviet men and their emergence marked a distinct break with their predecessors, the *jadidist* generation. They were members of the “*Clan of 38*” and were part of Uzbek Stalinist group. The purge provided opportunity for the promotion of Young Kosmol members. A good example of this was the case of Sabir Kamalov. Kamalov joined the Komsomol Apparatchik serving in New Bukhara. Kamalov became Komsomol Secretary for the Kara Kalpak Obkom. In 1939, he studied Marxism-Leninism and was sent first to raikom (Rayon committee) and then to the Margelan gorkom (city committee) where he served during the period of purge. By 1938 he had risen to become the Second Secretary of the Ferghana Obkom. In 1939, he rose to the senior post of People’s Commissar for Agriculture and became a Deputy Chairman of the Uzbek Sovnarkom. Similarly, the other Kosmol member whose career rose upward was Sirodzh Nurutdinov. He was one of the first Uzbek leaders who experienced what was to become a typical career pattern in the future for the upwardly mobile Uzbek workers who rose to the top posts of the republic. They were  

joined by Amin Niyazov and very few others who being members of the pre-purge generation survived the purge and continued to occupy top posts. Niyazov entered the politburo in 1946 and was appointed as Chairman of Supreme Soviet in March 1947 when Yusupov and Abdul Rakhmanov were transferred to Moscow in April 1950. In the struggle for power, Niyazov got the position held by Yusupov as the Premier of the Uzbek apparatchik. A. Mavlvanov, a close follower of Yusupov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Rashidov, the Chairman of the Writers’ Union then replaced Niyazov and became Chairman of the Supreme Soviet in 1949-50.

From this development in the political field with regard to appointment of political elites, it can be pointed out that Stalin period provided a transitional framework to analyse Soviet political system in general and Uzbekistan in particular. Stalin with a view to strengthen his control over the political system of the Soviet Union appointed his own men in top republic posts. He also liquidated some dedicated Communist Party workers of the Bolsheviks era. In fact, the political development during this period was closely related to the ‘power elite model’ of democracy advocated by C. Wright Mills.26

Despite many drawbacks in political arena and at the level of decision-making authority at the top level of republic of Uzbekistan, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan played a crucial role in the mobilisation of the masses and their political socialisation both in terms of men and materials. In the sphere of

economic relations and strengthening and consolidation of the collective ownership of the means of production, the Communist Party also devised concrete ways and means for cultural and economic development of each region by taking into account the conditions of their valuable geographical, economic and natural resources. In the sphere of ideology and culture, the party came out heavily against the survival of "bourgeois views and ideas". It set the aim before it to make every citizen of the USSR 'a conscious patriot and active fighter of Communism'.

To mobilise the masses and to instill consciousness in them, the Party Organisation staged plays in the villages on political, economic and scientific themes. Books and magazines were sent to collective farms and libraries, party members and workers participated in the construction of village clubs, centres and places for cultural and recreational activities. The participation by these workers in programmes devoted to spreading and popularising Socialist ideology further mobilised the workers and peasants. In the republic during 1947-48, there were about 205 district and city party schools, 26,100 local political training centres of cadres. Besides there were seven evening universities which were conducting courses in Marxism-Leninism for the party members.

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28 OIKUP, op.cit, p. 486, cited in M. S. Sansanwal, op.cit, p. 90.
De-Stalinisation and Its Impact upon Uzbekistan’s Politics

Soviet political scenario soon after the death of Stalin underwent spectacular changes. One of the most important characteristics of post-Stalin Soviet politics was the ‘struggle for political power’ among the elites of Soviet political system. The period from March 1953 to June 1957 was regarded as a sort of interregnum comparable to that which existed in the Soviet Union for five years after the death of Stalin. Khrushchev emerged as an undisputed leader in Soviet politics in 1954-1955. The development that took place in Moscow was also felt in regional capitals and Uzbekistan could not escape from this stark reality. In Uzbekistan, important changes took place at the top level of Uzbek political leadership. After Stalin’s death Yusupov returned to Tashkent. He re-entered the Uzbek Communist Party’s Politburo and became the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Similarly, Mukhtidinov was demoted and named First Deputy Minister. In 1953, Niyazov remained as First Secretary and Rashidov retained the largely ceremonial role of the Chairman of Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan. Khrushchev’s successful drive in political sphere for de-Stalinisation was felt at both the Central and Republic level. In Uzbekistan, its impact was deeply felt. Yusupov who rose to higher position in the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was removed from his post. Mukhtidinov replaced him and again became Chairman of Council of Ministers. In December 1955, after his Asian tour, Khrushchev

removed Niyazov from the post of First Secretary and appointed Mukhtidinov.\textsuperscript{30}

In February 1956, Mukhtidinov was chosen a candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU itself. Two years later, he was transferred to the CPSU Secretariat at Moscow.

The rise of Mukhtidinov showed that Khrushchev wanted to appoint his close confidants in important and prestigious positions, a policy quite similar to that of Stalin. Despite much advancement made in socio-economic and political fields, it reflected the existence of the traditional notion of patron-client relationship in Soviet Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{31}

The promotion of Mukhtidinov did not end the fight to have a sway over the political affairs of Uzbekistan, particularly in implementing Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation designs in Uzbekistan. Mukhtidinov also issued pronouncements on nationality policy that gave new salience to the republic and republic level politicians and he promoted a policy of indigenisation of cadres. These two approaches represented innovation of major magnitude and marked a quantum jump from the Stalinist system’s reduction of the republics to the role of a mere province in what was essentially a unitary centralised order.\textsuperscript{31}

Apart from this, Mukhtidinov’s untiring efforts to reconstitute the political leadership continued even after his transfer to Moscow. One important person who got axed from the top position of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was


Sabir Kamalov, who was removed from office in March 1959. One of his close associates, who also fell from Mukhtidinov’s favour, was Mirza Akhmedov, Chairman of Council of Ministers. The major 1959 “purge” brought Mukhtidinov’s associate Alimov to the post of Chairman of the Council Of Ministers. Sharaf Rashidov was appointed as First Secretary of Uzbekistan Communist Party. Nasreddinova occupied the post earlier held by Rashidov. The basic intention of Mukhtidinov in appointing Rashidov as Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party was to put a political leader in that post so that there was no danger to him. This unexpected removal from the Central Secretariat and from the Presidium, in October 1961 provided opportunity to Rashidov to become a member of the CPSU Presidium.

The study of Uzbekistan’s democratic development during Khrushchev period will remain incomplete without analysing the Communist Party’s role and its impact on development of Uzbekistan’s politics. The policy of mass involvement and further strengthening of party apparatus in the Khrushchev period resulted in an increase in the membership of Communist Party in Uzbekistan. This can be proved from the fact that, in 1959-60, the Uzbeks of the republic constituted 62.3 percent of the total population, while in the party in the same year they constituted 63.5 percent of the new candidate members.32 The representation of the Uzbeks not only increased in the Communist Party of Uzbekistan but also the participation of the Uzbek Party in the CPSU Congress

also increased over a period of time. In the 19th and 22nd Congress of CPSU, the strength of the Uzbek Party delegates was 2.1 and 2.5 percent respectively.\textsuperscript{33}

Thus by 1964, the Uzbek Party had begun to provide an important forum to the people of Uzbekistan for participation in the political system of the country and had contributed effectively in consolidating the democratic process in the republic.

Khrushchev’s removal in October 1964 produced a great momentum in Soviet political system. Although, the official reason cited for his removal was his advanced age and worsening health condition, but the main reason for his removal was his differences with others within the Presidium over various issues.\textsuperscript{34} This paved the way for the initiation of “de-de-Stalinisation”, in Uzbekistan’s political system. The first task that Rashidov, the First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party did was the rehabilitation of Faizullah Khodzhaev, the leading Uzbek politician between 1925 and 1937.\textsuperscript{35} Even during Khrushchev period he was not rehabilitated. On 28 February 1967, the Uzbek Central Committee and the Council of Ministers passed a decree commemorating F. Khodzhaev. Rashidov not only rehabilitated many anti-Stalinists but also rehabilitated many victims of de-Stalinisation. A good example in this regard was the treatment of Usmal Yusupov upon his death in May 1966, after whom The Great Fergana was renamed.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p. 375.
\textsuperscript{34} Churchwood, op.cit, p. 287.
\textsuperscript{35} Donald S. Carlisle, Central Asian Survey, op.cit, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{36} , Problems of Communism, op.cit, p. 29.
After Khrushchev, Brezhnev adopted a somewhat pragmatic policy towards the republics. A notable feature of Brezhnev’s period was increasing trust on the cadres, stress on stability and increasing autonomy to the republics. This provided opportunity for Rashidov to function independently without much dependence on Moscow. One important feature of Rashidov’s regime was that he followed an “affirmative action” policy which improved Uzbeks’ opportunity for employment, educational advancement and access to other avenues of social mobility and economic success.37

Unlike other First Secretaries, Rashidov developed some concrete theories regarding socio-political aspects of Uzbek politics. He felt that the resistance to change the traditional living patterns especially among the rural inhabitants could be overcome only by determined government and party efforts. Rashidov also argued that Communism could not be attained without transforming rural areas. Rashidov also insisted on the use of local advantages by governmental planning. As he argued principal attention in government economic plans was devoted to every possible use of each nation’s material possibilities, the development of the economy of the republic and economic regions.38

Although Rashidov was able to maintain cordial relations with the central leaders of CPSU and was able to provide an able administration, he also faced growing factionalism and dissidence within party. He faced challenges from

Mankual Kurbanov and Yaggar Nasreddinova. The main tactics employed by both sides in this power struggle was to send revelatory information to Moscow. Both the groups had their own network in Moscow Central Committee through which they tried to denounce the opponent in the eyes of Brezhnev and other secretaries of the Central Committee of CPSU. The war between the rival claim in the apparatus of the republic continued with each side scoring its share of success, but the Moscow Central Committee tried its best to avoid an open scandalous wholesale exposure of the ruling elite of Uzbekistan.39

The internecine conflict among the top elites of Uzbek Communist Party soon became exposed and in a damage control exercise, Nasreddinova was removed and transferred to Moscow where she became Chairman of Supreme Soviet of Nationalities. Kurbanov was found guilty of corruption charges and was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. However, nothing could happen to Rashidov due to his strong rapport with Brezhnev. This proved a blessing in disguise for Rashidov. He was soon able to dominate the Republican politics and succeeded in placing his own men in important positions, which helped him further consolidate his position. He appointed N. D. Khudaiberdeyev as Chairman of Council of Ministers. N. Matchanov took over Nasreddinova’s post of Chairman of the Presidium of Uzbekistan’s Supreme Soviet and member of the Politburo of Communist Party of Uzbekistan.

39 Ibid, p.146.
It should be noted that the development that took place in Uzbek politics after 1978 proved negative for Rashidov. In December 1978, Matchanov resigned because of deterioration of his health condition. He was replaced by Inamzhoon B. Usmankhodzhaev and he also did not belong to the clique of Rashidov. This was a great setback to Rashidov. Other factor affecting Uzbekistan politics was the issue of corruption which was highlighted by Yuri Andropov who came to power after replacing Brezhnev. Yuri Andropov charged Rashidov with corruption. Subsequently after the death of Rashidov in October 1983 far reaching purge were launched in Uzbekistan that lasted for over five years. In the mean time, I. B. Usmankhodzaev became the First Secretary. Usmankhodzhaev supported by Andropov launched a campaign to root out corruption from Uzbekistan. The main casualties in this process were the leading politicians of Rashidov era. Meanwhile, the autonomy which Uzbekistan enjoyed during the Breznev-Rashidov era was reversed to some extent. It called for repudiation of “affirmative action” policies, elimination of shadow economy and rejection of bifurcation model, which were practiced during Rashidov era. In just three years, from 1984 to 1987, 90.4 percent of nomenklatura of the CPSU Central Committee was replaced. About 300 high officials were sent from the Soviet Union’s central region to replace the dismissed national cadres.40

Regional and Clan Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan

Despite adoption of Socialistic pattern of governance and great advancement made in modernising the political system of the republic, Soviet Uzbekistan was able to immune itself from primordial and clan loyalties which played an important role in the social and political culture of the republic before the formation of Soviet Union. As mentioned above, before the formation of Soviet Uzbekistan, it remained under different khanates, as a result of which after the formation of Soviet Uzbekistan the same clan and territorial division came into force. Each region had its own unique cultural characteristics which were shaped by historical and geographical factors. These historical and geographical differences to some extent influenced the political elites of those regions and imparted a sense of identity. Belonging to a certain clan or region allowed one many privileges like promotion in job, improving one’s position in party hierarchy, etc. Traditionally, Soviet Uzbekistan can be divided into five regions: 1) Fergana valley, 2) Tashkent Oasis, 3) Samarkand, Dzhizak and Bukhara, 4) Kashka Darya and Surkhan-Darya area and 5) Khorezm area.41

In Soviet Uzbekistan, inter-clan rivalries could be traced back to 1920s-30s. In 1925, First Secretary of Communist Party of Uzbekistan came from Tashkent region, while Chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet I.U. Ahunbaev

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belongs to Fergana region, and the Chairman of Council of Ministers, F. Khojaev belonged to Bukhara region, thus, maintaining a delicate balance between three regions of the republic. Similarly, U. Yusupov who succeeded A. Ikramov as First Secretary of Communist Party of Soviet Uzbekistan came from Fergana Oblast, while the Chairman of Council of Minister belonged to Tashkent Oblast. It should be noted that in the pre-revolutionary era, though clans existed at the social level, clan politics was not there in Uzbekistan, but it got reinforced only after the formation of Soviet Uzbekistan. A. Ikramov and Faizulla Khojaev, who belonged to Tashkent and Bukhara Oblast got support from other smaller clans. The clans of Ikramov and Faizullah Khojaev were politically defeated and, in the main, physically destroyed during the purges of the 1930s.42 This above development in Soviet Uzbekistan’s politics shows that political elites always use primordial loyalty and clan politics as a basis for their career advancement.

After A. Ikramov and U. Yusupov, A. Niyazov became the First Secretary of Communist Party of Uzbekistan. He came from Fergana Oblast. He became the second person from Fergana to get the post of First Secretary. However, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet came from Jizak, Samarkand Oblast. But N. Mukhtidinov who succeeded A. Niyazov as First Secretary of Communist Party of Uzbekistan belonged to Tashkent region. At the same time S. Kamalov who became Chairman of the Council of Ministers also belonged to Tashkent region. It should be noticed that this was first time since 1925 when

two important republican posts were held by persons belong to same region. This also demonstrated the preponderance of Tashkent region in Soviet Uzbekistan politics. S. Kamalov, who was previously occupied the post of Chairman of Council of Ministers, became the First Secretary of Communist party of Uzbekistan from 1957 to 1959. However, the dominance of Tashkent region in Soviet Uzbekistan politics came to halt when Sh. Rashidov became the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Uzbekistan. He was the first person from the Samarkand-Jizak oblast to become the First Secretary of Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1959 and was also the longest serving First Secretary of Uzbekistan's Communist Party. In order to consolidate his new clans, the first task he did was to end the dominance of the old groupings. So in the initial years in office the first task he did was to remove the loyalists of old clans. A manifestation of this phenomenon was the replacement, in 1959-65, of five Central Committee Secretaries for agriculture, four for industry and two for ideology in Uzbekistan. In each Obkom three to four secretaries were replaced. Cadre changes at lower levels of the leadership were even more considerable. After this, the situation somewhat stabilized.\textsuperscript{43} Rashidov faced considerable challenges from opposition regional clans. The most serious crisis of Rashidov's leadership was apparently connected to such an occurrence. in 1969, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Yadgar N. Nasriddinova and Secretary of the Central Committee Rafiq Nishanov, representing respectively the Fergana and Tashkent regional elite grouping concluded an alliance with Rahmakul Kurbanov,

\textsuperscript{43} Cited in ibid, p. 111.
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who was of Bukharan extraction and therefore, close to the core of the Samarkand-Bukhara regional elite. All three were members of the Central Committee Bureau, thus belonging to the inner circle of the political leadership. They leveled serious charges against Rashidov, before the Central leadership. But, their attempt to depose Rashidov failed. 44

The dominance of Rashidov’s clan in Uzbek politics continued till his death. After his death major regional groups took control over the politics of Uzbekistan. I. Usmankhojaev, who became the First Secretary of Communist Party of Uzbekistan, was from the Fergana region. After A. Niyazov, he became the second person from the region to occupy the highest position in the party hierarchy. But the dominance of Tashkent Oblast could not recede. A. Salimov became the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, while, G. Kadurov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers also belonging to Tashkent region became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Thus the ascendancy of Usmankhodzhaev, Salimov, and Khaidarov (supported by Arishimin and the new second secretary T. I. Osetrov) marked the return of the Tashkent/ Fergana axis to supremacy within the Uzbek native elite. It also strengthened Moscow’s hold over the republic in bringing to power the young, well-educated, and technically trained Uzbeks who were beholden to the centre, career-wise linked to the All-Union development perspective and at least temporally oriented principally to Moscow. 45

45 Donald S. Carlisle, op.cit, Central Asian Survey, p. 129.
I. Usmankhojaev could not last long. Soon he found himself charged with corruption and was also unable to fight against corruption. This led to replacement of Usmankhojaev with Rafiq Nishanov, who became First Secretary and he also belonged to Tashkent region. Nishanov tried to replace those who survived the 1984-87 purges. During the year after Nishanov came to power fifteen ministers and government bodies were liquidated in Uzbekistan and the Syr-Darya and Jizak oblasts created under Rashidov were annulled. Sixty other structural administrative sections were reorganised. About 30 officials lost their posts.46

This process of axing members led to significant changes in cadres. Those who found favour from Rashidov got axed by Nishanov. The bloody conflict that took place in Uzbekistan during Nishanov’s period in Fergana valley, between Meshkhetian Turks and Uzbeks, provided opportunity to anti-Nishanov regional groups to join hand with the aim of replacing him as First Secretary, as a result of which Nishanov lost his job and was replaced by Islam Karimov. He belongs to Samarkand region. This shows that after a brief lull Samarkand clan became active again following Karimov’s appointment. Sh. Iuldashev became Chairman of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet, who belongs to Fergana region. M. Mirkosymov from Tashkent became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. This shows that in adopting a pattern of governance, the role of informal structure of authority could not wither away. In fact, it played a crucial rule in influencing decision making process and selection of party officials. This also demonstrated

46 Damien Vaisman, op.cit, p. 118.
the fact that the Mohalla (neighbourhood) and Clan ties were as important as Socialistic principles of governance.

The importance Rashidov attached to the clan and regional grouping in order to consolidate his position can be evident from the composition of Politburo of the Communist Party in 1971. In 1971, out of six members, four were educated at Samarkand. With the fall of Nasreddinova and Kurbanov, not only the personal power configuration changed to Rashidov’s advantage, but the Tashkent/Fergana power axis was disrupted and downgraded. The centre of power shifted to Rashidov and his associates who were based in outlying and formerly peripheral territories rather than the north-eastern and eastern region centering on Fergana/Tashkent. Two of the 1971 native candidate members apart from Politburo members were from non-Tashkent and Fergana province.

In 1976, Rashidov allies and protégés dominated Uzbek ranks within the politburo and secretariat. The new leader who emerged to become a major figure in the future was A. Khozhaev. He also had some experience in administrative experience in the Samarkand region.

Apart from using regional connections to consolidate his position, Rashidov also used family connections to crush the opposition. His son married the daughter of the First Secretary of the Kara Kalpak Obkom, Kalibek Kamalov, who occupied the post for 21 years. This helped him to control Kara Kalpak Obkom. Similarly, he got his daughter married to Ibrahim Muminov’s son, who almost immediately became First Vice-President of the prestigious Institute of Nuclear
Physics of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences. Another daughter became the wife of Muminov's nephew.47

All these above drawbacks notwithstanding, Uzbekistan had made a commendable progress in socio-economic fields following the October revolution and especially after the 1924, national territorial delimitation. The Soviet policy framers, within the framework of Leninism and Marxism and combining it with socio-cultural conditions of Uzbekistan tried to develop the backward region of Uzbekistan. At the same time the policy of Democratic Centralism provided an opportunity for the masses to participate actively in the political development of Soviet Union.

In terms of literacy, employment opportunity and development of industries Uzbekistan made a great stride in comparison to pre-October revolution era. The success of democratic development in Uzbekistan could be gauged from the increasing participation of people and increase in cadres of Communist Party. Yet, like in other underdeveloped countries, the political elites of Uzbekistan failed to live up to the expectations of the people. Almost all the First Secretaries and other higher officials became part of the power game and sometimes acted for pursuing their narrower objectives. The other issues in Uzbekistan which closely resembled the politics of Third World were issue of corruption among political elites and promotion and patronage of one's own clan and region instead of development of the masses. All these issues later proved costly to Soviet Union in general and Uzbekistan in particular especially after the introduction of Glasnost by Gorbachev.